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INTRODUCTION 
Due to its adverse nature, the study of illicit behavior has taken a center stage in current 
economic research. Illicit behavior can take various forms, such as corruption, fraud, and 
tax evasion, but they are all generally detrimental to both society and economy, and hamper 
our social lives. Understanding the drivers of illicit behavior and how they interrelate with 
institutional factors not only draws a clearer picture of how and why individuals behave in 
illegitimate ways, but also how they facilitate the creation and implementation of more ef-
ficient and effective policy measures. These motivations are at the heart of this dissertation. 
The collection of scientific works in this dissertation build upon an interdisciplinary ap-
proach. By applying survey techniques, empirical investigations of observational data, as 
well as experimental methodology, the research presented here sheds light on topics re-
lated to the economics of crime and corruption. I employ the encompassing term behavioral 
ethics to stress the fact that my research gives priority to assessing the drivers and conse-
quences of individual decision-making in (un)ethical settings. I follow Bazerman and Gino 
(2012, p. 85) in defining the term behavioral ethics as “the study of systematic and predict-
able ways in which individuals make ethical decisions and judge the ethical decisions of oth-
ers when these decisions are at odds with intuition and the benefits of the broader society.” 
I expand this perspective by enriching the discussion on decision-making within the uneth-
ical sphere, and contribute to a broader understanding of (un)ethical behavior. 
A total of five papers are arranged according to their topic in three distinct chapters. The 
structure of this dissertation follows a macro-to-micro approach, which is conducive to lead-
ing a comprehensive discussion on illicit behavior. The order in which my research projects 
are discussed in this dissertation transitions from a high-level approach to a concise behav-
ioral investigation at the individual level. To set the stage, I first discuss the status-quo of 
existing theories and empirical research on the drivers of illicit behavior with a particular 
focus, but not limited to, corruption, before investigating the interrelation between illicit 
behavior and institutional environments employing empirical techniques of observational 
data analyzing the bilateral interdependence between corruption and migration. I complete 
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the picture with a narrow microanalysis on the individual drivers of illicit behavior with a 
particular focus on behavioral spillovers.  
In more detail, Chapter 1 deals with the general overview and discussion of the economics 
of corruption from an interdisciplinary perspective (Dimant & Schulte, forthcoming). Cor-
ruption, as the predominant part of organized crime, has fierce impacts on economic and 
societal development, with estimates suggesting the direct cost from corruption to exceed 
$1 trillion on a global scale (Transparency International, 2011a). As Gire (1999, p. 1) explains 
it, “corruption is one of the most dangerous social ills of any society. This is because corrup-
tion, like a deadly virus, attacks the vital structures that make for society’s progressive func-
tioning, thus putting its very existence into serious peril.” By definition, corruption repre-
sents a hidden action distending under the surface of our daily life, rendering reliable esti-
mates of its magnitude and pervasiveness nearly impossible. Nonetheless, and to the best 
of our knowledge, corruption has soaked through entire parts of society and the economy, 
both in subliminal and pervasive forms (cf. Rose-Ackerman & Soreide (2011)). It also has be-
come a more publicly discussed topic due to increased media coverage, recently driven by 
the FIFA corruption scandals and exposed cases of performance enhancing drugs in profes-
sional sports (Dimant & Deutscher (2015)). Consequently, in order to understand the bigger 
picture of corruption it is important to break the underlying mechanisms down into ante-
cedents and effects of corruption at the micro, meso, and macro level. This represents this 
chapter’s paper, arguing that only the consideration of rational and behavioral aspects, as 
well as sociological, criminological, and institutional factors and their interaction paints us 
a comprehensive picture of why, how, and to what extent, individuals engage in illicit be-
havior in general and corrupt behavior in particular. 
In Chapter 2, the empirical analyses of observational data shed light on the impact of cor-
rupt institutional environments on migration decisions as well as on the reverse link that is 
the impact of immigration on destination country’s corruption levels. In the paper by Di-
mant, Krieger & Meierrieks (2013) discussed in Chapter 2.1, we shed light on the role of cor-
ruption in triggering emigration flows from corruption-ridden countries. We examine the in-
fluence of corruption on migration for 111 countries between 1985 and 2000. Robust evi-
dence indicates that corruption is among the push factors of migration, especially fueling 
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skilled migration. We argue that corruption tends to diminish the returns to education, 
which is particularly relevant to the better educated. In a second step, in the research pro-
ject by Dimant, Krieger & Redlin (2015) discussed in Chapter 2.1, we capitalize on a compre-
hensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 coun-
tries of origin for the period 1984–2008 in order to explore different channels through which 
corruption might migrate. By employing a wide range of different estimation methods and 
econometric specifications to ensure the robustness of our results, we consistently find that 
while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country’s corruption 
level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the desti-
nation country. Our findings not only provide a more profound understanding of the socio-
economic implications associated with migration flows, but also bear important implica-
tions from a policy perspective.  
Chapter 3 closes with two experimental studies investigating the mechanism of behavioral 
contagion and the role of both social identification and exposure to peer behavior in medi-
ating behavioral spillovers, as well as tax evasion behavior within the institutional frame-
work of a crown witness regulation. In particular, in the research project by Dimant (2015) 
of Chapter 3.1, light is shed on the mechanism of behavioral spillovers in the realm of 
(un)ethical behavior. Social interactions and the resulting peer effects loom large in both 
economic and social con-texts. This is particularly true for the spillover of (un)ethical behav-
ior in explaining how behavior and norms spread across individual people, neighborhoods, 
or even cultures. Although we under-stand and observe the outcomes of such contagion 
effects, little is known about the drivers and the underlying mechanisms, especially with 
respect to the role of social identity with one’s peers and the (un)ethicality of behavior one 
is exposed to. We use a variant of a give-or-take dictator game to shed light on these aspects 
in a con-trolled laboratory setting. Our experiment contributes to the existing literature in 
two ways: first, using a novel approach of inducing social identification with one’s peers in 
the lab, our design allows us to analyze the spillover-effects of (un)ethical behavior under 
varied levels of social identification. Second, we study whether contagion of ethical behav-
ior differs from contagion of unethical behavior. Our results suggest that a) unethical behav-
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ior is more contagious, and b) social identification with one’s peers and not the (un)ethical-
ity of observed behavior is the main driver of behavioral contagion. Our findings are partic-
ularly important from a policy perspective both in order to foster pro-social and mitigate 
deviant behavior. Finally, in the research project by Mittone, Buckenmaier & Dimant (2015) 
of Chapter 3.2, we experimentally investigate indirect tax evasion that requires the cooper-
ation of an intermediary. We explore the effectiveness of the introduction of a crown witness 
regulation as a means to facilitate tax compliance. Reactions show a significant drop in tax 
compliance that, surprisingly, is vastly different across gender with the effect being mainly 
driven by women. As a result, women decrease their tax compliance significantly reaching 
an even lower level than men, who in turn do not react to the institutional change. 
Each project discussed in this dissertation provides a unique set of contributions to existing 
research. That is, Chapter 1 not only presents the first state-of-the-art discussion of corrupt 
behavior from an interdisciplinary perspective, but also indulges in a novel discussion of 
new and conflicting empirical evidence on the antecedents and effects of corruption pub-
lished during the last decade. Moreover, the papers in Chapter 2 are the first of its kind to 
empirically investigate the interrelation between corruption and migration decisions, which 
has triggered a number of follow-up research studies. Finally, the experimental studies in 
Chapter 3 employ novel settings and approaches both to study tax evasion in an environ-
ment of strategic interaction and to induce salient and varying degrees of social identifica-
tion in the lab in order to assess peer effects in (un)ethical behavior. Overall, the research 
projects presented here draw on unprecedented empirical data and innovative experi-
mental techniques to contribute from both the methodological and content perspective. 
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CHAPTER 1: SURVEY  
 
THE NATURE OF CORRUPTION:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVEꟸ
Eugen Dimant*, Thorben Schulte** 
 
ABSTRACT: 
In response to the many facets of corruption, many scholars have produced 
interdisciplinary research from both the theoretical and empirical perspective. This paper 
provides a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of existing literature on corruption, 
utilizing these interdisciplinary insights. Specifically, we shed light on corruption research 
including insights from, among others, the fields of economics, psychology, and 
criminology. Our systematic discussion of the antecedents and effects of corruption at the 
micro, meso, and macro level allows us to capture the big picture of not only what drives 
corrupt behavior, but also its substantial ramifications. 
 
KEYWORDS: Bribery; Corruption; Development; Interdisciplinary; Survey 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D73; O17; K42 
  
                                                             
ꟸ Forthcoming in: Special Issue of the German Law Journal (2016).  
* University of Pennsylvania. Corresponding author. 
** University of Paderborn. 
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1.1  Introduction 
Over the last decades, research on corruption—especially on the economic assessments 
and detrimental effects of its antecedents and detrimental effects has accelerated and 
corruption has become an established focal point on political agendas. Swelling media 
coverage, the inception of anti-corruption institutions and anti-corruption laws, and the 
availability of both micro and macro data has facilitated the visibility of corruption and its 
adverse effects. Consequently, today’s increasingly sensitized society has put pressure on 
governmental bodies to put this topic on the agenda of politicians to find means and ways 
to fight the spread of corruption. Now more than ever, scholars have a better understanding 
of corruption’s mechanism due to the availability of better data giving rise to more eclectic 
measures.  
Corruption is considered one of the biggest threats to humanity in both developing and 
developed countries because it distorts economic growth (Aidt (2011), Johnson & 
LaFountain (2011)) lowers foreign direct investment (Habib & Zurawicki (2002), Mathur & 
Singh (2007), Reiter & Steensma (2010)), and decreases productivity on a firm level due to 
inefficient allocations of contracts (Faruq, et al. (2011), Vial & Hanoteau  (2010), OECD 
(2015)). Corruption also impedes the general societal and economic environment because 
it reduces voluntary contributions to public goods (Beekman, et al., 2014), increases 
inequality (Justesen & Bjørnskov (2014), Christensen (2011)), facilitates emigration of highly 
skilled people (brain drain) (Dimant, et al., 2013), and creates inefficiencies in the sport 
sector (Dimant & Deutscher, 2015). Research also indicates that corruption rattles a 
community’s public perception, triggers an atrophy of general and political trust, provides 
an incubator for general crime, dilutes societal norms and values, and distorts both 
competition and innovation (Richey (2010), Claros (2013), Dimant (2014)).  Interestingly, 
certain forms of corruption, such as bribing a foreign official, were often viewed as legal and 
common practice in many countries until the late 1990s (Tanzi, 1998). These considerations 
not only show the economic drawbacks, but also highlight ethical implications on how 
society as a whole is affected by corruption. 
In a recent report, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
tried to measure and describe international corruption cases that have been unveiled since 
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the introduction of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999 (OECD, 2014b). Among other 
things, their findings indicate that forty-three percent of the total cases evaluated involved 
the bribing of public officials from countries ranked either high or very high in terms of 
human development status. More than half of the infringements were committed or at the 
very least known by the management level or higher. It is also found that governmental 
corporations—for example, corporations either owned or controlled by the state—were 
involved in more than one quarter of all affairs, while public officials were involved in almost 
another quarter. Shockingly, the total sum of money used for bribing amounted to almost 
eleven percent of the overall transaction volume that was connected to the analyzed 
infringements (OECD, 2014b). These figures indicate that corrupt behavior entails a moral 
component. “The common good of any society consists not only in its material possessions 
but in its shared ideals. When these ideals are betrayed, as they are betrayed when bribery 
is practiced, the common good, intangible though it be, suffers injury.” (Noonan, 1987, p. 
700) Still, it is important to stress that the moral conflict of corrupt behavior is subject to the 
underlying environment and cannot be assessed purely from the perspective of its 
economic or societal harm. What is assumed to be moral and along the lines of acceptable 
behavior in one country or culture may be disapproved of in another (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014). 
Rather, one should consider, among other things, the existing and relevant norms, and the 
institutional environment that is key to facilitating deviant behavior. Due to considerable 
heterogeneity with respect to the understanding of what corruption is, its moral 
reprehension, and its drivers, we deem it important to approach this topic from an 
interdisciplinary perspective. 
One point is worth clarifying. There is an enormous amount of existing conceptual, 
theoretical, and empirical research on the topic of corruption. In particular, empirical 
research—namely, using survey methods, field and lab experiments—has accelerated over 
the last twenty years, allowing researchers to contrast theoretical predictions with actual 
occurrence of corruption. The goal of this Article is to provide a systematic discussion of 
existing research by shedding light on the different key concepts that explain the spread and 
diversity of corruption from an interdisciplinary perspective. We deem it important to use 
this approach and to incorporate theoretical foundations and empirical studies focusing on 
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explaining corrupt behavior at the micro, meso, and macro level. This reasoning results from 
current and past research evidence indicating that a variety of factors going beyond clear-
cut rational decision-making facilitate or attenuate corrupt behavior. Rather, existing 
results promote the idea that social and institutional factors possess extensive explanatory 
power. Naturally, inherent to the interdisciplinary approach is the dichotomy of these 
concepts, more often than not leading to different assumptions, perspectives, and 
predictions—for example, rational choice versus behavioral concepts. This Article does not 
attempt to settle the dispute over which approach explains corrupt behavior best. Instead, 
it offers a comprehensive collection and discussion of existing theories and evidence 
explaining the antecedents and effects of corruption.  
In what follows, Section 1.2 provides a brief summary of the historical development of 
corruption. In Section 1.3, we first discuss the facets of corruption subdivided into an 
“internal world” —rational choice and behavioral factors, a “meso world”—sociological and 
criminological determinants, and an “external world”—economic, legal, political, historical 
and geographical factors. Applying such an interdisciplinary strategy is essential to 
construct a well-rounded explanation for corrupt behavior. We conclude in Section 1.4. 
 
1.2  History of Corruption and Corruption Research 
In the past, several institutions and regulations were introduced to strengthen the 
international fight against corruption. However, corruption is not a new phenomenon, 
having its origins in ancient history. First, documents on the existence and recognition of 
corruption date back to Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Polybius, and Aristotle 
(Wallis, 2006). Additionally,  
archives recovered from the administrative center of Middle 
Kingdom Assyria (c 1,400 B C) refer to civil servants taking bribes, 
with senior officials and a close relative of the head of state 
implicated. There are also references to bribery in the Old Testament 
scriptures […] Corruption must be exposed for what it is, a form of 
organized crime and a serious abuse of human rights. (Evans, 1999) 
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Still, for a long time, corruption was mainly a research topic in the fields of political, 
sociological, historical and criminal law research. In the 1960s and 1970s, general 
approaches to assessing the mechanism of corruption created an ambiguous picture of its 
overall effects. Due to a lack of reliable data and methodological issues, economic research 
remained largely silent (Myrdal, 2011). At that time, conflicting interests between politicians 
and researchers were preventing corruption research from advancing. For example, trying 
to receive a visa for a possibly corruption-ridden country was almost impossible at that time 
if the trip’s purpose—a corruption study—was mentioned (Nye, 1967). 
On top of that, research on corruption had suffered from disagreement on a formal 
definition and the context dependency of an act, which may fall under the definition of 
corruption in one country but not in another. One of the first oft-recited definitions was 
coined by Nye (1967, p. 419):“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties 
of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence.” One drawback of this definition is the inherent ambiguity, because “all 
illegal acts are not necessarily corrupt and all corrupt acts are not necessarily illegal.” 
(Peters & Welch, 2011, p. 155) In certain societies, particular actions may already be 
considered a form of corrupt misconduct, whereas in other societies these acts may well be 
part of their “formal duties” and “just politics.” (Peters & Welch, 2011) 
Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, sound theoretical approaches facilitated the 
scholarly efforts to study the mechanism of the economics of corruption. Especially in light 
of the economic acceleration of Asian countries at that time, research was still unsettled on 
whether corruption exhibits only adverse effects on societies and economics—sanding the 
wheels—or might create positive effects—greasing the wheels—under certain 
circumstances through the reduction of inefficient red tape (Dreher & Gassebner (2013), Vial 
& Hanoteau (2010)). Today, this argument was settled by sound research, indicating that 
corruption above all is detrimental to the society. These results are now broadly accepted. 
Through the use of more sophisticated methodological approaches and more reliable data, 
current research has settled on the fact that the general and long-term detrimental effects 
of corruption outweigh the context-specific and short-termed positive effects (Aidt (2009), 
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Méon & Sekkat (2005)). The broader availability of huge datasets was key for this 
development. For example, the PRS Group introduced the “International Country Risk 
Guide” in 1984 and Transparency International established the Corruption Perception Index 
as one of the most acknowledged measurements in 1995. In the 1990s and after the end of 
the Cold War, the first global anti-corruption movements occurred along with the 
democratization process of many developing countries. Ever since, the media has become 
increasingly involved in a critical assessment of corruption, drawing the public’s attention 
to its consequences (Lambropoulou, et al., 2005). 
In what follows, the mechanism, the antecedents, and the effects of corruption will be 
discussed from an interdisciplinary perspective on the micro, meso, and macro level. 
 
1.3  Facets and Determinants of Corruption 
The next section centers on the interdisciplinary nature of corruption research. In our 
attempt to blend different theories from various areas, we introduce a structural framework 
that allows us to discuss corruption stepwise, from what we refer to as the inner-to-outer-
world approach.  
For this reason, we start with the analysis of corrupt behavior in the internal world, which 
comprises a critical discussion of the rational choice theory and behavioral theories. 
Building on this, we then add an additional level of discussion at the meso level, where we 
shed light on both sociological and criminological factors. Ultimately, we discuss corrupt 
behavior from the perspective of the external world, which includes, among others, 
economic, legal, and political aspects. We believe that such an approach encompasses the 
breath of scientific discussion on the topic of corruption and does sufficient justice to the 
different theories and approaches that contribute to a better understanding of what shapes 
corrupt behavior. For reasons of convenience, we provide a graphical illustration to guide 
the reader through the next section’s discussion of factors that explain corrupt behavior. 
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Figure 1.1: Interdisciplinary Perspective 
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1.3.1  Internal World – Rational Choice & Behavioral Perspective 
The internal world represents a micro perspective that highlights the individual’s intrinsic 
willingness to actively engage in acts of corruption. This aspect comprises purely rational 
behavior and behavior beyond this clear-cut rationale. Here, light will be shed on aspects 
that exclusively target the individual perspective. This represents a precise methodological 
difference in comparison to the aggregate levels that will be analyzed in subsequent 
chapters. We deem it important to include these different perspectives to allow for a well-
rounded discussion of the antecedents and effects of corruption. For this purpose, we will 
start with a pure actor-based perspective and then gradually move towards an aggregate 
perspective.  
Considering rational choice, this particular approach in the context of crime has its roots in 
the seminal contribution of Gary S. Becker, analyzing the disposition to deviant behavior 
based on cost-benefit calculations (Becker, 1968).  Encompassing economic theories on 
crime causation have evolved ever since. The rational choice, whether or not to succumb to 
corrupt behavior, is based on a decision process in which individuals try to maximize their 
utility. This is done by weighing expected benefits against expected costs of deviant 
behavior, including opportunity costs and the risk of being caught or punished. One can use 
this general approach to understand a subset of criminal behavior, namely corruption, by 
shedding light on the decision making process of both the briber and the bribee. Although 
opportunity costs and risk calculation will certainly differ for each of the parties involved, 
the basic decision process is similar. (1) Opportunity costs due to time allocation: Whenever 
time is spent on criminal engagement, less time is available for legal activities. The 
opportunity costs therefore represent the amount of income, which is given up to attend to 
the alternative action. (2) Risk calculation: The consideration of the risk of being caught or 
punished. Certain actions are less likely to be observed and prosecuted and thus drive the 
individual risk assessment.  
Both factors also represent viable ways to deter corrupt behavior, for example, through 
applying more severe punishments and increasing the probability of detection. Research 
indicates that both increasing the certainty and the severity of punishment are viable 
measures to deter criminal behavior, with the former being backed up by more, consistent, 
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empirical evidence than the latter (Nagin, 2013). Feess et al. report that increasing the 
magnitude of punishment—for example, up to a death penalty like in China—might even 
bring about perverse effects (Feess, et al., 2014). It is reasonable to assume that under such 
circumstances, judges would tend to be more careful in sentencing, since the condemnation 
would be associated with high costs for both the defendant and the judge given the risk of 
a potentially wrong decision. Consequently, irrespective of the corrupt acts detected, 
percentage of actual convictions might drop, rendering increased sanction detrimental or 
useless at the best. From a criminal’s perspective, in a situation in which deviant behavior 
becomes more lucrative due to a ceteris paribus decrease in expected costs, such a leeway 
might induce even more deviant behavior. After all, facing both a drop in convictions and a 
rising estimated number of unreported cases may tempt the government to impose even 
harder sanctions, leading to a vicious circle (Steinrücken, 2004). 
Yet, more often than not, individual behavior goes beyond clear-cut rational decision-
making but is bounded in terms of to what extent decisions are thoroughly elaborated 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). As described before, the pure rational choice approach leaves 
no room for moral quarrels that may influence the calculus, although real life experience 
proves morals highly relevant. Yet, morals differ not only from society to society but also on 
an individual level and even from one situation to another—especially if factors such as 
emotions are considered. Essentially, a combination of all these aspects is needed to reach 
a well-elaborated internal view. Thus, in recent years, the behavioral approach, which 
enriches the rational perspective with the inclusion of psychological aspects and biases, has 
been incorporated into models trying to better explain deviant behavior in general and 
corrupt behavior in particular. It has been argued that even a rational decision-maker might 
end up engaging in seemingly irrational behavior that is guided by more than just a rational 
calculus, but rather is a function of the underlying environment. This stream of literature 
has extended the decision space of the so-called “homo oeconomicus” by incorporating 
factors such as reciprocity, emotions, social image and the like to draw a more realistic 
picture of human behavior (Barberis, 2011). Clearly, the growing body of approaches 
represents an addition rather than substitution of the rational choice approach. 
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Arguably, pure rational choice concerns are incapable of explaining the de facto extent of 
existing corruption. Lambsdorff argues that the rational choice theory brings about two 
seemingly conflicting outcomes, one with and one without existing corruption. On the one 
hand, one should observe corruption more frequently as it is the case since—at least in the 
absence of norms, values, and the like—criminal behavior is solely driven by rational 
calculus (Lambsdorff, 2012). On the other hand, since bribery is not a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium, its actual occurrence might already be surprising. In one-shot bribery settings, 
as is usually the case, reputation does not play any role, suggesting that the bribee has no 
incentive to reciprocate the behavior of the briber. Consequently, the briber anticipates the 
bribee’s deviant behavior—e.g. pocketing the money without providing the respective 
service—and, as a result, he should not pay any bribes in the first place. Even in repetitive 
settings, the exchange will terminate eventually, leading to what is called an endgame 
effect, suggesting that the bribee will deviate from the reciprocal arrangement at some 
point. This entails that by using backward induction, the briber will refrain from paying 
bribes in the first place as well. Accounting for these seemingly conflicting outcomes, 
current research suggests that one’s decision-making process is vastly guided by the social 
environment and one’s peer’s behavior (Evans et al. (1992), Glaeser et al. (1996)). Among 
other things, theoretical and experimental research suggests that the effect of behavioral 
contagion is mediated by the social proximity to the peers (Akerlof (1997), Dimant (2015)). A 
person’s traits and behavior are predominantly based on social interaction (LaRossa & 
Reitzes, 1993); people are not born with them, but rather learned and adapted through the 
course of social interaction. These patterns and values can vary and develop as time moves 
on and they can be considered to be under constant exogenous influence. What is more, 
existing evidence points at the importance of social norms and values, but also the impact 
of reputation in repeated game environments, in explaining corrupt behavior (Gächter & 
Falk (2002), Milinski et al. (2002)). “Reputation is a powerful force for strengthening and 
enlarging moral.” (Haidt, 2007, p. 998) 
In sum, the many factors comprising the internal world can be seen as the essential pillars 
in explaining corrupt behavior. Research indicates, however, that the decision to behave in 
a corrupt manner is not driven solely by internal factors. Instead, it is the interplay with the 
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social environment that impacts or overrides the internal world. The social nature of 
humans promotes the consideration of peer group affiliation and reputation, deeming it 
unlikely that behavior in general and unethical one in particular is purely self-driven. We 
now turn to the discussion of meso and macro factors that add to the understanding of 
corrupt decision-making and build upon the internal world.  
 
1.3.2  Meso World—Sociological & Criminological Factors 
The meso world focuses on social interaction. It is plausible to assume that, beyond the 
intrinsic willingness, different components like typical values, rules, and norms within a 
given society have a strong impact on a person’s decision on whether or not to act corruptly. 
There are many sociological factors and criminological aspects as well as theories that can 
influence the level of corrupt behavior.  
Sociological Factors 
The general culture within a given country can have a significant impact on individual 
decisions to engage in corrupt behavior. Husted examines the effect of different cultural 
aspects and describes “a cultural profile of a corrupt country as one in which there is high 
uncertainty avoidance, high masculinity, and high power distance.” (Husted, 1999, p. 354) 
Other studies come to a similar conclusion. For example, Volkema and Getz (2001) analyzed 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance, again showing a significant positive correlation 
between these cultural factors and the level of corruption. Recent studies also support these 
results. The two dimensions of national culture (power distance and individualism) 
moderate the relationship between human development and corruption (Sims, et al., 2012). 
This is also true if norms and values are carried over from different cultures through 
migration. For example, Dimant et al. find some indication for such a footprint effect. In 
continuing to conduct business as usual, the destination countries experience deterioration 
in institutional quality and an increase in corruption levels in the short run. But they also 
find that migrants eventually assimilate to the new environment in the medium run 
(Dimant, et al., 2015). 
Aside from the cultural aspects, research also points at the relevance of education in 
mediating the inclination towards corrupt behavior. Education typically intensifies in the 
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process of economic development within a given country and contributes to lower levels of 
corruption (Treisman, 2000). A study conducted in Nepal indicates that education is one of 
the primary determinants of corrupt behavior. Higher education is strongly correlated with 
the likeliness to condemn corrupt behavior and the reluctance to accept even small bribes 
(Truex, 2011). 
Research also indicates that the composition of gender in leading positions mediates the 
extent of corruption (Sung & Chu (2003), Sung (2003), Sung (2012)). For example, Dollar et 
al. (2001) find that a greater number of women involved in parliament is typically associated 
with lower levels of corruption. Similar results are common in cross-country evaluations 
(Swamy, et al., 2001). Typically, women tend to obey society rules and are less likely to take 
serious risks and therefore less often commit to corruption (Esarey & Chirillo (2013), Frank 
et al. (2011)). 
 
Criminological Factors 
From a criminological perspective, corruption is at the center of general crime and it 
facilitates the pervasiveness of the crime (Husman & Walle (2010), Shelley (2014)). The 
criminological view on deviant behavior is interdisciplinary in itself. In particular, there is a 
strong interdependence between the sociological factors and criminology, because aspects 
like culture and education have an effect on general crime rates and therefore on the level 
of corruption. The incorporation of rational decision-making also represents an evident link 
to the internal world (Glueck & Glueck, 2014). 
Sutherland and Cressey (2014) brought forward the differential association theory, 
concluding that criminal behavior is commonly learned and adopted in interaction with 
other people. Aspects such as social class, race and unstable homes are not only factors 
favoring the commitment to criminal activity but they also increase the probability that 
people will socialize with persons of similar character. This theory is widely supported by 
empirical research that focuses on social learning for both criminal and conforming 
behavior (Akers (2014), Cohen (2014)). At the same time, social learning is not only restricted 
to small neighborhoods or certain areas, but also does entail an aggregate perspective on 
the societal level. The strain theory, first established by Merton in 1938 in a time when the 
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most widely accepted hypothesis was that criminal behavior can be primarily attributed to 
biological disposition, highlights the relevance of social structures and social pressure in the 
occurrence of criminal behavior (Merton, 1938). Whenever individuals feel they are being 
treated unfairly by the society—e.g. restricted access to good schooling—, they encounter a 
stressful situation, which in turn taxes one’s self-control (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1990). This 
theory suggests that under these circumstances, people may tend to reverse the goals set 
by society and create their own goals conflicting with existing norms and values. They are 
likely to believe that the means justify the ends, which is conducive to their decision to 
engage in criminal activities (Cohen (2014), Messner & Rosenfeld (2014)). The basic strain 
theory, however, has been altered over time, eventually leading to a more generalized 
theory.  
Individuals even in a stable personal environment—e.g. well paid and secure job—are 
potentially willing to put everything at risk and choose to engage in criminal behavior. Such 
behavior might stem from a biased self-perception. Although well-educated white-collar 
individuals should be able to fully take stock of the consequences of their corrupt behavior, 
Benson argues that such offenders often do not view themselves as criminals but rather as 
good employees, justifying their acts solely on the basis of trying to enforce the company’s 
success (Benson, 2014). This theory seems to hold especially for employees in higher 
positions with ample responsibilities when they see the chance to, for example, secure other 
people’s jobs by acting corruptly (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2009). Such a biased self-
perception might be the result of both hypocrisy and a different understanding of what is 
right and wrong. As research indicates, such an understanding of, for example, what is 
considered a bribe or a gift is context dependent, which varies substantially across countries 
(Millington, et al. (2005), Steidlmeier (1999)). However, aside from varying perceptions in 
different countries, the rationalization process is present in every society and it is a key 
determinant for white-collar crime and corruption in particular. The ability to rationalize 
unethical behavior pushes out feelings of guilt and shame, rendering corrupt behavior 
justifiable if there are enough good reasons (Søreide, 2014). In line with the social learning 
theory introduced earlier, such work environments can be deemed highly negative. If the 
supervisors act corruptly without any feelings of guilt, this behavior may affect the other 
 25
employees’ decision-making process. Consequently, further analysis is essential with 
respect to the extremely high damages involved in white-collar crimes. Prosecution and 
quantification of such crimes turn out to be extremely tough (Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015), 
and even though numerous cases with extensive damage are known, the actual 
ramifications remain devious. Furthermore, higher levels of corruption combined with weak 
institutional structures, soak through society and eventually lead to rising general crime 
rates, creating a hostile environment and breeding ground for even more corruption (Claros, 
2013). 
This article now turns to the external world by shedding light at factors at the macro level 
that influence the extent of corruption.  
 
1.3.3 EXTERNAL World—Economic, Legal, Political, Historical and Geo-
graphical Factors 
The external world includes all other elements representing extrinsic opportunities that 
directly or indirectly have an influence on corruption. Among others, these are economic, 
legal, political, historical and geographical factors. 
 
Economic Factors 
Existing research points at a broad range of economic factors relevant to the extent of 
corruption. For example, the overall quality of the government in a given country is a well-
studied determinant. “Poor governance may affect economic performance through their 
impact on tax revenue, public spending, and fiscal deficit.” (Tanzi, 1999, p. 10) Inefficient 
bureaucracy fuels corruption because it provides a fertile ground for “speed money.” Such 
a mechanism is designed to circumvent impeding regulatory bodies, which represent the 
major ingredient of the greasing the wheels hypothesis described in Section 1.2. In the 
context of firm entry in highly regulated countries, Dreher and Gassebner (2013) analyzed 
more than forty countries for several years, concluding that the greasing the wheels 
hypothesis holds even today. The more inefficient regulations are, the longer the delays for 
companies being able to start their business. In consequence, such inefficiency, coupled 
with the risk of losing money and business, trigger their decision to make use of speed 
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money (Tanzi, 1998). Whenever the extent and bureaucracy and each public official’s 
decision power are high, people may use their power for personal gain at the cost of general 
welfare. (Tanzi, 1998) 
Research also indicates the relevance of economic and political freedom. Whenever a 
country inhabits characteristics such as high protectionism and other significant barriers to 
trade, corruption appears to breed (Ades & Di Tella, 1999), whereas countries with a 
prolonged history of openness to trade are typically characterized by lower levels of 
corruption (Treisman, 2007). Cross-country comparisons indicate that the extent of 
economic and political freedom is negatively correlated with corruption levels (Ali & Isse, 
2003). 
Along these lines, a country’s economic growth as measured by the increase in the gross 
domestic product per capita (GDP) has been found to have a traceable impact on a country’s 
corruption level (Ades & Di Tella (1999), Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman (2005),  Treisman 
(2007)). For example, Bai et al. (2014) analyzed annual firm data from Vietnam and found 
that corruption will subside automatically after several years of extensive economic growth. 
Generally speaking, “corruption vanishes as countries get rich, and there is a transition from 
poverty to honesty .” (Gundlach & Paldam, 2008, p. 6)1 
 
Legal and Political Factors 
Institutions play an important role in both ensuring a sound legal environment and 
facilitating the companies’ business. They set “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” (North, 1990, 
p. 3) Whenever an imbalance of power exists, parties are likely to abuse the system and 
engage in deviant behavior that is detrimental to the society. Typically, weak institutions 
are responsible for inefficient regulations and the loss of trust on the side of the citizens. 
Well-functioning institutions therefore represent important factors in the fight against 
corruption (Dreher, et al., 2007). 
                                                             
1 For a more detailed discussion of economic factors, see Dimant (2014). 
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Political institutions are indispensable in the fight against corruption because they set the 
rules and regulations that depict the economic environment. The set of rules imposed by 
political institutions influence key conditions such as trade openness, competition and 
economic development. Here, transparency and accountability are key in moderating the 
public officials’ inclination to engage in fraudulent behavior, which is likely to be the case 
under freedom of speech and democratic elections. For example, Lederman et al. find that 
“corruption tends to decrease systematically with democracy, parliamentary systems, 
democratic stability, and freedom of press.” (Lederman, et al., 2005, p. 27) 
Research also points to the relevance of institutional decentralization. Autonomy of states 
and the ability to enforce this power seems to go hand in hand with breeding corruption 
(Lederman, et al., 2005). In a cross-national study, Gerring and Thacker (2004) find that a 
centralized government system can have a significant decreasing effect on corruption. 
Contrary to these findings, Fisman and Gatti (2002) find a positive relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and corruption using indices on a cross-country level.     
   
Historical & Geographical Factors 
Existing research suggests that historical and geographical factors are highly predictive of a 
country’s corruption level (Svensson, 2005). One distinct determinant is a country’s history 
of colonization. For example, Acemoglu et al. found that, throughout the past five hundred 
years, colonization had sizable effects on the spread of corruption.  
Civilizations in Meso-America, the Andes, India, and Southeast 
Asia were richer than those located in North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, or the southern cone of Latin America. 
The intervention of Europe reversed this pattern. This is a first-
order fact, both for understanding economic and political 
development over the past 500 years, and for evaluating 
various theories of long-run development (Acemoglu, et al., 
2002). 
Treisman (2000) finds support for this argument and argues that the effect of colonization is 
mediated by the influence of religion.  
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The geographical disposition appears to have a traceable effect on corruption levels as well. 
Research suggests that resource endowments, agricultural aspects, and production factors 
play an important role in overall economic development and, thus, indirectly affect the level 
of corruption (Bloch & Tang, 2004). Extensive resource abundance, however, might also 
cause perverse outcomes. Bloch and Tang (2004) point at numerous examples where 
resource abundance had detrimental effects on the economy, leading to declining per 
capita incomes in countries like Venezuela. The exploitation of large resource endowments 
may often lead to strong income imbalances, political corruption, and property right 
infringements. These factors tend to contribute to criminal activity due to more profitable 
rent-seeking behavior. In addition, Goel and Nelson (2010, p. 444) find support for the 
hypothesis that “countries with more geographically concentrated populations (Urban) are 
likely to have lower corruption.” The authors show that in densely populated areas 
corruption is strongly deterred by easier detection and stronger stigmatization.  
 
1.3.4  Interdisciplinary Perspective and Empirical Findings 
Combining the factors and different views that have been elaborated throughout this paper, 
a deeper understanding and intuitive understanding for the figure presented at the 
beginning of Section 1.3 should now be established.  
In this section, and throughout this Article, we shall not attempt to weigh one approach 
against the other. Rather, we try to provide a comprehensive view on the factors that are 
relevant to corrupt decision-making. Existing research indicates that corrupt behavior can 
be explained by an array of existing theories, stressing the importance of an interdisciplinary 
approach. Although we provide a rough framework, explaining the underlying mechanism 
of how all the interdisciplinary concepts are interrelated and build upon each other is 
beyond the goal of this Article. Instead, we stress the individual, and how individuals are 
subjected to the interplay of the different worlds. In any given context, an individual’s 
decision to engage in corrupt behavior is subject to interior rationalization—internal world, 
as well as the underlying social—meso world, and institutional context—external world. 
With this, we conceptually unify the approaches and theory that focus on both the individual 
actor and the aggregate perspective. 
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In particular, in the internal world, decisions based on pure rational choice mechanisms, as 
well as the inclusion of behavioral factors, determine the individual’s basic inclination to 
engage in corrupt behavior. At this point, we have shown that using insights from rational 
choice theory alone cannot sufficiently explain the actual occurrence of corruption. 
Although the choice whether or not to act corruptly always begins in the internal world, the 
other layers cannot be excluded from the decision-making process. Thus, it is key to 
combine this actor-based view with influences from the outside that are almost entirely 
empirically assessed on an aggregate level. The meso world covers the sociological and 
criminological factors that add another layer to the decision-making process. Factors like 
culture, ethical standards, and education are important determinants for deviant conduct. 
The external world includes economic, legal, political, historical, and geographical 
determinants, representing factors that individuals are subjected to, but have little power 
to influence on their own. It is worth noting that these three different layers are not distinct 
but rather interdependent, thus creating retroactive effects.  
At an individual level, the rational-self reaches the decision to behave corruptly by simply 
weighing the expected costs against the expected benefits. In addition, the psychological 
assessment supports this decision because one observes peer behavior of the same kind, 
thus triggering behavioral conformity. The decision to engage in deviant behavior, however, 
might go against the norms, values, and moral virtues one was raised with, which could 
trigger the consideration of long-term consequences such behavior might have in terms of 
social welfare. Therefore, although corrupt behavior seems to be perfectly rational and 
justifiable from a pure self-maximization perspective, a more deliberate assessment of the 
consequences might lead to a different outcome. This argument is in line with previously 
discussed literature raising the point that the actual occurrence of corruption is in line with 
what one would expect based on the predictions derived by rational choice theory. 
 
1.4  Conclusion 
Research on the antecedents and effects of corruption has undergone a profound 
development over the last decades. Studies using theoretical, empirical, and experimental 
approaches have broadened our understanding of corruption, helping to develop 
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meaningful countermeasures. In this paper, we shed light on the interdisciplinary 
discussion of corruption at the micro, meso, and macro level, providing ample evidence that 
corrupt behavior is not only the result of an internal cost-benefit analysis, but is rather a 
function of the underlying social and economic environment. For this reason, a 
multidisciplinary approach is required to understand the complex nature of corruption.  
Research indicates that corrupt behavior is driven by a multitude of different mechanisms 
that have their origin at both the individual and the collective level. Moreover, while the 
decision to engage in corrupt behavior is the result of a deliberative decision—as opposed 
to an impulsive one when it comes to general acts of crime—there are many conflicting 
mechanisms at play. Throughout this paper, we have claimed that pure rational choice 
theories do not sufficiently explain the occurrence, or the lack, of corruption. Using game-
theoretic predictions, one would expect corruption to not exist at all or to be observed 
everywhere. Instead, we observe both corrupt and honest people, and empirical research 
also points to substantial heterogeneity across, and even within, countries. The inception 
of more reliable measures of corruption has stimulated a broad variety of research trying to 
explain the mechanisms of corruption going beyond clear-cut rational decision-making. 
Rather, in reaching a decision, research has emphasized the importance of bounded 
rationality; the inherent values and norms one person has been raised with, as well as the 
institutional and political environment.  
In this paper, we focused on discussion of state-of-the-art literature on corruption as well as 
bridging the gap between different theories and approaches to the understanding of what 
really drives corrupt behavior beyond rational decision-making. One aspect that we 
highlighted throughout the different sections of our interdisciplinary approach is the 
relevance and influence of moral and ethical considerations on corrupt behavior. As 
mentioned in the limitations of the internal world, rational choice approaches neglect this 
aspect entirely and insufficiently explain the non-occurrence of corruption. Adding the 
consideration of ethical aspects allows us to draw a more balanced picture of the drivers of 
corruption.  
Throughout this paper, we have argued that more than through simple cost-benefit 
heuristics, individuals are driven by moral and ethical concerns, which are shaped by, and 
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are independent from, the economic, legal, and political environment in which they live. 
The consideration of moral aspects is essential to understanding the spread of corruption 
at each level: micro, meso, and macro. Being more sensitized to ethical considerations, and 
the impact of one’s own behavior on others, is likely to increase both self-awareness and 
control, and moderate the likelihood to engage in inopportune behavior in the first place. 
Arguably, ethicality is what makes humans distinct from animals and the lack thereof is 
likely to facilitate a vicious cycle of systemic misdemeanor. 
A problem for centuries, one has to be an inveterate optimist to believe that corruption can 
be entirely annihilated without undermining the fact that this would not be desirable from 
a welfare perspective, considering the concomitant costs. At best, research on this topic and 
the implementation of an effective regulatory policy, suitable codes of conduct, political 
and bureaucratic transparency, and effective anti-corruption measures can help to mitigate 
the dissemination of corruption.  
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2.1  THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON MIGRATION, 1985-2000ꟸ
Eugen Dimant*, Tim Krieger**, Daniel Meierrieks *** 
 
ABSTRACT: 
We examine the influence of corruption on migration for 111 countries between 1985 and 
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education, which is particularly relevant to the better educated. 
 
KEYWORDS: Corruption; migration; skilled migration; push factors of migration 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D73; F22; O15 
  
                                                             
ꟸ Published in: Applied Economics Letters (2013), 20(13), pp. 1270-1274.  
* University of Paderborn. Corresponding author. 
** University of Freiburg and CESifo. 
*** University of Freiburg. 
 33
2.1.1  Introduction 
Previous empirical research suggests that, besides socio-economic and demographic fac-
tors (e.g., underdevelopment and demographic pressures), politico-institutional conditions 
(e.g., political instability) are among the push factors of international migration (cf., e.g., 
Hatton and Williamson (2003); Mayda (2010); Dreher et al. (2011); Docquier and Rapoport 
(2012)). We argue that a related important push factor, which has so far been mostly ne-
glected in both theoretical and empirical research, is corruption. 
Corruption is associated with a number of unfavorable outcomes. For one, corruption tends 
to negatively affect a country’s (short-run) level of economic activity.1 Economies plagued 
by high levels of corruption grow more slowly, e.g., as corruption contributes to an ineffi-
cient allocation of resources (Jain (2001); Campos et al. (2010)). For another, corruption may 
also worsen a country’s (structural) socio-economic situation. For instance, Gupta et al. 
(2002) find that high levels of corruption promote income inequality and the spread of pov-
erty. Furthermore, corruption may also lead to suboptimal patterns of social mobility when 
it matters more strongly to upward mobility than actual merits.  
In sum, the prevalence of corruption is likely to worsen individual working and living condi-
tions for the majority of citizens. It may therefore also matter to the calculus of a potential 
migrant. Individual education is a particularly important factor influencing migration deci-
sions. Here, corruption tends to lower the returns to education, e.g., by contributing to slow 
economic growth and unemployment, widespread inequality and the lack of social ad-
vancement. Given the irreversibility of human capital investment, corruption may make it 
more attractive to migrate to recoup one’s individual education investment. Here, we ex-
pect the highly skilled to be particularly responsive to the prevalence of corruption, given 
their high level of human capital investment and subsequent need for particularly high (i.e., 
cost-effective) skill premiums.2 Based on these lines of reasoning, we hypothesize that cor-
ruption is among the push factors of migration and particularly relevant to skilled migration. 
                                                             
1 Note, however, that this assessment does not rule out that corruption may actually yield positive economic effects under 
specific circumstances (Dreher and Gassebner, 2013). 
2 In addition to that, the increase of income inequality and poverty caused by corruption (Gupta, et al., 2002) may foster 
the political demand for redistribution. As the better skilled are typically the typical net payers of (progressive) income 
taxes, this may further fuel skilled emigration. 
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2.1.2  Data and Methodology 
To empirically examine this hypothesis, we compile data on (skilled and average) migration, 
corruption and further controls for 111 countries between 1985 and 2000. The summary sta-
tistics and the operationalization of the controls are reported in Table 1.3 Data on our de-
pendent variables, the migration rates, are drawn from Defoort (2008) who provides esti-
mates of the rates of skilled and average migration to six main receiving countries (Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.). Here, the skilled migration rate refers to 
the ratio of the number of skilled emigrants (who exhibit a post-secondary certificate) to the 
total number of skilled natives aged 25 or older, while the average migration rate is defined 
as the ratio of the total number of emigrants to the total number of natives aged 25 or older  
(Defoort, 2008). 
                                                             
3 The migration data is available only for three points in time (1990, 1995 and 2000). Therefore, we use five-year averages 
of the explanatory variables (for the 1986-1990, 1991-1995 and 1996-2000 periods) to estimate their influence on migration. 
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Table 2.2.1: Summary Statistics and Data Operationalization and Sources 
Variable Observa-
tions 
Mean SD Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Operationalization Source 
Skilled Migration 333 0.143 0.179 0.001 0.910  
Average Migration 333 0.035 0.061 0.001 0.419  
Corruption 333 2.669 1.294 0 5.983   
Per Capita Income 333 8.625 1.179 5.576 10.908 Real, PPP-adjusted per capita income, logged (a) 
Population Size 333 9.380 1.487 6.028 14.038 Population size in thousands, logged (a) 
Regime Type 333 2.169 7.072 -10 10 Revised Combined Polity Score, ranging from -10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy (b) 
Political Instability 333 0.300 0.758 0 3.766 Number of battle deaths in civil wars (defined as a conflict with at least 25 battle deaths 
per year), logged+1 
(c) 
Youth Burden 333 0.260 0.030 0.174 0.333 Number of people between the ages of 15 and 29 as share of total population (d) 
Quality of Bureau-
cracy 
333 1.890 1.200 0 4 Index of institutional strength and quality of a country’s bureaucracy (e) 
Trade Openness  333 4.026 0.644 0.486 5.811 Sum of exports and imports as a share of real GDP, logged (a) 
Former Colony 333 0.495 0.501 0 1 Time-invariant dummy variable (1=country has colonial links to one of the six major re-
ceiving countries) 
(f) 
Distance 333 7.943 1.066 4.456 9.093 Time invariant variable that measures the distance between country’s capital and the 
nearest capital of one of the six major receiving countries, logged 
(f) 
Notes: Source refers to (a) PENN World Tables (https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/), (b) Polity4 Dataset (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), (c) 
PRIO Battle Deaths Data (http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/), (d) United Nations Population Division 
(http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm), (e) ICRG (2009), (f) CEPII GeoDist Dataset (http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presenta-
tion.asp?id=6). 
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Corruption data are drawn from the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 2008).4
Surveying experts, the ICRG issues a corruption index that we use as our main explanatory 
variable. Here, corruption refers to financial corruption associated with conducting busi-
ness (e.g., bribes) as well as other forms of political corruption such as excessive patronage, 
nepotism and close ties between politics and business. Note that we rescaled the ICRG cor-
ruption index, so that higher values correspond to higher corruption levels. 
To avoid detecting only spurious effects of corruption on migration, we also consider a num-
ber of confounding controls that may simultaneously affect corruption and migration. For 
instance, we control for the effect of economic development, as richer countries are both 
less susceptible to corruption and less likely to have high migration rates. Following the em-
pirical literature on the determinants of corruption (Serra, 2006) and migration (Docquier & 
Rapoport, 2012), in our baseline specification we control for the effect of per capita income, 
population size, regime type and political instability. As robustness checks, we amend this 
model with additional controls for demographic pressure (youth burden), institutional qual-
ity (the quality of a country’s bureaucracy), trade openness and certain country-specific 
traits that may affect migration costs (colonial ties and distance between sending and desti-
nation countries).5
Initial tests indicate the presence of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
dependence, as it is common for panel data with country-year observations. We therefore 
run a series of pooled OLS and fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
that are robust to these data characteristics (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998).6
                                                             
4 We use the ICRG data because it is available since 1984, making a panel estimation approach to the corruption-migration 
nexus possible. Other corruption measures are available only for shorter time periods. Jain (Jain, 2001, p. 77) notes that 
the various corruption measures are usually highly correlated. 
5 Our findings are also robust to the inclusion of further controls for religious fractionalization, oil production, government 
size, further geographic and historic country characteristics (landlocked location, common language) and education 
(years of schooling). 
6 We also experimented with instrumental variable (IV) estimations, as reverse causation may be an issue. However, pooled 
and fixed-effects IV-estimations (where corruption is instrumented by the quality of judicial institutions and the degree of 
democratic participation) do not indicate that corruption is endogenous to migration. Also, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests 
suggests that any endogeneity among the regressors does not bias our estimates. 
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2.1.3  Empirical results 
The pooled OLS estimates are reported in Table 2. We find that corruption has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on both skilled and average migration. However, the marginal 
effect of corruption on skilled migration tends to be approximately three to four times 
higher than its effect on average migration. This finding provides first support for our hy-
pothesis that corruption as among the push factors of migration and especially matters to 
the migration decisions of the highly skilled. 
The fixed-effects estimates—which truly consider the panel structure of our dataset—are re-
ported in Table 3.7
 We find that corruption only has a positive, statistically significant and specification-robust 
effect on skilled migration, but has no significant impact on average migration. This result 
further strengthens our previous finding that the decision of the highly skilled to emigrate 
is strongly affected by the disincentive of corruption at home.  
 
                                                             
7 Note that all constant influencing factors (colonial ties, distance etc.) are now subsumed under the fixed effects. 
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Table 2.2.2: Corruption and Migration (Pooled OLS Estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Skilled Migration (1)-(5) Average Migration (6)-(10) 
Corruption 0.025 0.022 0.036 0.024 0.035 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.012 
 (0.006)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Per Capita  -0.046 -0.043 -0.057 -0.048 -0.045 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Income (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Size -0.044 -0.044 -0.047 -0.040 -0.041 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)*** 
Regime Type 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Political  0.002 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
Instability (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Youth Burden  0.389     0.403    
  (0.361)     (0.041)**    
Quality of    -0.027     -0.002   
Bureaucracy   (0.010)     (0.005)   
Trade     0.020     0.009  
Openness    (0.001)***     (0.001)***  
Former Colony     0.068     0.019 
     (0.001)***     (0.001)*** 
Distance     -0.026     -0.010 
     (0.003)**     (0.002)** 
R2 0.252 0.254 0.262 0.255 0.294 0.200 0.225 0.200 0.206 0.237 
N*T 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 
Notes: Constant not reported. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 2.2.3: Corruption and Migration (Fixed-Effects Model Estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Skilled Migration (1)-(4) Average Migration (5)-(8) 
Corruption 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Per Capita  -0.048 -0.043 -0.045 -0.051 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
Income (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Population Size 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Regime Type 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Political  0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Instability (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001)* 
Youth Burden  0.190    -0.087   
  (0.028)**    (0.018)**   
Quality of    0.003    -0.001  
Bureaucracy   (0.001)    (0.005)  
Trade     0.006    0.003 
Openness    (0.006)    (0.001)** 
Within-R2 0.174 0.182 0.176 0.176 0.145 0.145 0.132 0.130 
N*T 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 
Notes: Constant not reported. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Finally, note that the results for the control variables are largely in line with previous re-
search. For instance, both the pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates suggest that skilled 
migration is less common in richer countries, as previously reported in Docquier and 
Rapoport (2012). As another example, the positive effect of political instability on skilled mi-
gration in the fixed-effects regressions is in line with Dreher et al. (2011). 
 
2.1.4  Conclusion 
We examine the impact of corruption on migration for a panel of 111 countries between 
1985 and 2000. Our empirical results indicate that corruption especially drives skilled mi-
gration, while its effect on average migration is less pronounced and not statistically robust. 
Our main finding is consistent with the hypothesis that corruption lowers the returns to ed-
ucation and consequently matters most to the calculus of (prospective) highly skilled mi-
grants. Corruption control may therefore be an important policy tool to rein the brain drain, 
particularly when this brain drain is associated with predominantly poor development out-
comes. 
 
  
 41 
Appendix 
Albania Dom. Republic Italy Papua N. 
Guinea 
Tunisia 
Algeria Ecuador Jamaica Paraguay Turkey 
Angola Egypt Japan Peru Uganda 
Argentina El Salvador Jordan Philippines U. Arab Emirates 
Australia Ethiopia Kenya Poland United Kingdom 
Austria Finland Kuwait Portugal United States 
Bahrain France Liberia Qatar Uruguay 
Bangladesh Gabon Libya Romania Venezuela 
Belgium Gambia Madagascar Saudi Arabia Vietnam 
Bolivia Germany Malawi Senegal Zambia 
Botswana Ghana Malaysia Sierra Leone Zimbabwe 
Brazil Greece Mali Singapore  
Bulgaria Guatemala Mexico Somalia  
Burkina Faso Guinea Mongolia South Africa  
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Morocco South Korea  
Canada Guyana Mozambique Spain  
Chile Haiti Netherlands Sri Lanka  
China Honduras New Zealand Sudan  
Colombia Hungary Nicaragua Sweden  
Congo (Repub-
lic) 
India Niger Switzerland  
Costa Rica Indonesia Nigeria Syria  
Cote d’Ivoire Iran Norway Tanzania  
Cuba Iraq Oman Thailand  
Cyprus Ireland Pakistan Togo  
Denmark Israel Panama Trinidad  
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2.2  A CROOK IS A CROOK … BUT IS HE STILL A CROOK ABROAD? 
ON THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON DESTINATION-COUNTRY 
CORRUPTIONꟸ 
Eugen Dimant*, Tim Krieger**, Margarete Redlin*** 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination-country corruption levels. 
Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD 
countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984–2008, we explore different 
channels through which corruption might migrate. We employ different estimation 
methods using fixed effects and Tobit regressions in order to validate our findings. 
Moreover, we also address the issue of endogeneity by using the Difference-Generalized 
Method of Moments estimator. Independent of the econometric methodology, we 
consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination 
country’s corruption level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts 
corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding 
of the socioeconomic implications associated with migration flows. 
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2.2.1  Introduction 
Among the countries with the highest level of corruption (according to the International 
Country Risk Guide), several countries exhibit substantial numbers of emigrants. One may 
speculate that persistent corruption in a country makes corrupt behavior a general attitude 
among citizens, and emigrants from a corruption-ridden country may carry some of this at-
titude to their destination countries. That is, once substantial inflows of migrants from more 
corrupt countries into less corrupt countries are observed, will we see – sooner or later –
increasing levels of corruption in the destination countries as well? Or, rather, will we see no 
significant (or even an opposite) effect on destination countries’ levels of corruption be-
cause it is mostly honest citizens that flee their corrupted home countries? Given these con-
trasting views, the ultimate impact of migration flows on the destination country’s corrup-
tion is not immediately obvious. It will thus be the present paper’s aim to investigate the 
underlying effects in detail, and segregate them in distinct channels through which corrup-
tion may migrate and thus possibly exert adverse effects on the targeted society in the short 
and medium term. To date, this specific topic has yet not been examined in the existing lit-
erature, but in related literature, addressed in this paper.  
Anecdotal evidence from several branches of organized crime exemplifies the problem un-
der consideration. In the late nineteenth century, thousands of members of the Cosa Nostra 
migrated from Sicily to the United States, where they started their criminal activities. While 
in the beginning they resorted to petty crime, institutional shifts in US public policies al-
lowed them to establish a powerful Mafia organization exerting various forms of criminal 
activities including all levels of corrupt behavior (from petty corruption to grand corruption) 
(Varese, 2011).  
In 1980, the Mariel boatlift became infamous for Fidel Castro forcing boat owners who were 
allowed to bring relatives from Cuba to the United States to also carry back prisoners of 
Cuban jails. Consequently, many of the 125,000 refugees that landed in Florida had a crimi-
nal record (Larzelere, 1988), arguably affecting criminal and corrupt behavior in Florida. At 
the same time, the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s made thousands of members of the 
Miri-Clan flee the country and head toward Europe. They settled mainly in larger German 
towns, where they soon became involved in criminal activities, allegedly including drug and 
arms trafficking, kidnapping and prostitution (Albrecht, 1997). Similarly, mainly driven by 
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contrasting attitudes and behavior patterns, Chinese immigration to Thailand and Indone-
sia triggered criminal activities over the last decades. In particular, the combination of se-
vere government regulation and ethnic discrimination compelled overseas Chinese to turn 
to both ad hoc bribery and more sophisticated economic relations with government offi-
cials, precipitating a discernible acceleration of criminal behavior in the post-World War II 
era (Sowell, 1997). 
In fact, the fear that domestic criminal activities and corruption might skyrocket due to gen-
erous immigration policies recently entered the international arena, when the G20 agreed 
to immigration control measures proposed by the Anti-Corruption Working Group targeting 
specifically corrupt immigrants and the proceeds of crime imported into the G20 countries. 
These measures even include the deportation of wealthy foreign nationals (De Palma, et al., 
2013).  
The previous examples point at two different issues which require closer inspection. First, 
the channels through which corruption might migrate, and second, the impact that (selec-
tive) migration has on the development of corruption in the destination country. Our pa-
per’s aim is to shed light on both these issues. However, there is a third issue, namely en-
dogeneity, which needs to be considered. Our previous reasoning implicitly assumes that 
destination countries’ levels of corruption change as a consequence of inflows of migrants. 
While this appears plausible given the presented evidence, we cannot entirely exclude the 
possibility that migration flows are shaped by the levels of corruption in the destination 
country. For instance, corrupt (honest) migrants might have a preference for living in a cor-
rupt (non-corrupt) environment both at home and abroad. If this kind of reverse causality 
(or other endogeneity problems) apply, statistical inference would be misleading. Hence, 
we include appropriate empirical strategies in particular, a Difference-General Method of 
Moments (Difference-GMM) approach to exclude this possibility. 
Our paper will proceed as follows: Section 2.2.2 will elaborate on the theoretical assump-
tions underlying the migration process and derive hypotheses on the migration–corruption 
nexus. Our empirical method will be explained in Section 2.2.3, while our data will be pre-
sented in Section 2.2.4. Our hypotheses will be empirically tested and discussed in Section 
2.2.5. We conclude in Section 2.2.6. 
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2.2.2 Theoretical Considerations  
There are many reasons why individuals may want to leave their home countries and move 
abroad. In his seminal paper, Sjaastad (1962) condenses the individual migration decision 
to a meaningful cost–benefit calculus. Both, economic and non-economic costs1 and bene-
fits2 need to be taken into account. More specifically, we may apply the following categori-
zation which distinguishes between push and pull factors affecting migration decisions.3 On 
the one hand, better career and income prospects are typical pull factors which attract mi-
grants to come to a certain destination country. On the other hand, unfavorable conditions 
at home, such as poverty or unemployment, constitute push factors which make people 
want to leave. However, these examples are purely economic ones. A number of recent pub-
lications have shown that politico-institutional factors (and sometimes environmental fac-
tors, cf., e.g., Gröschl (2005)) also affect potential migrants’ cost–benefit matrices. Of partic-
ular relevance for our approach are papers which relate a weak institutional framework to 
migration flows. For instance, civil war tends to foster emigration (cf., e.g., Collier and Hoef-
fler (2004)) and migrants might harbor more conflictive attitudes than locals after war (Hall 
(2014, p. 2)).  
Similarly, Dreher et al. (2011) show that people tend to leave terror-ridden countries. Cooray 
and Schneider (2014) and Dimant et al. (2013) explicitly consider the effect of corruption on 
migration, showing that a high level of corruption drives people out of the country. Interest-
ingly, these authors also argue that skilled people are particularly prone to emigrate be-
cause terror and corruption make it difficult to recoup the often substantial investments 
into one’s own education, and to earn an adequate return on this investment. We will return 
to this argument shortly.  
Let us first turn to the important question why we would (or would not) expect migration to 
affect the level of corruption in the destination country. At first glance, there appear to be 
several arguments why there ought to be no such effect. Migrants tend to assimilate (at 
least) in economic terms – although at different speeds – in the target country (cf. Chiswick 
                                                             
1 These costs include, for example, the actual moving costs as well as (psychological) costs related to giving up social rela-
tions or a devaluation of location-specific human capital. 
2 Here, we refer to, inter alia, higher incomes as well as gaining personal freedoms. 
3 Cf. Zimmermann (1996) for a detailed description of the push–pull model of migration, including a discussion of a variety 
of these factors. 
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(1978)). One may also reasonably speculate that this is true in even more general terms, for 
example, assimilation might occur on a wide range of individual behaviors.4 Hence, even if 
immigrants stem from a highly corrupted country, once they enter the less corrupted desti-
nation country they might very well start to follow the rules, and align themselves to the 
existing norms of the destination country. This leads us to our first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis H1: The general effect of immigration on the host country’s level of corruption 
is insignificant. 
 
Contrary to this view, the effect of selective migration could be traceable, thus allowing the 
destination countries’ corruption levels to change with immigration, thereby allowing for 
effects in either direction. To begin, emigrants from a highly corrupted country may repre-
sent a positive selection. Selection effects have played a prominent role in the migration 
literature since Borjas’ (1987) seminal paper. Self-selection into specific countries occurs 
because migrants with certain characteristics expect these traits to generate utility gains 
abroad.5 In this context, Krieger et al. (2014) show that cultural closeness matters to the self-
selection of migrants, suggesting that a wide range of factors, including cultural, political 
and institutional ones, are indicative of explaining migration flows. With respect to our 
model, Dimant et al. (2013) raise the important point that the reason for brain drain from a 
corrupted country might be that skilled workers could be outsiders to the labor market due 
to inherent systemic frictions. Although highly productive, these workers do not find em-
ployment because of corruption and nepotism. Jobs are given to insiders irrespective of 
their qualification, for example, to those who are either close to the employer, or who have 
sufficient funds to bribe them. Here, frustrations with existing institutions are important 
drivers to migrant self-selection.  
What is more, when (skilled) outsiders leave a country there ought to be a high probability 
that they are (far) less corruptible than the average citizens of this country when nepotism 
                                                             
4 Cf. Zimmermann (1996) for a detailed description of the push–pull model of migration, including a discussion of a variety 
of these factors. 
5 For instance, people with high individual ability may prefer to enter countries with a less equal income distribution than 
at home because they expect to end up with a high probability at the upper end of the more dispersed income scale due 
to their superior skills. 
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(from which they do not benefit) prevails. In fact, they might even be less corruptible than 
the average person in the destination country. This would imply a decreasing level of cor-
ruption after immigration took place.6  
Finally, the behavior of the target country’s population and the country’s institutional set-
ting matters. Even if immigrants are highly corrupt and remain so over time, the target coun-
try’s population may simply ignore immigrants’ attempts to bribe them. If then the native 
population is approached by immigrants for goods, services or other things which might 
require bribing, there is arguably no reason to expect that immigration will have a relevant 
effect on the level of corruption in the host country. Consequently, one could be more in-
clined to believe that corruption is relatively invariant against migration.  
However, the previous reasoning might be challenged on several grounds. First, corrupt 
countries often experience large outflows of migrants. Corruption is often accompanied by 
a large set of unfavorable outcomes such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, a rise of 
the shadow economy, adverse effects on economic growth, abolishment of social values 
and norms and the like (cf. Tanzi (1998); for a comprehensive overview, cf. Dimant (2014)). 
These negative conditions typically constitute push factors of migration, not only for a small 
positive selection of honest people but also to the corruptible average individual. Our anec-
dotal evidence points in this direction.  
Second, the assimilation assumption might be difficult to justify if persistent cultural and 
social beliefs prevail. Corruption in a country might be the outcome of the (historical) devel-
opment of institutions, policies and markets. If, in the evolution of this institutional setting, 
corrupt behavior has become a cultural norm and belief, it will be internal to the individual. 
When individuals migrate, their beliefs and values can be expected to move with them, alt-
hough their external (corrupt) environment remains behind (cf. Alesina et al. (2013)). This 
argument is in line with a wide range of scholarly work. Capitalizing on a unique dataset that 
includes the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan, Fisman and Miguel 
(2007) find that corruption levels in the diplomats’ home countries are strongly related to 
their parking violations in Manhattan. Their results indicate that inherent norms related to 
                                                             
6 Clark et al. (2014) find that a higher stock of migrants coming from non-OECD countries leads to an improvement of insti-
tutional quality in a set of 110 countries. Zhang (2014) finds that, over time, migration leads to a decrease in property crime 
rates in Canada. 
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corruption are deeply entrenched within the people’s mindset. Bilodeau (2014) finds that 
the immigrants’ relationship with their destination country’s politics is substantially af-
fected by the political environment in their home country, thus sustainably imprinting their 
personal attitudes. Along these lines, Helliwell (2014) also find support for the footprint ef-
fect of trust levels, which is of high relevance in the corruption context (cf. Bjørnskov (2011); 
Rothstein and Eek (2009)). Their results suggest that migrants from low-trust environments 
carry over their trust-attitudes to their destination countries in a much more pronounced 
way than migrants from high trust environments, indicating an asymmetric interrelation be-
tween migration and stickiness of norms (see also Uslaner (2008)). Consequently, value as-
similation becomes unlikely in the short run, and corrupt behavior remains persistent.  
Third, as Varese (2011) notes, successful criminal behavior in a new and unknown environ-
ment does not only require a criminal mind, but also an opportunity. It might take some 
time after entering the destination country to comprehensively adapt to the new environ-
ment, and to find ways and means for successful corruption. If immigrants show persistent 
corruption attitudes, the full effect of immigrants’ corrupt behavior may become visible in 
the target country only after some period of time. This leads us to our next hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis H2: The effect on the destination country’s level of corruption, related to immi-
gration from a more corrupt sending country to a less corrupt destination country, is posi-
tive. However, it might take some time before the effect becomes noticeable. 
 
In the following section, we will test our hypotheses to investigate which effects dominate. 
Beforehand, a caveat is in order. Endogeneity is a widely acknowledged issue in empirical 
corruption research.7 As is generally true for empirical panel data research, a correlation ex-
poses a general coherence rather than rendering a clear causal relationship. In our case, 
corruption could potentially be both the antecedent and the effect of other factors. As al-
ready indicated above, Cooray and Schneider (2014) and Dimant et al. (2013) show reverse 
causality between migration and corruption, finding that excessive corruption decisively 
impacts migration flows. Hence, immigration might very well leave a corrupt footprint in the 
                                                             
7 For example, the literature indicates that the relationship between corruption and economic growth also holds in the 
reverse direction (cf. Dreher and Gassebner (2013); supporting the ‘greasing- the-wheels’ hypothesis, and Méon and Sekkat 
(2005), supporting the ‘sanding-the-wheels’ hypothesis). 
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destination country because of (self-) selection effects. If, for instance, an honest outsider 
decides to leave a corrupt country it is unlikely that he/she will (voluntarily) choose an 
equally corrupt destination. That is, the level of corruption in the destination country might 
be relevant in shaping migration flows. Evidently, it is important to control for endogeneity 
as the results might potentially suffer from a reverse-causality bias. Our approach of how to 
address this problem will be presented in the following section. 
 
2.2.3 Empirical Analysis 
The Empirical Model 
Based on the previous theoretical considerations, the discussion in this and the following 
section aims at testing the hypotheses developed in Section 2.2.2. Our starting point is a 
panel model of the form 
itcorruption  = α + ф i t qm ig r a t io n  + β 1itX  + i  + it  
where itcorruption  is the level of corruption in country i and year t, i t qm ig r a t io n  is the total 
migration stock with a time lag q, 1itX  is a conditioning set of lagged control variables and 
the disturbance term is composed of the individual effect ηi and the stochastic disturbance 
it which is assumed to be generated by a white noise process. This specification allows test-
ing the general effect of migration on corruption according to hypothesis H1. 
Since we assume the migration variable to have a time-shift effect on corruption, we let the 
independent variable of interest enter the model with a time lag q, which may take values 
from one to five if, for example, the maximum lag is five years. This lag structure allows us 
to differentiate between immediate and delayed effects. Additionally, lagging the independ-
ent variable of interest dampens the problem of a possible endogenous relationship be-
tween corruption and migration by eliminating the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error term. We report the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) to allow for a comparison of the model fit of the alternative lag 
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selections.8 Assuming control variables also do not have an immediate effect in the same 
period, all other controls enter the model with a lag of t-1. We provide results for fixed-ef-
fects panel regressions that allow us to account for country-specific effects. 
Furthermore, we explore the effect of immigration from highly corrupt countries on the cor-
ruption level of the target countries according to hypothesis H2. This is tested by regressing 
the total migration stock from countries that exhibit a corruption level which is higher than 
the total average over all 207 countries of migration origin on the corruption level of the 
destination country, so that we can test if a higher migration stock from more than propor-
tionally corrupt countries drives the corruption level in the destination country. 
Dealing with Potential Endogeneity 
We account for potential endogeneity by applying a Difference-GMM estimation in order to 
exclude results that might be driven by the underlying econometric approach, and thus do 
not allow for statistically reliable inference. The dynamic GMM approach developed by Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) appears as an appropriate approach, as it allows calculating con-
sistent and efficient estimates by using lagged levels dated in period t-2 and earlier as in-
struments. The corresponding moment condition can be checked using the Sargan statistic 
that tests the validity of the instruments. 
In following Arellano and Bond (1991), we provide results for Difference-GMM estimations. 
In general, the results are in line with the estimations presented before. An alternative esti-
mation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is the System-
GMM approach, which performs well with highly persistent data under mild assumptions. 
However, there is an important point to be made about using System-GMM. Given that Sys-
tem-GMM uses more instruments than the Difference-GMM, it may not be appropriate to use 
System-GMM with a dataset that consists of a small number of countries. In this case, this 
method is likely to exhibit a finite sample bias as the number of instruments increases ex-
ponentially with the number of periods used. As argued by Roodman (2009), such an over-
fitting of endogenous variables is likely to lead to false positive results. In addition, the as-
sumption of lagged control variables being exogenous to the error term is non-trivial. For this 
                                                             
8 Plümper et al. (2005) illustrate that in fixed-effects models the lag structure of the independent variable has a large impact 
on the coefficient and the level of significance. They argue that there is no generally accepted indicator for the 
determination of the length of the lag, however, there are several candidates like the t-statistic, the R2, the AIC and the BIC 
that facilitate the choice. 
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reason, we resort to the Difference-GMM approach, as the ratio of countries and time peri-
ods used in our panel is well balanced, thus ruling out a potential small sample bias (cf. 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999)).9 
 
2.2.4 Data 
Dependent Variable 
We use the cross-national corruption rating from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) (PRS Group, 2008). It relies on the subjective assessment of country experts typically 
operating within international non-governmental organizations. As a component of the po-
litical rights index, it is concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding and suspi-
ciously close ties between politics and business.10 Originally, the value of the index ranges 
from 0 to 6, with 0 indicating a high level of corruption and 6 representing a low level. We 
transpose the scale to simplify the interpretation of the results so that higher values of the 
index indicate a higher extent of corruption. The main advantage of this index is that it is 
available annually for a large sample of countries beginning in the early 1980s, and so ena-
bles us to analyze the corruption–migration nexus within a panel framework.11 The sum-
mary statistics can be found in Table S1. 
 
Main Independent Variable of Interest 
Our main independent variable is immigration (migration). We use the OECD International 
Migration Database which provides annual series on migration flows and stocks into OECD 
countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1975–2011 (OECD, 2014a). The major 
advantage of this dataset is that it provides bilateral data and so allows distinguishing be-
tween countries of destination and countries of origin, allowing us not only to analyze the 
general effect of migration on corruption but also to group source countries according to 
                                                             
9 To check the robustness of the model specification, we also run all regressions using the System-GMM. The results sup-
port our main findings. However, the rule of thumb – to keep the number of instruments less than or equal to the number 
of groups – cannot be met. Even if only the second lag is used as an instrument for the System-GMM the number of instru-
ments exceeds the number of countries. The results are available on request. 
10 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx. 
11 Other common corruption measures like the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) constructed by Transparency Interna-
tional or the Control of Corruption Rating published by the World Bank are available only from 1995 and 1996, respectively. 
Svensson (2005) and Treisman (2007) show that all three measures are highly correlated. 
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their level of corruption. We weigh migration by the respective destination country’s popu-
lation in thousands in order to account for the inherent population size heterogeneity 
across the OECD countries. Since different countries use different definitions of immigra-
tion12 and different sources for their migration statistics, the OECD database offers both 
data on immigrants by nationality and on immigrants by country of birth.  
Especially in the case of the migration stock variable, the differences in the definition play 
an important role and must be considered. The ‘country of birth’ approach takes into ac-
count the foreign-born population, for example, the first generation of immigrants, includ-
ing immigrants that have obtained citizenship. The ‘nationality’ approach includes second 
and higher generations of foreigners, but does not cover naturalized citizens. Thus, the na-
ture of the countries’ legislation on citizenship and naturalization plays a role (Pedersen et 
al. (2008)). We use the immigrants stock by ‘nationality’ variable for three reasons. First, this 
variable is available for more country-time observations than the immigration stock by 
‘country of birth’, thus allowing for more meaningful estimations. Second, we act on the 
assumption that naturalized citizens should be put on an equal footing with the domestic 
population as it is reasonable to assume that the naturalized citizens’ magnitude of assimi-
lation is well advanced. Third (and closely connected to the previous argument), our hy-
pothesis H2 takes the assimilation process into consideration assuming that the full effect 
of immigration on destination country corruption occurs only after some time. The ‘nation-
ality’ approach takes up this time dimension more naturally. 
 
Control Variables  
To avoid spurious relationships between the dependent variable and the independent var-
iable of interest, we employ a set of control variables commonly identified as potential de-
terminants of corruption. In our baseline specification we control, first, for the impact of 
economic development measured by (logged) real per capita income (GDP p.c.) extracted 
from the Penn World Table (PWT) (Heston, et al., 2012). It is a commonly used variable to 
explain corruption. The theoretical argument stresses that economic development fosters 
                                                             
12 Countries like Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, the Slovak Republic and the United States de-
fine an ‘immigrant’ by country of origin or country of birth, while some countries like Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Sweden define an immigrant by citizenship and finally some countries like Bel-
gium, France, Hungary, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom rely on self-
reported nationality (Pedersen, et al., 2008). 
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higher institutional quality, which in turn will provide fewer breeding grounds for corruption 
via implementation of more sophisticated anticorruption measures. A higher chance of 
identification and punishment of corruption will increase the expected costs, and crowd out 
incentives to engage in deviant behavior (cf. Serra (2006)). Along these lines, several empir-
ical studies find a robust negative correlation between economic development and per-
ceived corruption, suggesting that poorer countries exhibit higher corruption rates (cf. La 
Porta et al. (1999); Serra (2006); Treisman (2007)). However, panel studies based on fixed-
effect estimation by Braun and Di Tella (2004) find that an increase in a country’s wealth 
measured by GDP per capita also increases corruption. A potential explanation for a positive 
nexus between growth and corruption is provided by Kindleberger (2000). He argues that 
moral standards vanish in times of economic booms due to a more pronounced manifesta-
tion of greed, eventually undermining the individual’s disposition to obey the law. Overall, 
we follow the empirically settled mainstream argument and expect that more developed 
countries (in terms of GDP per capita) experience lower rates of corruption.  
We also account for the effect of population size (PWT) on corruption. From the theoretical 
perspective, Knack and Azfar (2003) suggest that larger polities may benefit from economies 
of scale in establishing political and administrative structures, so that a large country size 
might be negatively correlated with corruption. On the other hand, small countries may 
benefit from higher manageability, and more efficiency and transparency in administrative 
management, leading to a positive correlation between population size and corruption. Em-
pirical evidence shows mixed results. For one, Knack and Azfar (2003) show that there is in-
deed no clear relationship between country size and corruption and that existing results 
suffer from selection bias. On the other hand, a cross-country study by Tavares (2003) shows 
a negative impact of population on corruption, while Root (1999) finds that a larger popula-
tion is significantly associated with more corruption indicating that smaller countries are 
less corrupt than larger countries. We follow the majority of existing evidence and assume 
that population size and extent of corruption go hand in hand, due to a higher number of 
potential bribers and bribees and issues of effective monitoring, which are likely to be more 
extensive with a growing population size.  
Ali and Isse (2003) argue that a large government sector (government size) may create op-
portunities for corruption. The larger the size and scope of the bureaucracy, the more likely 
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it is to find corrupt behavior. On the contrary, Goel and Nelson (2010) indicate that govern-
ment size might be inversely related to a country’s corruption level. Not a large public sector 
per se determines the magnitude of corrupt activity, but larger governments might in fact 
devote a higher share of public spending to operative law enforcement aimed at deterring 
deviant behavior (cf. Fisman and Gatti (2002); Goel and Nelson (2010)).13 Although not ex-
plicitly tested for a subset of OECD countries, we follow the majority of existing empirical 
evidence and expect a large government sector to have a negative impact on a country’s 
corruption level. The variable is measured by government expenditure divided by GDP and 
extracted form the World Development Indicators (WorldBank, 2013).  
Furthermore, we control for democracy measured by the Polity2 index (Polity IV Project, 
2012), which is found to be highly relevant in existing theoretical and empirical research on 
corruption. In general, both strands of research indicate that more democratic countries 
tend to be less corrupt (e.g., Braun and Di Tella (2004); Knack and Azfar (2003); Kunicová and 
Rose-Ackerman (2005); Shen and Williamson (2005)). From a theoretical perspective, Shen 
and Williamson (2005) contend that states with democratic governments are likely to have 
more sophisticated policies and legal institutions that are more likely to be independent of 
the elites’ impairment. Seldadyo and de Haan (2006) argue that political liberty imposes 
transparency and provides checks and balances within the political system and so tends to 
reduce corruption. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) suggest that electoral rules and po-
litical structures can influence the level of corruption. Political participation, political com-
petition and constraints on the chief executive make it easier to monitor the political system 
and limit political corruption.14 Overall, since both theory and empirics resonate with each 
other, we would expect a negative impact of democracy on corruption.  
In addition, existing research acknowledges the important link between economic freedom 
(ICRG) and corruption. From a theoretical perspective, one can argue that, especially in 
modern economies, many restrictions on economic freedom– in particular restrictions of 
                                                             
13 However, it is worth noting that parts of the existing literature also point at a different relationship between government 
sector and corruption. Corrupt governments may impose detrimental effects on public goods delivery, weaken the tax 
morale and the bureaucratic quality whose functional interaction, ceteris paribus, likely leads to a smaller government 
sector (cf. Frey and Torgler (2007); Hall and Jones (1999); Johnson et al. (1997); Tanzi (2013)). 
14 Treisman (2007) indicates that the relationship between democracy and corruption might be more complex, suggesting 
that democratization increases corruption in the short run and reduces it as democracy deepens. However, the composi-
tion of our data does not allow us to examine long-run effects of controls such as democratization. Thus, we resort to a 
short-run examination of the control’s impact on corruption. 
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capital and financial markets – provide opportunities for corruption (cf. Graeff and Mehlkop 
(2003)). This notion is strongly supported by the empirical literature. Goel and Nelson (2005) 
find a strong negative relationship between economic freedom and corruption, where the 
relationship depends on a country’s level of development. Paldam (2002) presents similar 
results suggesting that countries with high regulation and little economic freedom have a 
larger potential for rent seeking, resulting in higher levels of corruption. Supportive results 
of a negative relationship between economic freedom and corruption are also found by Ali 
and Isse (2003), and Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005). We expect that more economic 
freedom and fewer restrictions imposed on trade are inversely correlated with a country’s 
corruption level. We measure economic freedom by the investment profile variable of the 
ICRG, arguing that a high investment risk accompanies lower economic freedom.15  
Finally, religion may also matter for explaining corruption. Religion is believed to play a de-
cisive role in affecting corruption levels through its inherent heterogeneity in putting em-
phasis on moral values, honesty and being in thrall to authority. Consequently, religious 
structures that are more hierarchical are believed to be more conducive to the inception 
and development of corrupt structures (Paldam, 2001). Empirical research finds that coun-
tries with a predominantly protestant population tend to have lower corruption levels, 
while more hierarchically structured religions (such as Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and 
Islam) tend to increase corruption (La Porta, et al., 1999). We follow Blomberg and Hess 
(2008) in using religious tensions as a control in order to get an impression whether a dom-
inant role of a specific religious group, and the suppression of religious freedom, has an ef-
fect on the level of corruption. The argument is that a dominant religion in a country creates 
differential access to power, leading to a situation in which less powerful religious groups 
resort to corruption for leveling the political and economic landscape.  
A set of variables does not enter our baseline model, in particular economic growth, trade 
openness, internal and external conflicts and regime stability. Rather, they are used to as-
sess the robustness of our findings. The first of these variables is economic growth (PWT) (in 
addition to the level of development). Ali and Isse (2003) argue that if countries with lower 
corruption levels grew faster, this positive experience ought to give way to a stricter fight 
                                                             
15 As an alternative, we also employed the ‘Economic Freedom’ index provided by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney & Lawson, 
2008). The results (based on a significantly smaller dataset) support our main findings and are available on request. 
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against corruption in the future. That is, economic growth should be negatively correlated 
with future corruption. However, the empirical evidence on this argument is mixed. While 
Leite and Weidmann (1999) find that GDP growth has a dampening effect on country level 
corruption, Berdiev et al. (2013) find the opposite effect. However, for the subset of OECD 
countries (in which we are interested in) their results remain insignificant. Furthermore, 
other studies find no significant effect at all (cf. Ali and Isse (2003); Brunetti et al. (1997); 
Mauro (1995)). Consequently, due to the focus on the same subset of countries, we expect 
our results to be in line with Berdiev et al. (2013) for their subset of OECD countries and ex-
pect no significant effect in either direction of GDP growth on corruption levels. 
We furthermore assess the impact of trade openness – measured by exports and imports as 
a share of GDP (PWT) – as an indicator of competition.16 Leite and Weidmann (1999) suggest 
that openness to foreign trade, which is equivalent to a relatively strong economic compe-
tition, is a primary factor for experiencing relatively low levels of corruption. This argument 
is backed up by empirical research. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) find that economic inte-
gration decreases corruption activity, albeit not directly.17 In particular, the existing re-
search sheds light on the interrelation between openness of financial markets and corrup-
tion levels. Although not entirely congruent, for the most part the existing literature points 
at the idea that restrictions bring about individual effort to bypass regulations with the use 
of deviant behavior, such as bribing public officials (cf. Dreher and Siemers (2009); Edwards 
(1999)). We thus expect an inverse relationship between trade openness and corruption, 
which is along the lines of the previous discussion on the impact of economic freedom on 
corruption.  
We also account for a potential effect of internal and external conflicts (ICRG) on corruption. 
Conflicts – in terms of domestic and transnational terrorism or civil war – may have a desta-
bilizing effect on the economy which is what we expect to show up in our analysis. For in-
stance, Dreher et al. (2010) and Meierrieks and Gries (2013) show that terrorism affects the 
                                                             
16 Alternatively, we proxy trade openness by the ratio of import to GDP (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003). Here, a low import share 
implies high import restrictions. Consequently, the presence of such restrictions offers an opportunity to bribe (Seldadyo 
& De Haan, 2006). 
17 However, Knack and Azfar (2003) argue that trade share and import share of GDP are strongly related to country size. 
Smaller countries tend to have a higher trade share, so not controlling for population the coefficient on openness is likely 
to reflect selection bias. 
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economy negatively and contributes to political instability. This in turn may create a breed-
ing ground and may also provide opportunities for corruption.  
Regardless of the regime type, regime stability (Polity IV Project, 2012) is another political 
variable that may affect corruption. As suggested by Treisman (2007), it may take decades 
for democratic institutions to translate into low perceived corruption so that not the current 
regime type but the regime stability affects the corruption level. This is supported by an ex-
treme-bounds analysis by Serra (2006), who provides evidence that actual democracy is 
weakly interrelated with corruption, whereas political stability measured by uninterrupted 
democracy results in reducing corruption. It is reasonable to assume that the political vac-
uums inherent to unstable regimes enable fraudsters to more easily find means to precipi-
tate successful acts of corruption. Consequently, and in compliance with the previously lead 
discussion on the interrelation between democracy and corruption, we expect countries 
with stable regimes to be less prone to corruption. 
 
2.2.5 Empirical Results  
In this section, we report our empirical results using different econometric approaches to 
ensure robustness and to account for possible endogeneity issues. Table 1 presents results 
for the baseline model with an alternative lag length for both fixed effects (FE) and Differ-
ence-GMM estimations, while Tobit results are generally presented in the supporting infor-
mation.18 
 
                                                             
18 It should be noted that the results of the GMM estimates differ from those of the FE and the Tobit estimates in some 
cases. This has at least two reasons. For one, the Difference-GMM includes the lag of the dependent variable as an addi-
tional regressor, resulting in a reduction in the number of observations of about 10%. For another, based on the rule of 
thumb, which declares the number of instruments to be smaller than the number of cross sections, only one lag is used for 
instrumentation. However, in this case the GMM estimator is not necessarily efficient since it does not make use of all 
available moment restrictions. 
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Table 2.1.1: Migration and Corruption - Fixed Effects and GMM Baseline Regression 
corruption  Fixed Effects GMM 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) 
corruption t-1      0.4985*** 
(0.1652) 
0.4491** 
(0.2237) 
0.3917 
(0.2425) 
0.3147 
(0.2147) 
0.3484 
(0.2145) 
migration t-1 0.0005 
(0.0039) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0003 
(0.0047) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration t-2  
 
0.0002 
(0.0043) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0017 
(0.0051) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration t-3  
 
 
 
0.0019 
(0.0047) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0047 
(0.0085) 
 
 
 
 
migration t-4  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0033 
(0.0046) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0122 
(0.0078) 
 
 
migration t-5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0043 
(0.0048) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0059 
(0.0042) 
GDP p.c. t-1 1.8796*** 
(0.5646) 
1.7139** 
(0.6567) 
1.4869* 
(0.7289) 
1.4467** 
(0.6060) 
1.6121*** 
(0.5222) 
-0.0311 
(0.4961) 
0.0215 
(0.5336) 
0.0422 
(0.8027) 
-0.5728 
(0.7398) 
0.0948 
(0.4358) 
population t-1 -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
gov size t-1 0.0770** 
(0.0345) 
0.0972*** 
(0.0345) 
0.1169*** 
(0.0291) 
0.1363*** 
(0.0259) 
0.1316*** 
(0.0258) 
-0.0050 
(0.0306) 
-0.0087 
(0.0352) 
-0.0058 
(0.0347) 
-0.0180 
(0.0328) 
0.0039 
(0.0264) 
democracy t-1 -0.1664*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.0913* 
(0.0470) 
0.0875 
(0.1487) 
0.1434 
(0.1536) 
0.1997 
(0.1603) 
-0.0081 
(0.0267) 
0.0124 
(0.0703) 
-0.0034 
(0.0728) 
-0.0390 
(0.0654) 
-0.0245 
(0.0604) 
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Table 2.1.1: Continued from Previous Page 
econ freedom t-1 0.0592* 
(0.0307) 
0.0648* 
(0.0343) 
0.0674* 
(0.0348) 
0.0639** 
(0.0291) 
0.0463** 
(0.0217) 
0.0620*** 
(0.0235) 
0.0525*** 
(0.0202) 
0.0606*** 
(0.0178) 
0.0580*** 
(0.0167) 
0.0435*** 
(0.0145) 
religious tensiont-1 0.2412 
(0.1431) 
0.2159 
(0.1353) 
0.2188 
(0.1351) 
0.1842 
(0.1290) 
0.1606 
(0.1176) 
-0.0581 
(0.0742) 
-0.0744 
(0.0786) 
-0.0470 
(0.1054) 
-0.0805 
(0.0850) 
-0.0780 
(0.0660) 
VIF 
Adjusted R2 
1.55 
0.383 
1.56 
0.368 
1.58 
0.397 
1.59 
0.438 
1.61 
0.486 
     
AIC 669.3707 632.4003 550.0034 467.6052 392.3704      
BIC 697.9622 660.6486 577.8022 494.9997 419.3358      
Sargan (p-value)      0.5958 0.7639 0.7944 0.6773 0.6785 
AR (2) (p-value)      0.1857 0.2882 0.4189 0.5372 0.5605 
Instruments      31 30 29 28 27 
Observations 439 418 392 370 348 406 385 363 341 319 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; GMM results based on the two-step Difference estimator, second lag of the dependent varia-
ble used as GMM-style instrument; AR (2) refers to the Arelano Bond test for autoregressive correlation (order 2); Sargan refers to the Sargan test of over identification 
restrictions; migration stock is weighted by population.
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For the FE model, AIC and BIC indicate that a higher lag length selection leads to a better 
model fit. To account for possible heteroskedasticity, standard errors are Huber/White-cor-
rected (Huber (1967); White (1980)). To rule out the problem of multicollinearity, we present 
the mean VIF statistics of the corresponding regression, according to which our estimations 
do not suffer from this problem. In addition, to verify GMM consistency, we have to ensure 
the validity of the instruments. We use the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to test 
the validity of the instrumental variables, and consider the test of second-order serial cor-
relation of the error term suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Throughout all model 
specifications, both tests do not indicate problems with the instruments’ validity.  
Our results suggest that general migration has no consistent impact on corruption that 
would survive and hold across our different econometric models. This supports hypothesis 
H1. Specifically, both the FE and Difference-GMM estimations do not indicate any significant 
impact of general migration on corruption in the short or medium term.19  
With respect to our control variables, we find that corruption is more likely in more devel-
oped (in terms of GDP per capita) countries, that have a high level of economic freedom and 
a large government, which finds support in existing empirical work (cf. Ali and Isse (2003); 
Braun and Di Tella (2004)). Our findings concerning the impact of economic freedom on cor-
ruption are somewhat more surprising. More economic freedom seems to propel a country’s 
corruption level, which is not in line with existing mainstream research. Rather, this result is 
supportive of the hypothesis that economic freedom deals with a country’s link to the global 
markets, and that this link could be beneficial for illegal actors, for example, in terms of an 
exploitation of economic rents (as argued by, inter alia, Graeff and Mehlkop (2003); Tornell 
and Lane (1999)). Such a disparity might partly be attributed to the circumstance that prior 
to our examination, to the best of our knowledge, no such comprehensive analysis existed 
                                                             
19 It is important to note that although the lagged structure of the migration stock allows investigating a delayed effect, it 
should nevertheless be considered a short-term effect. A truly long-run effect (in the sense of a steady-state equilibrium 
outcome) might exhibit a different effect. Although the analysis focuses on the short-term perspective, we also run models 
which are able to capture long-run effects as a robustness check. The results from Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) 
and Error-Correction Models (ECM) which we used to investigate a long-term relationship between migration and corrup-
tion are, however, ambiguous. While DOLS does not find a long-run relationship, the results of ECM support a cointegrated 
relationship between migration and corruption. The results are presented in Table S5. A full-fledged investigation of these 
findings is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper and is therefore left to future research. 
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for the impact of economic freedom on a subset of OECD countries’ corruption level. For 
these countries with their particularly well-developed institutional settings, the interde-
pendency between economic freedom and corruption levels might very well deviate from 
what has been found on a global scale. The impact of economic freedom on corruption lev-
els proves to be robust in terms of the coefficients’ magnitude, the effect’s direction, the 
significance levels across different econometric models and the use of the Economic Free-
dom index provided by the Fraser Institute as an alternative measure (see footnote 18). 
Along these lines, we do not find such robustness across different specifications for the im-
pact of GDP p.c. and government size on corruption levels.  
As for the remaining controls, neither religion nor population size exerts a significant impact 
on corruption. As suggested by Paldam (2001), an existing misbalance of religious groups is 
generally conducive to the spread of corruption in a given country. However, this seems not 
to be true for the subset of OECD countries. Provided that OECD countries dispose of a 
higher institutional quality and a more comprehensive protection of (religious) interests as 
compared to the global average, OECD countries could be less prone to corruption driven 
by a religious imbalance.  
Although the general picture is the same and supports our main hypothesis H1 when apply-
ing the Difference-GMM approach, the results are far more conservative with respect to the 
controls’ impact on corruption levels. Here, only economic freedom shows up significantly. 
The direction and magnitude of the economic freedom’s impact on host countries’ corrup-
tion levels are similar to what is indicated by the FE regressions. This strengthens the validity 
of the result that a higher degree of economic freedom facilitates corruption in OECD coun-
tries.  
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we add further controls (trade openness, 
internal and external conflicts) to our baseline model and use alternative measures for de-
velopment by using GDP growth as well as regime stability. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 2 and again confirm our previous finding that the general stock of immigration in a coun-
try has no effect on its corruption level.20 Only few of the alternative controls have significant 
                                                             
20 Due to space restrictions, we present only the results of the first and fifth lag of the immigration stock, yet, similar to the 
results of the baseline specification, the second, third and fourth lags are insignificant, too. The same applies to all the 
tables where we do not provide the intermediate lags, too. 
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signs. Specifically, the FE estimations suggest that larger governments, less restrictions on 
trade and more stable regimes, boost the country’s corruption levels. The latter speaks to 
the idea that stable regimes become increasingly more prone for corrupt behaviour over 
time, while regime changes bring about new structures, thus inducing both uncertainty and 
the deterioration of existing corrupt structures. This finding is also in line with Mancur Ol-
son’s (1984) concept of institutional sclerosis, indicating that stable regimes are more prone 
to corruption due to cheaper lobbying and bribing (Berggren, et al., 2012). However, these 
effects are not consistently detectable when applying the Difference-GMM approach. 
A further control is GDP growth. The estimations yield no significant impact of GDP growth 
on corruption which is in line with the results of Ali and Isse (2003), Berdiev et al. (2013), 
Brunetti et al. (1997) and Mauro (1995). Considering trade openness, we can again identify a 
positive and significant effect on corruption, indicating that a high trade share increases the 
probability of corruption. This result supports the argument that the rents created by trade 
endowments induce opportunities for rents-related corruption (Tornell & Lane, 1999).  
When applying the Difference-GMM approach, both the internal conflict risk and the exter-
nal conflict level have a weaker significant impact, although the effects go in opposite direc-
tions. The results suggest that, in the medium run, inner country turmoil and social unrests 
might successfully trigger the implementation of more sophisticated institutional struc-
tures that reduce opportunities for corruption, while the destabilizing effect of transna-
tional conflicts – for example, transnational terrorism – on the economy may indeed create 
opportunities (due to growing intelligence and military services which often operate outside 
public control). However, these effects are only weakly significant and should not be over-
interpreted, especially given that they do not remain consistently significant across differ-
ent econometric methods.   
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Table 2.1.2: Migration and Corruption - Fixed Effects Baseline Regression with Alternative Controls 
corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
migration t-1 0.0079*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0007 
(0.0035) 
-0.0004 
(0.0037) 
-0.0003 
(0.0025) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration t-5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0093** 
(0.0034) 
0.0018 
(0.0048) 
0.0040 
(0.0046) 
0.0009 
(0.0034) 
GDP p.c. t-1   
 
1.8293*** 
(0.5131) 
-0.1325 
(0.9277) 
 
 
 
 
1.5394*** 
(0.4985) 
0.7642 
(0.6353) 
population t-1 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
gov size t-1 0.0737* 
(0.0407) 
0.0840** 
(0.0369) 
0.0644** 
(0.0302) 
0.0347 
(0.0320) 
0.1063*** 
(0.0323) 
0.1171*** 
(0.0289) 
0.1243*** 
(0.0255) 
0.1074*** 
(0.0295) 
democracy t-1 -0.0377 
(0.0426) 
-0.0930** 
(0.0352) 
-0.1348*** 
(0.0322) 
 
 
0.2731 
(0.2143) 
0.2163 
(0.1758) 
0.2266 
(0.1678) 
 
 
econ freedom t-1 0.1217*** 
(0.0253) 
0.0544** 
(0.0242) 
0.0520** 
(0.0234) 
0.0413 
(0.0277) 
0.0983*** 
(0.0248) 
0.0585** 
(0.0214) 
0.0454** 
(0.0216) 
0.0164 
(0.0222) 
religious tension t-1 0.2275 
(0.1676) 
0.2090 
(0.1589) 
0.2473* 
(0.1337) 
0.1951 
(0.1505) 
0.1667 
(0.1240) 
0.1379 
(0.1305) 
0.1698 
(0.1124) 
0.0954 
(0.1205) 
GDP p.c. growth t-1 0.6949 
(1.4672) 
   -0.2731 
(1.1339) 
   
trade openness t-1  0.0156*** 
(0.0035) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0119*** 
(0.0038) 
 
 
 
 
internal conflict t-1  
 
 
 
-0.0850 
(0.0667) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0605 
(0.0641) 
 
 
external conflict t-1  
 
 
 
0.1203 
(0.0966) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0724 
(0.0821) 
 
 
regime stability t-1  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0613** 
(0.0234) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0433** 
(0.0208) 
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Table 2.1.2: Continued from Previous Page 
VIF 1.28 1.98 1.77 1.58 1.34 2.19 1.91 1.58 
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.379 0.396 0.411 0.443 0.483 0.489 0.493 
AIC 696.9321 672.1169 661.6321 648.9388 420.2725 394.3588 392.0972 387.4652 
BIC 725.3623 700.7084 698.3926 677.5303 447.2379 421.3242 426.7670 414.4306 
Observations 429 439 439 439 348 348 348 348 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; migration stock is weighted by population. 
 65 
Finally, the Difference-GMM estimations yield a significant and positive effect of regime sta-
bility, indicating that, in the short run, countries that are wealthier and possess a more sta-
ble regime structure are more prone to corruption. While the overall direction is the same, 
the effect’s magnitude is more conservative than the coefficients derived from the FE ap-
proach and only shows up significantly in the short run. We present the Difference-GMM re-
sults in Table 3.21  
After we could not identify a consistent and significant effect of general immigration on cor-
ruption supporting H1, we now turn to the question raised in hypothesis H2, whether cor-
ruption migrates and how long it may take to infiltrate the destination country. More specif-
ically, we explore whether immigrants from highly corrupt countries carry over their behav-
ior, so that immigration from countries with a level of corruption that is higher than the av-
erage leads to an increase in corruption in the destination country. The results of this exer-
cise are shown in Table 4. Again, we present the FE and Difference-GMM estimations jointly. 
The results are based on a calculation of the total average of corruption levels over all coun-
tries for each year from which we then derive the most corrupt countries at the top 50% 
level.22  
Overall, the results indicate that immigration from highly corrupt countries boosts the cor-
ruption level in the host country, thus supporting our hypothesis H2. According to the FE 
estimation, we find a significant and positive effect of selected migration on host countries’ 
corruption levels. The coefficient rises to a value of 0.0099 (for a lag of three periods), which 
means that an increase in the migration stock of one hundred migrants per one thousand 
citizens affects corruption significantly, increasing the corruption value by 0.99 points (out 
of 7). This is a raise of 14.1% of the maximum scale. As it has previously been the case, the 
results of the Difference-GMM estimations are more conservative, thus representing a lower 
bound result with a raise of up to 4.4% of the maximum scale for the same increase in the 
migrants-to-citizens ratio. Conversely, the results of the alternative Tobit regressions point 
to an upper bound result, indicating a raise of up to 18.1% of the maximum scale. In general, 
                                                             
21 We also calculate a Tobit version of the regressions with and without alternative control variables. The results are in line 
with the FE estimation and are presented in Table S3. 
22 Our findings do not change when we consider migration from even more corrupt countries at the top 40% (30%, 20% 
and 10%) level. 
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the Difference-GMM results are more conservative and turn out to be significant less often 
compared to the FE and Tobit estimations. We trace this back to the limited amount of cross 
sections, which is a problem inherent to our focus on OECD countries.23 Future research 
might potentially overcome this drawback by extending the research scope beyond OECD 
countries.  
Noticeably, while we initially observe an escalating effect of selective migration on corrup-
tion levels, the results are indicative of an assimilation process over time. 
 
                                                             
23 Further possible explanations were offered in the beginning of this section. 
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Table 2.1.3: Migration and Corruption - Difference-GMM Regression with Alternative Controls 
corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
corruption t-1 0.4531*** 
(0.1466) 
0.4341*** 
(0.1587) 
0.4909*** 
(0.1740) 
0.5372** 
(0.2237) 
0.3699* 
(0.1919) 
0.3327* 
(0.1975) 
0.3743* 
(0.2000) 
0.6012*** 
(0.0921) 
migration t-1 0.0006 
(0.0038) 
-0.0026 
(0.0061) 
-0.0006 
(0.0047) 
-0.0040 
(0.0056) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration t-5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0075 
(0.0053) 
0.0050 
(0.0037) 
0.0064* 
(0.0038) 
0.0030 
(0.0032) 
GDP p.c. t-1  
 
 
 
-0.0115 
(0.5432) 
-1.0297*** 
(0.3747) 
 
 
 
 
-0.1208 
(0.2843) 
-0.9525 
(0.7889) 
population t-1 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
gov size t-1 -0.0115 
(0.0337) 
0.0006 
(0.0288) 
-0.0102 
(0.0328) 
-0.0189 
(0.0337) 
-0.0096 
(0.0259) 
0.0087 
(0.0288) 
0.0042 
(0.0260) 
-0.0257 
(0.0278) 
democracy t-1 -0.0131 
(0.0251) 
-0.0182 
(0.0237) 
0.0068 
(0.0313) 
 
 
0.0207 
(0.0950) 
-0.0259 
(0.1338) 
0.0672 
(0.0821) 
 
 
econ freedom t-1 0.0669*** 
(0.0254) 
0.0604** 
(0.0242) 
0.0567** 
(0.0222) 
0.0406** 
(0.0162) 
0.0464*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0382*** 
(0.0131) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0154) 
0.0192 
(0.0137) 
religious tension t-1 0.0418 
(0.0861) 
0.0520 
(0.0740) 
0.0792 
(0.0865) 
0.0707 
(0.0913) 
0.0674 
(0.0583) 
0.0735 
(0.0612) 
0.0555 
(0.0708) 
0.1102* 
(0.0609) 
GDP p.c. growth -0.5576 
(0.8686) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.7175 
(0.7638) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trade openness t-1  
 
0.0033  
(0.0043) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0021 
(0.0030) 
 
 
 
 
internal conflict t-1  
 
 
 
-0.0129 
(0.0380) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0896* 
(0.0458) 
 
 
external conflict t-1  
 
 
 
0.0311 
(0.0384) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0822* 
(0.0430) 
 
 
regime stability t-1  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0457** 
(0.0201) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0397 
(0.0250) 
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Sargan (p-Value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
0.5787 
0.2176 
0.6018 
0.2107 
0.7435 
0.2153 
0.6894 
0.1494 
0.7741 
0.5403 
0.7274 
0.5610 
0.7305 
0.6099 
0.7374 
0.4782 
Instruments 30 31 33 31 27 27 29 27 
Observations 396 406 406 406 319 319 319 319 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; GMM results based on the two-step Difference-GMM estimator, second lag of the dependent 
variable used as GMM-style instrument; AR (2) refers to the Arelano Bond test for autoregressive correlation (order 2); Sargan refers to the Sargan test of over identification 
restrictions; migration stock is weighted by population.  
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Table 2.1.4: Migration from Corrupt Countries and Corruption - Fixed Effects and GMM Regression  
corruption Fixed Effects  GMM 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) 
corruption t-1      0.5278*** 
(0.1875) 
0.4694** 
(0.1974) 
0.5085*** 
(0.1926) 
0.3542** 
(0.1716) 
0.3792* 
(0.2219) 
migration t-1 0.0087** 
(0.0037) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0016 
(0.0014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration t-2  
 
0.0095*** 
(0.0033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0026* 
(0.0014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
migration t-3  
 
 
 
0.0099*** 
(0.0030) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0031** 
(0.0015) 
 
 
 
 
migration t-4  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0073*** 
(0.0023) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
 
 
migration t-5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0040* 
(0.0020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0007 
(0.0011) 
GDP p.c. t-1 1.0742* 
(0.5622) 
1.0156 
(0.5998) 
1.0565 
(0.6270) 
1.2442** 
(0.5403) 
1.6372*** 
(0.4360) 
-0.3686 
(0.5195) 
-0.3201 
(0.3661) 
-0.4154 
(0.4664) 
-0.1656 
(0.3887) 
0.1622 
(0.5569) 
population t-1 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
gov size t-1 0.0522 
(0.0388) 
0.0734** 
(0.0338) 
0.0855*** 
(0.0290) 
0.0997*** 
(0.0273) 
0.0989*** 
(0.0250) 
-0.0109 
(0.0332) 
-0.0078 
(0.0265) 
-0.0171 
(0.0353) 
-0.0013 
(0.0272) 
0.0050 
(0.0358) 
democracy t-1 -0.1738*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.1251** 
(0.0512) 
0.0682 
(0.1657) 
0.1052 
(0.1667) 
0.1565 
(0.1573) 
0.0332 
(0.0887) 
0.0210 
(0.2159) 
-0.0095 
(0.1567) 
0.0446 
(0.1538) 
-0.0003 
(0.1068) 
econ freedom t-1 0.0741** 
(0.0327) 
0.0721** 
(0.0348) 
0.0672* 
(0.0363) 
0.0616* 
(0.0313) 
0.0425* 
(0.0229) 
0.0505** 
(0.0212) 
0.0382* 
(0.0230) 
0.0410** 
(0.0160) 
0.0393** 
(0.0171) 
0.0433** 
(0.0192) 
religious tensiont-1 0.2573* 
(0.1401) 
0.2462* 
(0.1341) 
0.2584* 
(0.1303) 
0.2035 
(0.1209) 
0.1564 
(0.1077) 
-0.0273 
(0.0807) 
-0.0234 
(0.0752) 
-0.0104 
(0.0795) 
-0.0405 
(0.0418) 
-0.0564 
(0.0480) 
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VIF 
Adjusted R2 
1.24 
0.382 
1.26 
0.381 
1.27 
0.423 
1.26 
0.459 
1.27 
0.494 
     
AIC 625.1091 579.3207 501.4671 432.3486 367.1703      
BIC 653.2051 607.0477 528.7663 459.2535 393.6571      
Sargan (p-value)      0.7940 0.9690 0.8070 0.8624 0.6690 
AR (2) (p-value)      0.3989 0.3811 0.6287 0.6532 0.8664 
Instruments      31 30 29 28 27 
Observations 409 388 365 345 325 379 358 338 318 298 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; GMM results based on the two-step Difference-GMM estimator, second lag of the dependent 
variable used as GMM-style instrument; AR (2) refers to the Arelano Bond test for autoregressive correlation (order 2); Sargan refers to the Sargan test of over identification 
restrictions; migration stock is weighted by population. 
71 
 
These observations are in line with the previously discussed arguments presented by Chis-
wick (1978), which are supportive of the idea that the migrants’ assimilation happens at 
different speeds.24 Moreover, the results of the control variables are broadly in line with 
our previous findings presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusion  
In this paper, we shed light on the impact of migration on corruption in the destination 
country. Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual series on migration 
flows and stocks into OECD countries from 207 sending countries for the period 1984–2008, 
we explored different channels through which corruption might migrate. Initially, the impli-
cations might go into various directions as different effects are in place at the same time. On 
one side, the existing literature suggests that migration could be the result of a positive se-
lection. For example, highly skilled people might leave their home countries as they expect 
their individual living conditions to improve. On the contrary, however, poor socioeconomic 
conditions typically constitute push factors of migration, not only for a small positive selec-
tion of honest people but also for the corruptible average individual. 
Independent of the econometric methodology applied, we consistently find that (i) general 
migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country’s corruption level, and (ii) 
that immigration from corruption-ridden countries boosts corruption in the destination 
country. This holds even after controlling for potential endogeneity by means of a Differ-
ence-GMM estimation.  
Hence, the fear by international legislators (as expressed in recent agreements by the G20 
group) that immigration may cause a problematic inflow of corruption appears justified. 
Policy-makers will, therefore, have to take precautions to avoid this problem. However, it is 
not immediately obvious what the optimal response will be. One possibility could be to re-
strict immigration by only selecting immigrants originating from non-corrupt countries. Al-
ternatively, very careful checks ad personam could be conducted. The downside of this pol-
                                                             
24 The results of the Tobit regression are presented in Table S4 in the online appendix. The results are coherent and survive 
when using the alternative set of control variables. 
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icy is that the remaining inflow of migrants could be rather small, which might not be opti-
mal, given that most OECD countries face a severe ageing problem and are in need of immi-
gration to keep their social security systems sustainable. An arguably better strategy could 
be to immunize the domestic population against a corrupt attitude brought into the country 
by some immigrants. This would be in line with Varese’s (2011) argument which we may re-
phrase as follows: successful corruption needs both a corrupt mind and an opportunity.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENTS 
3.1  ON PEER EFFECTS: BEHAVIORAL CONTAGION OF (UN)ETHICAL 
BEHAVIOR AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 
Eugen Dimant* 
Version: December 2015 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Social interactions and the resulting peer effects loom large in both economic and social con-
texts. This is particularly true for the spillover of (un)ethical behavior in explaining how behavior 
and norms spread across individual people, neighborhoods, or even cultures. Although we un-
derstand and observe the outcomes of such contagion effects, little is known about the drivers 
and the underlying mechanisms, especially with respect to the role of social identity with one’s 
peers and the (un)ethicality of behavior one is exposed to. We use a variant of a give-or-take 
dictator game to shed light on these aspects in a controlled laboratory setting. Our experiment 
contributes to the existing literature in two ways: first, using a novel approach of inducing social 
identification with one’s peers in the lab, our design allows us to analyze the spillover-effects of 
(un)ethical behavior under varied levels of social identification. Second, we study whether con-
tagion of ethical behavior differs from contagion of unethical behavior. Our results suggest that 
a) unethical behavior is more contagious, and b) social identification with one’s peers and not 
the (un)ethicality of observed behavior is the main driver of behavioral contagion. Our findings 
are particularly important from a policy perspective both in order to foster pro-social and miti-
gate deviant behavior.  
 
KEYWORDS: Conformity, Contagion, Peer Effects, Social Identity, Unethical Behavior 
JEL: D03; D73; D81 
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3.1.1 Introduction 
Individuals do not co-exist in pure isolation but interact within social contexts, or as the em-
inent Elliot Aronson (2011) emphasizes it in his book’s title: individuals are social animals. 
Despite the long tradition in anthropology and sociology, economists have been rather neg-
ligent of the relevance of norms, values, and social influence of peers on one’s behavior for 
a long time. Fortunately, over the last two decades there has been a push in the economic 
discipline to expand our understanding of what comprises a more sophisticated individual 
decision maker by accounting for the individual’s identity, morals, and other-regarding con-
cerns (cf. Rabin (1993), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Akerlof & Kranton (2000), Bolton & Ockenfels 
(2000), Charness & Rabin (2002),  Bénabou & Tirole (2011)). These approaches have enriched 
our understanding by regarding social and economic decisions as a function of the respec-
tive social and economic environment and the relevance of one’s peers’ behavior.  
Recently, both economists and psychologists have started engaging in a promising dialogue 
on behavioral ethics and the drivers of (un)ethical behavior by bringing together classical 
and behavioral approaches (for a recent review see Irlenbusch & Villeval (2015)). A standard 
economic argument is the assumption of fixed preferences, translating into one’s conform-
ing behavior being the result of social conventions or norms. Conversely, psychologists, so-
ciologists, and recently some economists, among others, have challenged this fundamental 
assumption, suggesting that behavioral adaptation is the result of converging preferences 
and fluid tastes. Bernheim & Exley (2015) refer to the former as belief mechanisms, and to 
the latter as preference mechanisms. Along these lines, scholars in economics and psychol-
ogy have attempted to shed light on the mechanism of peer effects using both lab and field 
experiments (for an overview see Houser et al. (2012) and Lahno & Serra-Garcia (2015)). Ex-
emplarily, peers are found to significantly influence individual judgment (Asch, 1951) and 
risk taking behavior such as credit decisions (Banerjee, et al., 2013), stock market participa-
tion (Shiller, 1984), investment decisions (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990), and littering behavior 
(Cialdini, et al., 1990). Peer effects are also at play in education (Sacerdote, 2001) and 
productivity at work (Falk & Ichino (2006), Mas & Moretti (2009), and the seminal Moving-to-
Opportunity literature, cf. Case & Katz (1991), Katz, Kling & Liebman (2001), Kling, Ludwig & 
Katz (2005), Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007),  and Chetty, Hendren & Katz (2015)).  
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Studying behavioral spillovers and the adaptation of observed peer behavior particularly in 
the domain of (un)ethical behavior (we will call it behavioral contagion or behavioral adap-
tation) looms large due to its economic and social significance. Much like emotional conta-
gion, the underlying idea of behavioral contagion depicts a form of social influence that 
leads to the emulation of behavior one has been exposed to (see Wheeler (1966) for a dis-
cussion and differentiation from other frequently used terms to describe such a phenome-
non like conformity and imitation). It comes natural to analyze situations in which individu-
als can simultaneously engage in either ethical or unethical behavior. However, most exist-
ing studies have rather focused on analyzing ethical and unethical behavior in isolation. 
Economic studies have highlighted peer-effects in pro-social behavior (Frey & Meier (2004), 
Gächter et al. (2013)), voluntary cooperation (Thöni & Gächter, 2015), as well as within the 
unethical domain, such as the use of performance enhancing drugs (Gould & Kaplan, 2011), 
and even dishonesty (Innes & Mitra, 2013). In sum, there exists ample evidence that peer 
effects are a phenomenon across different contexts, social environments, and cultural 
groups and individuals adjust own behavior to resemble one’s peers.   
However, scholars across various fields are still disunited on whether the methods used 
qualify to observe clean peer effects, or whether our observations are an artifact of potential 
confounds. Exemplarily, a stream of literature points at methodological problems in 
soundly measuring such effects, especially outside the controlled laboratory environment 
(for a critical discussion see Manski (1993) & (2000) and Angrist (2014)). Our work adds to this 
literature by broadening our understanding of how peer effects and the resulting behavioral 
contagion play out within the spheres of both ethical and unethical behavior simultane-
ously. Using a novel design that allows us to study different types of behavior and behavioral 
spillovers simultaneously is one of the ways we add to the existing literature. Beyond that, 
we use a novel approach to induce varying levels of social identity in the lab to study behav-
ioral contagion in different social settings. We will return to this shortly. 
Our goal is to contribute to this debate by shedding light on two aspects: first, does social 
identification to one’s peers facilitate the spread of (un)ethical behavior? Second, is the 
magnitude of behavioral contagion dependent on the (un)ethicality of the behavior and if 
so, which behavior is more contagious? By answering these questions, we contribute to the 
growing economic literature on the role of identity and social context on behavior in general 
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(cf. Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996), Bohnet & Frey (1999), Akerlof & Cranton (2000), Char-
ness & Gneezy (2008)) and spillovers resulting from peer effects in particular (i.e. see the 
previously mentioned seminal Moving-to-Opportunity literature). However, in our study we 
analyze lower-bound peer effects because adaptive behavior remains unobservable by 
one’s peers and thus carries no signaling value. Because such a setting sets us apart from 
what is typically meant by the term conformity, we use the more encompassing term behav-
ioral adaptation (for a discussion of the mechanism and empirical literature on conformity 
see Bernheim (1994) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1998)). 
Embedded in a controlled lab experiment, our approach to measuring peer effects is a vari-
ation and extension of a dictator game as introduced by List (2007) and used by Bardsley 
(2008). We capitalize on a one-shot dictator game in which participants are given the oppor-
tunity to give to or take money away from the charity before and after learning peer behav-
ior. That is, the extend the one-shot setting by introducing a revision option to account for 
behavioral contagion (see Thöni & Gächter (2015) for a related approach). We deal with the 
noted reflection problem (Manski, 1993) by introducing a novel design, which we will discuss 
in more detail in the design section of our paper (see chapter 6). In short, our approach cen-
ters on two key design elements: first, only those who actively observe another participant’s 
behavior can react and revise initial behavior. Second, behavior of those who are observed 
is held fixed and cannot be changed afterwards, which is public knowledge. Such an ap-
proach allows us not only to study general peer effects in an unbiased way, but also to shed 
light on the relevance of factors such as the social identity to one’s peers and the (un)ethi-
cality of observed behavior in driving behavioral changes. Such an experimental set-up al-
lows us to contribute to existing research on peer effects in multiple ways and thus open a 
venue for future research. 
Being aware of the naturally occurring difficulty in studying social identity in an artificial but 
controlled laboratory setting without introducing potential confounds, we capitalize on a 
novel approach to mimic and gradually vary social identity in an artificial laboratory setting. 
In particular, we construct a list of personal statements taken from a major American dating 
website to categorize participants according to overlaps in preferences and interests (for a 
discussion, see Hitsch, Hortaçsu & Ariely (2010)). 
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1 This approach allows us to create a measure of social proximity and use this as an exoge-
nously varying matching device to study peer effects in the lab and to combine the best of 
both worlds: for one, the controlled laboratory setting mitigates the previously discussed 
arising difficulties when studying peer effects in the field. For another, our novel measure of 
social proximity allows us to mimic social affection that is normally absent in the laboratory 
setting due to its intended nature of anonymity. Our results indicate the validity of this prox-
imity measure as the observed peer effect (i.e. the magnitude of the behavioral reaction) is 
aligned with the degree of measured social proximity.  
Our study extends the existing literature on peer effects in a number of ways. We do not only 
provide a clean approach to test whether peer effects exist in the context of both ethical and 
unethical behavior; we also deliver sound evidence on how such peer effects depend on the 
social identification with their peers. We achieve this by contributing from both the content 
and the methodological perspective. 
From a content perspective, our work focuses on making a substantial contribution to bet-
ter understand drivers of behavioral adaptation in the domain of both ethical and unethical 
behavior. In social dilemmas and cooperative settings, existing theoretical and experi-
mental literature points out that giving and taking are indeed different concepts that trigger 
different behavior (cf. Cox et al. (2008), Gächter et al. (2015)). Essentially, we put these find-
ings to a test in a setting of individual decision-making under peer influence in which no 
strategic interaction between individuals exists. That is, we try to answer whether the un-
ethicality of observed behavior or social identification to one’s peers is a stronger predictor 
of behavioral contagion. While different streams of research suggest the relevance of both 
channels (see discussion in the next chapters), we are the first, to the best of our knowledge, 
to evaluate both channels in terms of their impact on behavioral contagion. From a meth-
odological perspective, our contribution in this paper is to introduce an approach that does 
not only allow us to directly mimic social proximity in the lab, but also to vary its degree. If 
                                                             
1 We use these questions to generate a composite matching score with other participants and randomly vary the 
information set across treatments given to matched pairs of participants. The exact matching mechanism and the 
treatment variations will be explained in more detail in chapter 6. 
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successful, such an approach opens the venue for a broad range of more refined future re-
search examining the role of social proximity in cooperation, reciprocity, and punishment 
behavior. 
So far, the economic literature in particular has been fairly silent on answering three natu-
rally arising questions with respect to peer effects that we will attempt to answer in this pa-
per.  
Question 1: Is there a systematic difference of behavioral contagion with respect to unethical 
behavior (e.g. taking away) as compared to ethical behavior (e.g. donating)?  
It is reasonable to assume that behavioral contagion is a function of the observed behavior’s 
nature. One obvious reason is the costs involved: good behavior implies bearing costs in 
order to improve the well-being of others, while bad behavior often implies improving one’s 
own well-being in one way or the other at the expense of a third party.  A number of seminal 
empirical contributions examining neighborhood effects indicate that the adaptation of be-
havior is asymmetric and depends on whether one has been exposed to good or bad influ-
ences and to what extent (cf. Kling, Ludwig & Katz (2005)). While existing studies have typi-
cally resorted to explaining behavioral contagion in one direction, that is either ethical or 
unethical, our experimental design allows us to compare the contagion of both behavioral 
domains directly. To our knowledge, this is the first controlled approach to directly and sim-
ultaneously compare peer effects and behavioral spillovers across these two domains. 
Question 2: To what extent is behavioral contagion in either direction (i.e. of moral and im-
moral behavior) mediated by the social proximity to the peers?  
Following the existing literature on social identity, it is reasonable to assume that observing 
behavior of people who are socially closer or similar depicts a more salient signal in terms 
of what is socially accepted or an existing norm. However, the exact interaction between 
social proximity and the contagion of (un)ethical behavior remains unclear. In addition, 
good and bad behavior differs in terms of the information set available to the individual. 
While good behavior might entail some ambiguity with respect to what is ‘appropriate’ 
within a given context, bad behavior might be less ambiguous: the nature of bad or unethi-
cal behavior implies the overstepping of (social) boundaries or infringing laws. Conse-
quently, the wiggle-room for self-justification is narrower in the latter case.  
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Question 3: What is the stronger driver of behavioral contagion – social proximity or the 
(un)ethicality of observed behavior?  
Two quite distinct streams of literature exist that examine the role of either social proximity 
or exposed behavior within the framework of peer effects: one on the relevance of social 
identification, and one on behavioral observation. In this research, we attempt at unifying 
both lines of research by using an experimental design that encompasses both aspects. We 
will return to this aspect in more detail in the next chapters. 
 In anticipating the results, we find that the magnitude of spillover-effects is a function of 
social identification that is asymmetrically biased towards the contagion of unethical be-
havior. Overall, our results suggest that within a given peer context it is more likely to ob-
serve behavioral contagion in the form of unethical than ethical behavior. Across different 
specifications, we find that social proximity to the peers is more relevant to the crowding-
out than to the crowding-in of ethical behavior, while the observation of (un)ethical behav-
ior alone is insufficient to trigger any particular behavioral change. Thus, the mere observa-
tion of behavior alone is insufficient for the existence of peer effects in the (un)ethical 
sphere, but is rather contingent on the social identification to one’s peers.  The interaction 
between social identification and type of observed behavior adds to the understanding of 
peer effects and yields relevant policy recommendations. 
In summary, it can be stated that our experimental work is along the lines and an extension 
of the seminal Moving-to-Opportunity (MTO) field studies that examine neighborhood ef-
fects and assimilation of behavior (see discussion in chapter 3.1.3). To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first experimental examination of behavioral spillovers as a 
function of varied levels of social identity and the (un)ethicality of observed behavior, which 
in combination with the methodological novelty depicts our principal contribution.  
The paper is structured as follows: chapter 3.1.2 provides a more detailed thematic back-
ground and the course of our investigation, whereas we deal with the conceptual framework 
of behavioral contagion and its existing relevant literature in more detail in chapter 3.1.3. In 
chapter 3.1.4, we will discuss the drivers of behavioral adaptation and some of the more 
relevant concepts from the fields of economics and (social) psychology. We will introduce a 
simple theoretical model in chapter 3.1.5 before turning to our experimental analysis in 
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chapter 3.1.6. We close with a concise discussion on potential policy recommendations in 
chapter 3.1.7 and a conclusion and an outlook in chapter 3.1.8. 
 
3.1.2 Background and Course of Investigation 
A basic principle of classical economic theory suggests that individuals form rational expec-
tations based on available information and act on them accordingly. However, even the 
great John Maynard Keynes (1936) expressed his concern about the rationality of individu-
als to realize efficient investment decisions in the long run already 80 years ago. Instead, 
Keynes expected individuals to follow the herd, thus stressing the importance of peers for 
many economic decisions. Since then, a contrasting strain of literature emerged that ac-
counts for the relevance of behavioral traits on the individual decision-making process. Un-
derstanding the underlying mechanism of peer effects is key to comprehending its impact 
on economic decisions and outcomes. For the bigger part, existing research on peer effects 
mainly resorts to field experiments or purely observational studies that are generally infe-
rior to controlled lab experiments in terms of, among others, a clean identification of the 
relevant channels, endogeneity, and reflection problems (see Manski (2000), Falk & Fisch-
bacher (2002)). Only recently, there has been a push to study peer effects in the lab, allowing 
us to gain a deeper and often a more reliable understanding of the underlying mechanism 
Angrist (2014). 
Social interactions in general and the potentially resulting peer effects in particular play an 
instrumental role from both the societal and economic perspective. Existing literature indi-
cates that standard economic forces alone cannot encompass many of the outcomes that 
we observe in real life. Examples are, among others, the escalation of crime rates or the mas-
sive surge in female labor participation rates in World War II (cf. Mulligan (1998), Levitt 
(1999). See also recent findings on paternity leave by Dahl, Løken & Mogstad (2014)). In-
stead, social interactions are found to offer explanations helpful to understanding the 
causes of rapid shifts in economic fundamentals. Such ripple effects are likely the result of 
social interactions, thus raising the awareness about the importance of understanding the 
underlying mechanism of peer effects (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 2004). 
Although explicit research on peer effects and the resulting behavioral spillovers (in the lit-
erature sometimes referred to as behavioral or social contagion) has its origins in the late 
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19th century, the underlying concept has been observed long before.2  Reportedly, an ab-
struse-seeming stream of suicides happened after reading Goethe’s The Sorrows of the 
Young Werther two hundred years ago. “My friends […] thought that they must transform 
poetry into reality, imitate a novel like this in real life and, in any case, shoot themselves; 
and what occurred at first among a few took place later among the general public […]” (Goe-
the, quoted in Rose (1929, p. 29)). The widespread imitation of this behavior gave rise to fear 
among the population and governments, ultimately leading to a ban of the book in Italy, 
Leipzig, and Copenhagen (Phillips, 1974). The outbreak of the Tanganyika laughter epi-
demic of 1962 in Uganda is another infamous example of behavioral contagion. There, a 
mass hysteria infected almost 100 pupils with contagious laughter, forcing several schools 
to close down for days (Rankin & Philip, 1963). 
Initially, the concept of social contagion has been introduced in the form of a social phe-
nomenon – as opposed to a biological one – explaining why and how certain forms of be-
havior soak through society (for early work see Baldwin (1894), Tarde (1903)). Since the 
1950s, empirical research on this topic has been on the rise with evidence suggesting that 
the mere exposure to and contact with individuals or culture is sufficient to trigger behav-
ioral contagion. Conditional on a sufficiently salient trigger, behavioral contagion leads to 
behavioral adaptation towards observed behavior. In this paper, we aim at expanding the 
existing knowledge on the drivers of saliency, in particular with a focus on both the ethicality 
of the observed behavior and the degree of social distance or proximity with the observed 
individual. A long tradition in social science highlights the importance of social identity in 
understanding individual behavior within the framework of social interactions (cf. Bogardus 
(1928)). A salient state of social identity is found to trigger favoritism towards those of 
stronger social kinship.  
The term social identity is eclectic and several of its facets have been studied in existing 
economic research. While the term encompasses a broad range of conceptual elements, 
                                                             
2 Research on behavioral contagion is fragmented and different disciplines have introduced own notions and definitions 
referring to the same or closely related concept. Existing research interchangeably uses different terms to describe such 
situations, among others: conformity, behavioral contagion, imitation, or behavioral adaptation. Due to its more generic 
nature and the context of our research, we will mainly resort to the term behavioral contagion or behavioral adaptation. 
For the sake of comprehensibility, we will abstain from clearly defining and delimiting those concepts for now.  
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from shared preferences and experiences to shared cultural and religious beliefs, in this pa-
per we follow the primal understanding of this term as introduced by Tajfel and Turner 
(1979). More precise, we refer to the existence of social identity if a person derives self-es-
teem from belonging to the peer group and has a preference for exhibiting similar behav-
ioral patterns (for a similar approach, see Chen & Li (2009)). Using this definition in combi-
nation with a simple implementation of social identity, as applied in our experiment via the 
observation of preference similarity, is conducive to both deriving lower bound results for 
the role of social identity in facilitating (un)ethical behavior and easier reproducibility of our 
results. This line of research is important from a policy perspective in generating effective 
measures to trigger both more pro-social and less anti-social behavior, consequently reduc-
ing the otherwise resulting economic and social inefficiencies. 
With notable exceptions, existing research has been struggling to overcome a number of 
challenges to study clean peer effects in the lab, especially in contexts where social identity 
plays a mediating role. Among these, inducing or at least proxying the natural occurring var-
iation of social identity has proven to be difficult. Following the tradition of the minimal-
group paradigm (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), psychological research has introduced a number of 
ways to proxy social identity in the lab, such as having participants interact with participants 
that were assigned the same color avatar (Tajfel, 1982), a similar name (Pelham, et al., 2005), 
same birthday (Cialdini & DeNichols, 1989), or imagined closeness (Gunia, et al., 2009). So 
far, it has proven to be challenging to study peer effects under controlled settings in general, 
let alone within a more sophisticated social environment such as varied levels of social iden-
tity. Existing economic research has resorted to using a dual approach, studying peer effects 
in the lab and in the field, with both approaches having their limitations. Applying a novel 
methodological approach to induce varying levels of social identity in the lab allows us to 
combine the best features of both worlds to study peer effects beyond what had been pos-
sible so far. 
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To our knowledge, the first economic contribution examining this question in a controlled 
setting by varying social identity among individuals is the study by Bohnet & Frey (1999).3 
They used a rough proxy for social distance by varying the degrees of identification and 
found evidence that social distance is decisive in predicting the extent of other regarding 
behavior in a dictator game setting.4 Other examples of economic approaches that bridge 
anonymity and induce social identity, among others, vary the wording of the experimental 
instructions (Hoffman, et al., 1996), use face-to-face interaction (Bohnet & Frey, 1999) or 
show pictures to one party only (Eckel & Petrie, 2011), reveal names (Charness & Gneezy, 
2008), reveal preferences such as those for paintings (Chen & Li, 2009), or recruit friends and 
family members (Brandts & Solà, 2010). Such studies typically yield the robust finding that 
stronger social identity triggers favoritism. Two natural problems arise with the concepts 
used in economics so far. Firstly, using face-to-face communication or allowing participants 
to interact with friends or family members introduces serious biases and crowds-out the 
revelation of true preferences (Roth, 1995). Secondly, and more relevant to the point of our 
experiment, the degree of social identification measured in the lab by these concepts can 
hardly be varied and is rather binary. Our approach of using dating-website questions as a 
matching device allows us to induce and exogenously vary different levels of social proxim-
ity in the lab in order to study their role in the spillover of (un)ethical behavior. 
It is this paper’s aim to shed light on three questions stated above and to contribute to a 
better understanding of the general mechanism of peer-effects. For this reason, we propose 
a novel approach to proxy different levels of social proximity among peers in a laboratory 
setting. Such an approach allows us to exogenously vary social characteristics and study 
their role in behavioral contagion. We mimic social proximity by the use of questions taken 
from a major American dating website to capture individual preferences and interests and 
use the matching scores of overlapping answers among lab participants as an exogenous 
                                                             
3 Although motivated by a previous study of Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996), the work of Bohnet & Frey (1999) is the first 
to directly vary (a proxy for) social distance among peers. Instead, Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996) varied the language 
used in the distributed instructions, arguing that “subjects bring their ongoing repeated game experience and reputations 
from the world into the laboratory, and […] dictator instructions […] may imply that the objective is to share the money 
with someone, who, though anonymous, is socially relatively near to the decision maker” (Hoffman, et al., 1996, p. 655). 
4 Research usually refers to this concept as social identity, which encompasses both social distance and its inverse, social 
proximity. Throughout this paper, we will mainly refer to social proximity. Another approach to mimic social proximity 
used in economic and psychological experiments has been to ask participants to bring along their friends or relatives and 
study their interaction in a controlled environment. Among other things, we will discuss potential drawbacks of these and 
related approaches in chapter 3.1.5 in more detail.  
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matching device across treatments. This allows us to study decision-making going beyond 
simple ingroup - outgroup comparisons. Rather, our approach provides us with an extensive 
array of possibilities to match participants according to their shared similarities. To the best 
of our knowledge, we are the first to use such an approach. Thus, we not only complement 
existing field studies, but also broaden the scope and utilization of lab experiments in ex-
plaining behavior and behavioral changes in peer settings, especially within the unethical 
domain.  
For this purpose, we extend the currently existing approaches by a social component that 
sufficiently considers the relevance of social distance and proximity to one’s peers in affect-
ing behavioral decisions. This attempt will be at the heart of this paper, leading to a pro-
posed theoretical extension of Akerlof’s (1997) and Glaeser & Scheinkman’s (2004) seminal 
work on social interaction, social distance, and conformity, where the extent of social dis-
tance is a function of geographic location. We, however, emphasize the role of social dis-
tance as a function of an actual overlap in personality based on e.g. personality traits or 
interests. 
Another substantial contribution of our research is the direct comparison of behavioral con-
tagion of ethical and unethical behavior. In general, existing research has focused on shed-
ding light separately on behavioral spillovers of either ethical behavior (cf. Thöni & Gächter 
(2015)) or unethical behavior (cf. Gino et al. (2009)). Considering the differing settings and 
games used in existing experiments to study behavioral contagion, current research does 
not help to understand whether and to which extent behavioral contagion in either direc-
tion differs from each other. Instead, experiments that add to the understanding of the po-
tentially different mechanisms should place participants in a uniform environment and al-
low for the spillover of ethical and unethical behavior.  
Our experimental set-up allows us to study these questions. Participants play a one-shot 
dictator game in which they decide how much money to donate to or take away from a char-
ity, which resembles a variation of a dictator game implemented by List (2007) and Bardsley 
(2008)). Here, the (un)ethicality of (taking away) donating money to the charity is stressed 
by explaining the consequences of their behavior clearly to the participants. That is, all the 
money that is (taken away) donated to the charity will (not) be given forward to the charity, 
thus individual behavior will (harm) benefit the charity. Hence, participants face a riskless 
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but in terms of its (un)ethicality precisely defined situation in which they have to decide 
whether or not to personally benefit at the expense of a charity of their choice. After reach-
ing their initial decision, participants are given the opportunity to learn about other partici-
pants’ initial decisions followed by the option to revise their own initial decision.  
Several economic and psychological theories are able to explain behavioral contagion even 
under full anonymity and without observability of one’s own initial and potential revision 
decision, as implemented in our experiment. Among these are concepts relating to social 
decisions and social distance (Akerlof (1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)), imitation of pref-
erences (Sliwka, 2007), social learning (Bandura, 1971), norms (Cialdini et al. (1990) and Bic-
chieri (2006)), self-expansion (Aron & Aron, 1986) or even guilt (Kandel & Lazear, 1992). Many 
of these concepts are not strictly distinct, in both their assumptions and predictions. Thus, 
in this paper we will not attempt to resolve which approach explains behavioral contagion 
best but rather focus on shedding light on the drivers of behavioral contagion and its inter-
relation with the social identity dimension and the extent of (un)ethicality of observed be-
havior. 
3.1.3 The Conceptual Framework of Behavioral Adaptation  
3.1.3.1 The Mechanism of Social Interaction and Challenges of Measur-
ing its Effects 
A growing body of literature suggests that social interactions are principal not only to hu-
mans, e.g. in making social or economic decisions, but also to animals, e.g. in finding the 
right strategy or place to maximize one’s hunting success (Laland, 2002). Evidently, social 
interactions trigger different reactions and outcomes, which are referred to as social effects. 
Different streams of literature refer to such interactions in different ways: bandwagons, con-
formity, epidemics, herd behavior, imitation, neighborhood effects, peer influences, social 
learning, or social norms (see Hyman (1942), Merton (1957), Granovetter (1979), Jones 
(1984), Manski (2000)). In addition, Pingle & Day (1996) subsume these and other types of 
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behavior, including following an authority, habit, thoughtless impulse, and hunch, as econ-
omizing behavior. Some call it simply peer effects.5 Although these notions refer to different 
mechanisms, their outcome is often (but not always) similar; that is, the individual’s adap-
tation to observed behavior. However, some mechanisms encompass stronger interaction 
with the peers than others do (e.g. the peer’s ability to observe my reaction and exact 
change in behavior) and involve more or less deliberation.6  
As we will discuss in this chapter in more detail, existing research indicates that the exist-
ence and persistence of social effects are context specific and may even lead to, among oth-
ers, higher consumption of alcohol and drugs, cheating, and smoking. The same is also 
found to be true for pro-social and cooperative behavior. Thus, before turning to the specific 
effects of social interaction, we shall make the effort to understand the underlying mecha-
nisms first. 
The concept of social interaction lies at the heart of social psychology and sociology, for 
example in order to explain the formation of tastes (Weber, 1978). The importance of social 
interaction in explaining social phenomena has a long tradition and is often ascribed to 
Sutherland’s Differential Association Theory (Sutherland, 1939). Akerlof (1997) stresses the 
view that the theory of social interaction is key to understanding why individuals do not 
succumb to isolated and purely self-maximizing decision-making. Instead, this concept 
gives rise to conceive an individual as someone who constantly interrelates with the under-
lying social environment and produces and deals with the resulting externalities. A principle 
consequence of extending the rational model based on Becker’s early work by such a social 
dimension is that the type of the resulting individual is more sophisticated and resembles 
more closely to the intuition of sociologists than the classical economists.  
                                                             
5 Often, the term “peer effects” is used to refer to all of these mechanisms without specifying the exact channel through 
which behavioral adaptation arises. Although it is important to shed light on the different channels through which social 
interaction potentially transitions into behavioral adaptation, the focus of this study lies in understanding the role of 
exogenous factors such as social proximity that have the potential to influence the intensity of behavioral adaptation. We 
shall not attempt to settle the argument of which approach explains the mechanism of our experiment best. Instead, we 
will discuss some of the more prominent concepts and mechanisms in the fields of economics and social psychology that 
resemble the mechanism of behavioral adaptation the way it is implemented in our experiment in chapter 3.1.4. For our 
purpose, however, we will assume peer effects to be in play whenever an individual ࢏′ݏ behavior changes after having been 
exposed to behavior of individual ࢐, irrespective of the direction of the behavioral change. In turn, however, we assume 
behavioral contagion to be in place whenever individual ࢏′ݏ behavior changes in the direction of individual ࢐ behavior. 
6 It is worth noting that it is far beyond this paper’s scope to shed light on all of these concepts. Instead, we will pick out 
and discuss those concepts of which we believe are of bigger importance to what we analyze within our experiment.  
87 
 
Manski (1993) distinguishes between two types of social interactions.7 One is endogenous 
interaction in the form of, for example, information exchange among criminals or social 
norms. The behavior of the relevant peer group mediates the likelihood that the individual 
will engage in the same kind of behavior. In addition, exogenous interaction emphasizes 
that the propensity of an individual to behave in a certain way is also mediated by exoge-
nous characteristics of the group such as their attitude toward crime or social and economic 
status.8  
In social interactions, externalities abound. The key mechanism of social interaction implies 
that one’s personal net benefit is a function of the behavior exhibited by one’s relevant so-
cial group or contact person (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 2004).9 Inherent to such interactions 
are strategic complementarities in the form of circular cascades where “even if changes in 
fundamentals create only a small change in the level of activity for each individual, each 
individual’s small change will then raise the benefits for everyone else pursuing the activity” 
(Glaeser & Scheinkman, 2004, p. 84). In principle, small changes in fundamentals may cause 
large shifts in outcomes, which are sometimes referred to as the butterfly effect, a term hail-
ing from the chaos theory (Lorenz, 1963).  
Social interactions are also highly relevant in understanding the spread of criminal behav-
ior. Social interaction plays a decisive role in the formation of gangs and the recruitment of 
young criminals (see Reiss (1988) and Jankowski (1991)). This is particularly true for the 
criminals’ decision to engage in illicit behavior jointly (Reiss (1980)). “Social interactions 
seem to create a sense of invulnerability and a willingness to violate social norms and take 
                                                             
7 Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004) provide a more distinct categorization of the mechanisms that generate social interaction: 
physical, learning, stigma, and taste-related interactions. For the purpose of this experiment, we will extend this 
categorization in order to better capture the mechanism of behavioral changes we are interested in. We will discuss these 
points in more detail in chapter 3.1.6. 
8 While these two aspects represent interactions that are shaped by the underlying social environment, Manski (1993) also 
introduces correlated effects that explain similar behavior as the result of facing similar institutional environments (see 
also Manski (2000)). This third aspect is not considered any further since correlated effects are not social effects and are 
thus neither created by social interactions nor create social multipliers (see Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman (1996), 
(2003)). Using a novel approach in our experiment, a clean variation of both endogenous and exogenous interaction allows 
us to draw causal inferences that are more precise than what has previously been possible. We will return to this important 
point in our design section of chapter 3.1.6. 
9 The term ‘relevant social group or contact person’ is vague in existing research. A social group or contact person is self-
reported and defined from one’s individual point of view and refers to one or more individuals whose behavior either has 
a direct or indirect impact on one’s well-being, e.g. through resource externalities or other-regarding preferences. While it 
is important to understand the different channels through which behavioral spillovers occur, the focus of our study is to 
shed light on the drivers instead. See chapter 3.1.4 for a discussion.  
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risks, as long as one is in the company of like-minded individuals” (Glaeser, et al., 1996, p. 
511). Social interaction also strongly affects stigmatization, which is important from an evo-
lutionary perspective. As the number of criminals rise, illicit behavior becomes more com-
mon and thus potentially more accepted; and as criminality converges towards ‘normality’, 
the (social) rents of illicit behavior increase due to increased attractiveness, social accepta-
bility and a crowding-out of legal activities where earnings from legal activities are stolen by 
criminals (see Rasmussen (1996) and Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1993)). 
Researchers face substantial difficulties measuring social interactions and its resulting ef-
fects in a clean way. In a real-world instance, assigning changes in individual conformity to 
distinct mechanisms are subject to identification problems (Angrist, 2014). As argued be-
fore, this problem arises because individual behavior is affected by both endogenous (e.g. 
the group’s behavior) and exogenous effects (e.g. group characteristics) and, in addition, 
uniform behavior can be the result of similar unobserved characteristics (Manski, 1993). Pre-
vious empirical research involved regressing a person’s actions on the action of his peers. 
However, Manski (1993) points at three fundamental problems concerning this methodol-
ogy: first, drawing causal inference is difficult when endogeneity is a problem, in particular 
when the individual’s and its peer’s behavior is interactive and influences each other circu-
larly. Second, omitted variables increase the likelihood of spurious correlations between 
actions. Third, in reality, sorting and self-selection into particular neighborhoods renders it 
difficult to understand what actually drives behavior. Arguably, empirical research in partic-
ular faces these challenges because one only observes the behavior of individuals who self-
selected themselves into, for example, moving to a better neighborhood, but not of those 
who decided to turn down the opportunity (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 2004).10 
Of particular interest to our research are social interactions leading to the spread of uneth-
ical behavior. Existing research points to a strong presence of positive covariates across in-
dividuals’ decision to engage in criminal behavior. In particular, Glaeser, Sacerdote & 
                                                             
10 Prominent examples and forceful ways of addressing these issues include, among others, the work of Case & Katz (1991), 
Katz, Kling & Liebman (2001), Angrist & Lang (2004), Kling, Ludwig & Katz (2005), Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007), Ludwig & 
Kling (2007), Damm & Dustmann (2014), and Chetty, Hendren & Katz (2015). We will discuss these and other empirical 
contributions examining peer effects and behavioral adaptation in the field in more detail in this chapter. 
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Scheinkman (1996) state that only covariance across criminal decisions of individuals ex-
plains existing variance in crime rates, which is far beyond any theoretical prediction of 
crime rates. 
In order to mitigate any term-related confusion on the side of the interested reader, we are 
in need of a term that allows us to capture a particular type of behavior that resembles a 
subset of social interaction and its resulting social effects. More specifically, we are not in-
terested in the drivers of all kinds of behavioral changes resulting from observation, but only 
in behavioral changes that lead to a convergence of behavior. We are thus proposing the 
impartial term behavioral adaptation to capture such behavior.11  
The term behavioral adaptation refers only to a subset of social interaction because social 
interaction may lead to all kinds of social effects where the resulting behavior may or may 
not converge towards what has been observed. In its basic form, the existence of social ef-
fects does not tell us much about the specific behavioral reaction, if any, that follows from 
this exposure. In principle, the result of social interaction could lead to either behavioral 
alienation or adaptation. For the purpose of this study, we will focus on the latter. In turn, 
behavioral adaptation refers to those situations only in which the resulting behavior is co-
herent to the behavior one has been exposed to. Our study sheds light on the key drivers 
triggering an individual’s response to become more like others, in one way or another.12 
Existing macro- and micro-level data inadequately catches the underlying mechanisms and 
the causal relationships relevant to our project. That is, answering the questions of how be-
havioral adaptation varies with different levels of social proximity and whether this inter-
play is different for adaptation towards ethical versus unethical behavior. As has been ar-
gued by Angrist (2014), with rare exceptions like Kling et al.’s (2007) Moving-to-Opportunity 
research, most field studies on peer-effects suffer in one way or the other from endogeneity, 
                                                             
11 Behavioral adaptation has also been studied in the field of evolutionary game theory as well as in the theory of learning 
in games (see Selten (1978), Roth & Erev (1995), Schlag (1998), and Apesteguia, Huck & Oechssler (2007), to only name a 
few). However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to touch upon all streams of literature that have shed light on the 
general process of behavioral adaptation. Instead, we focus on the studies most relevant to our experiment and extend 
our apologies to colleagues whose research remains unnamed in this paper. 
12 Studying the drivers of behavioral alienation is a potential venue for future research, as this line of research has yet to 
catch attention from economists. Akerlof (1997) refers to this behavior as the result of status-seeking efforts. Beyond this, 
however, behavioral alienation can be the result of e.g. one’s desire to not be identified with a particular social group. 
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self-selection and confounds resulting from confusing the relevant subjects with the peers.13 
This renders it difficult to disentangle causation from simple correlation. For these reasons, 
Manski (2000) and Angrist (2014) emphasize the importance of controlled laboratory exper-
iments that are able to reduce potential confounds to a much stronger degree, which is what 
we attempt to do here. 
 
3.1.3.2 Why Understanding Behavioral Adaptation Matters 
Social interaction and more so the resulting social effects tell us a lot about the underlying 
mechanisms affecting social and economic outcomes. As argued by Akerlof (1997, p. 1006), 
“social interaction theory explains why social decisions – such as the demand for education, 
the practice of discrimination, the decision to marry, divorce, and bear children, and the 
decision whether or not to commit crimes – are not simple choices based primarily on indi-
vidual considerations.” Along these lines, behavioral changes are subject to spillover-effects 
induced by observing a particular kind of behavior. 
Arguably, economic literature neglected the relevance of spillover-effects on individual be-
havior for a long time and it is only recently that economists have begun incorporating mo-
tives beyond the neoclassical economic theory’s assumption of own-payoff maximizing 
egoists (Akerlof, 1997).14 It seems reasonable to assume that individual behavior is impacted 
by other people’s behavior, their preferences, their sentiments and the like. As prominently 
stated by Fehr & Fischbacher (2005, p. 167), “if people believe that cheating on taxes, cor-
ruption and abuses of the welfare state are wide-spread, they themselves are more likely to 
cheat on taxes, take bribes or abuse welfare state institutions.” Consequently, social inter-
action shapes one’s own understanding of the world and behavior surrounding us.  
Social interactions and its resulting effects are key in driving behavioral changes. In reality, 
we constantly make use of learning from and adapting to observed behavior. The rating sys-
tems of, among others, Amazon, eBay, and IMDB use the principle of social learning by hav-
ing introduced a publicly accessible valuation system to spread the word of good and bad 
products and services. Instead of resorting to time consuming and potentially harmful trial-
                                                             
13 For a rich and critical discussion on challenges relating to identifying and measuring social interactions, and avenues for 
future research, see Blume, Brock, Durlauf & Ioannides (2010). 
14 For early seminal contributions on the economics of altruism and egoism, see Becker (1976) and Becker (1981). 
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and-error behavior, learning from others’ experience is a survival strategy that facilitates 
(social) Darwinism and the stability of cultural cohesion (Laland, 2002). Evidently, social in-
teractions lead to social effects that are likely to trigger a type kind of behavior that we are 
particularly interested in: behavioral adaptation.  
Social effects are expected to be in place whenever events on an aggregate level interact 
with events on the individual level (Manski, 2000). Since the seminal contribution of Shelling 
(1973), a great amount of theoretical and empirical work highlighted the relevance of social 
effects in various contexts (cf. Evans, Oates & Schwab (1992), Glaeser, Sacerdote & 
Scheinkman (1996), Arcidiacono & Nicolson (2005), and Mas & Moretti (2009)). Such effects 
were also found to affect the individual’s inclination to reciprocate behavior positively, con-
sequently suggesting that social effects are of concern in trust relations (cf. Mittone & Ploner 
(2011)).  
In the fields of psychology, economics and sociology there exists a long tradition emphasiz-
ing the impact of peers on individual behavior. Research efforts gave rise to a more exten-
sive investigation of peer effects on behavior such as group norms (Sherif, 1936), band-
wagon effects (Asch, 1951), conformity and social influence (Kelman, 1958), obedience to 
authority (Milgram, 1974), social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980), social norms (Elster, 1989), social 
networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), tax morale (Frey, 1997), moral identity (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000) and social capital (Putnam, 2000).  
In sum, understanding why and how behavioral adaptation matters and how this is shaped 
by social interactions and its resulting social effects not only helps to understand the world 
around us but also facilitates the inception of policy measures that are more promising and 
target-aimed. Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004, p. 90) put it this way: “…if one person’s level of 
education increases his neighbor’s education through dissemination of learning, then it 
makes sense to subsidize education. There is a socially desirable spillover that should be 
subsidized. However, different policy implications appear if one person’s level of education 
increases his neighbor’s education for signaling reasons – namely, as one person gets more 
education the other person must also get more education or be thought inferior. In that 
case, there is a socially undesirable spillover that should not be subsidized.” 
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3.1.3.3 What We Know: On Peers, Behavioral Adaptation, and Neigh-
borhood Effects 
Because the ability to induce salient social identity in an artificial lab setting is instrumental 
to the study of the posed interaction between social proximity and behavioral contagion, 
existing research has focused on field rather than lab experiments. However, Angrist (2014) 
argues that many field studies on peer-effects potentially suffer from endogeneity, self-se-
lection, and confounds resulting from confusing the relevant subjects with their peers. Cor-
relations might arise without any causation simply indicating a spurious relationship. An-
grist (2014) points out that these challenges make it extremely difficult to disentangle cor-
relation from causation and he thus calls for a controlled approach in the lab where relevant 
characteristics can be varied exogenously. In addition to problems arising from correlated 
unobservables and endogenous group membership, Manski (1993) also prominently coined 
the term “reflection problem”, which results from the challenge of clearly disentangling the 
mutual influence peers exhibit on each other’s behavior. Such a cyclical relationship be-
tween observed and actual behavior poses a huge challenge for studying peer effects in the 
field (Manski, 2000). Beyond identification issues, it has proven difficult to define appropri-
ate peer groups and link them reliably to one another in the field. 
This chapter is devoted to provide a state-of-the-art overview of existing research that has 
convincingly provided results on peer effects. We approach the discussion of existing re-
search on behavioral adaptation by subdividing the literature based on its methodological 
approach, that is: evidence from the field or from the lab.15 Although behavioral adaptation 
can be the result of various mechanisms, the economic literature (and especially its experi-
mental subset) has put emphasis on studying peer effects, which is accepted as a term more 
broadly including the different mechanisms that we discussed previously. While this discus-
sion is by far not exhaustive, we will concentrate mainly on experimental studies focusing 
                                                             
15 Beyond question, previous research on peer effects not using experiments but rather observational data has been utterly 
important to today’s research. However, for reasons discussed by Manski (1993) mentioned earlier, our literature 
discussion focuses on controlled field or lab experiments. For a discussion of empirical studies on peer effects, see Angrist 
(2014). 
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on the relevance of peer effects in driving one’s behavior that are most relevant to our 
study.16 
 
Evidence from the Field 
A comprehensive line of research suggests that peers decisively affect individual behavior. 
Several field experiments have investigated the change of individual contribution levels in 
response to the observation of other people’s contribution decisions (cf. Frey & Meier (2004), 
Laundry et al. (2006), Croson & Shang (2008), Shang & Croson (2008)). However, Zafar (2011) 
argues that those results can be explained by at least two mechanisms working simultane-
ously: the individual’s drive to conform to an underlying social norm or as a response to 
updated beliefs concerning the charity’s quality.  
For this reason, existing literature attempts to tackle the topic of behavioral spillovers from 
various angles to better understand the channels at work. For example, Ploner (2013) inves-
tigates whether peer’s behavior affects intertemporal consumption choices at a university’s 
cafeteria. He finds positive evidence for the existence of peer effects on individual decision-
making. Mas & Moretti (2009) argue that peers substantially affect a worker’s productivity 
levels positively (see also Azmet & Ichiberri (2010)). Bandiera & Rasul (2006) find that the 
farmers in Northern Mozambique condition their decision to adopt a new crop on the 
choices of their family and friends. Interestingly, they find an inverse-U shaped relationship 
suggesting that the observed social effects are positive if their social network contains few 
adopters and negative if a certain threshold is overstepped. The study of Sacerdote (2001) 
highlights that among college roommates, peers have an impact on grade point averages 
and the willingness to join fraternities. Ichino & Maggi (2000) find empirical evidence for 
shirking behavior within organizations, in particular for the case of a large Italian bank. They 
find a close relationship between an individual’s absenteeism with the rate of absenteeism 
of co-workers. Cialdini et al. (1990) and Mas & Moretti (2009) show that the observation of 
another person’s behavior leads to less littering in public places and higher productivity.  
                                                             
16 In this chapter, we will introduce and discuss different concepts from the fields of economics and (social) psychology 
that offer more distinct explanations to how and why (or why not) behavioral adaptation is driven beyond the 
encompassing term peer effects. 
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Along the lines of a more delinquent context, Wilson & Kelling (1982) have outlined the in-
terdependence of disorder and criminality within a society, introducing the terminology of 
the ‘Broken Windows Theorem’. Here, a broken window can function as a signal transmit-
ting the understanding that social norms exist and tolerate fraudulent behavior. Social pref-
erences and contextual information decisively affect one’s understanding about what is 
seemingly appropriate in a given social context, thus shedding light on individual behavior 
from a comprehensive perspective (see Beckenkamp et al. (2014) for an experimental anal-
ysis). Another example for peer effects in the unethical domain is discussed by Gould & 
Kaplan (2011). Here, the authors examined peer effects for the use of performance enhanc-
ing drugs for baseball players.  
An extensive line of controlled experiment-in-the-field research focusing on neighborhood 
effects has been triggered by the seminal papers of Case & Katz (1991) in which they found 
evidence for criminal behavioral contagion both within families and neighborhoods in the 
Boston area. Ever since, multiple research projects have examined the short- and long-run 
effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity (MTO) project in which families are eligible to partici-
pate in a lottery for vouchers that would potentially help them to move to a better and safer 
neighborhood. Since 1994, this project has been in place in five cities: Baltimore, Boston, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City. Along these lines, Katz, Kling & Liebman (2001) 
examined the short-run effects of the MTO project on the well-being of the families who 
were offered a voucher. Their findings indicate a substantial improvement of well-being 
along different dimensions, including increased safety, and improved health conditions 
both mentally and physically. Surprisingly, especially young men were susceptible to the 
neighborhood change, while the young women’s disobedience remained invariant.  
With the ability to capitalize on a more extensive continuity of data, the studies by Kling, 
Ludwig & Katz (2005) and Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007) support previous results of an asym-
metric assimilation process across gender. In terms of criminal behavior, Kling, Ludwig & 
Katz (2005) find a strong gender effect. In terms of reduced arrests for violent crimes, men 
react positively to improved living conditions, at least in the short-run. In the long-run, how-
ever, these effects vanish. Opposite to what would have been expected from moving to a 
better neighborhood, males’ general problem behavior and property crime arrest soar irre-
spectively. Conversely, females’ criminal behavior decreases. The findings of Kling, Liebman 
95 
 
& Katz (2007) indicate that although neither adult’s economic self-sufficiency nor physical 
health conditions benefited from the MTO program, the mental health improvements for 
both adults and the female youth were substantial. What is more, the beneficial effects on 
education, risky behavior, and physical health that were found on the side of females were 
fully offset by the negative effects on the side of males, thus yielding limited contentment 
of the MTO initiative based on its overall impact. In a very recent study on the MTO program, 
Chetty, Hendren & Katz (2015) find strong evidence for positive income effects for children 
who were young (age 13 or younger) when their parents moved. Surprisingly, the same ef-
fects are either non-existent or even negative in the long-run for children who were older 
than 13 when they moved. The findings indicate that the marginal gains from the MTO pro-
gram decrease with the children’s age, possibly due to disruption effects and social aliena-
tion. Although such findings are in line with literature suggesting that the duration of expo-
sure of children to better environments is predictive of the treatment effect’s magnitude, 
the results dampen the overall expedience of the MTO program (for a discussion see Chetty, 
Hendren & Katz (2015)).  
Capitalizing on a different but comprehensive dataset that includes the assignment of refu-
gee immigrants to Denmark from 1986 to 1998, Damm & Dustmann (2014) find that the share 
of convicted young people in the neighborhood significantly increases both the probability 
for a male’s convictions later in life and the total number of convicted crimes that were ex-
ecuted by men. Their findings suggest that the spillover-effects of neighborhood crime are 
distinctively linked through the channel of social interaction, which is, however, only true 
for youth criminal behavior. Because the assignment of the refugee immigrants in their sam-
ple was quasi-random, this paper draws on a spatial allocation experiment that does not 
involve dealing with issues such as endogenous neighborhood selection and thus strength-
ens the validity of their findings. Bursztyn et al. (2014) used a high-stakes field experiment 
in Brazil to study different mechanisms of peer effects. In particular, their design allowed 
them to disentangle two typically confounded channels of social influence in the context of 
financial decisions, which are social learning (learning from the peer’s choice) and social 
utility (derived utility from the peer possessing the same asset) (see Bursztyn et al. (2014) 
for a comprehensive literature review). In terms of economic and statistical significance, 
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their findings indicate that social influence is transmitted through both channels and point 
in the same direction. 
Some studies, however, find little evidence for neighborhood or peer effects. In a highly re-
garded study, Evans, Oates & Schwab (1992) show that after controlling for selection bias, 
any measurable peer effect on teenage pregnancy and school dropout rates disappear. 
While being careful in not claiming that no peer effects exist at all, they rather point critically 
to methodological issues measuring peer effects in a clean way. Angrist & Lang (2004) use 
data from the Metropolitan Council for Opportunity (Metco) desegregation program in 
which mostly black students are sent to more affluent suburbs. Their findings indicate that 
there are little, if at all, positive spillovers on students. Similarly, Burke & Sass (2013) find 
little evidence of classroom peer effects on student achievement for Florida public school 
students. Likewise, Ludwig & Kling (2007) find little evidence for the contagion of crime hy-
pothesis using MTO data. Instead, their findings indicate that crime rates are merely driven 
by neighborhood racial segregation.  
In conclusion, the existence of peer effects is up for scholarly debate, which is mainly driven 
by methodological challenges and data problems. However, in following Angrist (2014), the 
previously discussed MTO program yields the most promising setting to study clean peer 
effects in the field. Previous research that utilized MTO data yields, among other things, 
strong gender asymmetries in terms of the evolution of criminal behavior. The authors sug-
gest that these findings can be attributed to differences in which males and females respond 
to their environment and its influences. Ultimately, this leads to differences in magnitude 
and speed at which (illicit) behavior is picked up.  
 
Evidence from the Lab 
In what follows, we shall not attempt to provide an exhausting overview of the comprehen-
sive literature dealing with peer effects in general. Instead, we will focus on a range of influ-
ential studies using lab experiments to shed light on mechanisms relating to behavioral 
spillovers that are more in line with our paper’s focus. Later in the paper, we will refer to 
these studies in more detail where necessary. 
Over the last decade, a comprehensive stream of literature studying spillover-effects and 
behavioral adaptation in the lab has emerged that complement the ongoing important work 
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in the field. As discussed previously, the methodological shift was strongly driven by chal-
lenges relating to identifying these effects in a clean way using observational data. Several 
researchers claim that although the most recent generation of studies measuring such ef-
fects with observational data has succeeded to make important steps towards tacking the 
challenges outlined before, controlled lab experiments are still the gold standard in reduc-
ing noise and potential confounds (Angrist, 2014). “However, even if the setting offers an 
almost perfect opportunity to identify peer effects in many of these studies, the impossibil-
ity of controlling for all local or personal confounding factors and for endogenous sorting 
makes the identification strategy not fully convincing" (Falk & Ichino, 2006, p. 40).  
Early laboratory research studying peer effects and social identification jointly has been pi-
oneered by Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996) and Bohnet & Frey (1999). These studies made 
use of variation in the instruction’s wording or enhanced face-to-face communication to 
study the role of social identification in giving decision, equivocally finding support for its 
relevance (see also Charness & Gneezy (2008)). We will return to these studies in more detail 
in chapter 3.1.5. 
Other studies have looked into peer effects in productivity decisions. In a highly regarded 
study, Falk & Ichino (2006) found robust evidence for the existence of peer effects in a 
productivity task. Their results indicate that low-productivity workers are particularly sus-
ceptible to peer effects, which results in an over-proportional raise in productivity. Follow-
ing the work of Mas & Moretti (2009), subsequent studies tried to disentangle the naturally 
occurring channels of simultaneously observing peers and being observed by peers. For the 
most part, these studies found the latter channel to be more effective than the former in 
boosting productivity (cf. Georganas, Tonin & Vlassopolous (2013); for exceptions see Veld-
huizen, Oosterbeek & Sonnemans (2014)). 
Along the lines of studying behavior in the workplace, Gächter et al. (2012) set up an exper-
iment that investigates reciprocal behavior under observability of other people’s actions. 
They find that the individual’s extent to comply with norms of reciprocity is significantly 
driven by both pay and effort comparison information. Zafar (2011) experimentally exam-
ines charitable giving in a social context. He finds that by systematically revealing infor-
mation, both the learning about descriptive norms (through observing what others do) and 
the image-related concerns (through revealing own behavior to the reference group) drive 
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individual contribution levels. In a more delinquent context, Falk & Fischbacher (2002) in-
vestigate peer effects in the form of conditional stealing behavior. In particular, they inves-
tigate whether an individual’s inclination to steal is dependent on other peer’s stealing be-
havior. Their main findings suggest that, on the aggregate level, people make stealing deci-
sions conditional on the behavior of their peers.  
In economics, a limited number experimental research has also pointed at the contagion of 
both selfish behavior and dishonesty. Bicchieriy and Xiao (2009) study a dictator game with 
varying information on other participant’s selfish or fair behavior, finding that fairness in 
actions is contagious. More to the point of our research, Innes & Mitra (2013) use a variant of 
Gneezy’s (2005) deception game to study whether dishonesty breeds dishonesty. Their find-
ings suggest that the beliefs about other’s dishonesty is indeed contagious, potentially 
driven by the wiggle-room created by such social cues and thus representing a justification 
device for one’s personal dishonest behavior. 
 
3.1.4 Drivers of Behavioral Contagion: An Interdisciplinary Perspec-
tive 
Prior to delving into the subject in more detail, some effort will be made to disentangle many 
of those existing concepts explaining why and under which circumstances people demon-
strate a change in behavior as a function of their peer’s behavior.  In both economics and 
psychology, several concepts have been developed over the past few decades referring to 
similar and often the same reasoning to change one’s own behavior.17 The complexity of the 
self and the dependency of one’s own behavior on what one observes of peers has received 
a lot of scholarly attention (cf. Baumeister (1987), Kahneman & Tversky (2009)). It is thus 
important to shed light on the underlying concepts driving behavioral adaptation. In this 
context, we will differentiate between concepts that originated in the (I) economic literature 
and in the (II) literature of (social) psychology. The economic concepts include (I.1) social 
decisions and social distance (Akerlof (1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)), (I.2) image re-
lated concerns (Bernheim, 1994), (I.3) taste for conformity (Bernheim, 1994), and (I.4) imita-
tion (Alós-Ferrer & Schlag (2009), Sliwka (2007)). In addition, we also discuss some (social) 
                                                             
17 See discussion in chapter 3.1.3. 
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psychological concepts including (II.1) social learning (Bandura (1971)), (II.2) norms (Cialdini 
et al. (1990), Bicchieri (2006)), and (II.3) psychological closeness and vicarious dishonesty 
(Aron & Aron (1986), Goldstein & Cialdini (2007)). 
One point is worth clarifying. In this paper, we shall not attempt to settle the argument 
which scholarly approach explains behavior best. Rather, for our purpose, we will use the 
previously defined unifying terms behavioral adaptation or behavioral contagion through-
out the paper in order to refer to one person’s decision to change initial behavior as a func-
tion of observed behavior from at least one other person. Using this umbrella term will allow 
us to focus on what is relevant without getting lost in conceptual debates. We deem it im-
portant to help understand the role social proximity plays in the change of behavior and to 
what extent proximity mediates the spillover of ethical and unethical behavior.  
It will be the next sub-chapters’ aim to dissect the different approaches in more detail and 
to explain the reasons why this is the case. At times, the predictions and the empirical out-
comes are identical, but the underlying forces causing such outcomes are diverse. In what 
follows, we will discuss the different theories outlined above and their implications with re-
spect to changes in behavior. At the end of this chapter, we will relate these theories to our 
experiment and provide a systematic breakdown with respect to the fit of each particular 
theory to explain behavior in our design.18  
 
3.1.4.1 Concepts in Economics 
Social Decisions and Social Distance 
Seminal contributions by Akerlof (1997) and Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004) were among the 
first to provide an economic framework highlighting the relevance of social distance in af-
fecting social interaction and behavioral adaptation. Beyond rationalizing one’s own behav-
ior in an isolated environment, research indicates that behavior is a function of both pure 
own-maximizing and other-regarding concerns. 
                                                             
18 It is worth noting, however, that our discussion here will be purely descriptively. We will contrast the explanatory power 
of these concepts within the frame of our experiment in chapter 3.1.6.  
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For a while, traditional economics has neglected such interdependence and rather put em-
phasis on individualism. In reality, however, decisions are rarely brought about in total iso-
lation, but are rather the result of an interplay with one’s (social) environment. Arguably, 
individuals care about both status concerns (in absolute and relative comparisons) and 
other’s well-being (Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), Charness & Rabin 
(2002)). Because social interactions typically render externalities with the potential of slow-
ing down conversion towards socially (un-)desirable equilibria, it is important to under-
stand the underlying mechanism.  
In his attempt to explain the connection between social interaction and behavioral adapta-
tion (conformity, in particular), Akerlof (1997) made use of the Newtonian theory of gravity. 
Akerlof’s approach centers on explaining conformist behavior as a function of distance in 
the social space. Such difference in one’s social space is characterized by the difference in 
behavior between oneself and a person or group of relevance. For his purpose, Akerlof ap-
plies the concepts of a gravity model allowing him to argue that conformity leads to benefits 
(e.g. higher individual utility or gains from trade) that are negatively correlated with dis-
tance in social space.19 Akerlof puts a reduced form concept forward in which one’s utility 
declines as the individual’s behavior deviates from the behavior of others. Assuming the ex-
istence of representative agents, his model predictions yield a set of equilibria in which the 
ultimate behavior of all individuals is the same, thus clearly characterizing the behavior of 
every party.20  
                                                             
19 Because geographic location is one determinant of social interaction, this approach is a generalization of what 
sociologists have coined “social geography”, which has been inspired by Krugman’s (1991) work on economic geography.  
20 Although ex-post behavior is uniform across individuals in equilibrium, such an approach still models conformism 
because of the ex-ante desire to be and behave like others. Akerlof also proposes an extension with individual 
heterogeneity that allows for the formation of social sub-groups with own norms and values. The extension models a 
mechanism in which (randomly distributed) past social location for each individual is inherited. In combination with static 
expectations about “the positions to be occupied by others in social space […] such a model can portray stable groups in 
low level equilibrium traps because individual’s incentives to choose x to conform with those whose inherited social 
locations are close may overwhelm their incentives to choose x for intrinsic reasons” (Akerlof, 1997, p. 1010).  In our 
experiment, we will study this mechanism by holding the other’s behavior fixed and thus allowing for deliberate behavioral 
adaptation free of unstable, higher-order, or even nonexistent beliefs about the other person’s next move. We will return 
to this argument in our design section. 
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Ultimately, in order to maximize one’s intrinsic utility, the individual will converge towards 
the observed behavior and thus reduces the existing social distance.21 With reduced dis-
tance, social interactions become more favorable through facilitation of e.g. mutually ben-
eficial trade. 
 
Image Related Concerns 
In understanding individual behavior, one fundamental question arises: “How much of what 
we do is the result of our genetic code (nature); and how much of it is a function of our envi-
ronment, including the actions of those around us and our own past actions (nurture)?” 
(Cabral, 2005, p. 15). The threat of reputation loss and being punished in the case of wrong-
doing is an integral component of individual decision making in general. By weighing costs 
against benefits, the impact of possible reputation loss might deter individuals to engage in 
illicit behavior of any kind. 
Individuals are striving for social inclusion and recognition. They want to belong to one or 
more social groups and engage in social interaction. Striving for social identity is an inherent 
characteristic, thus decisively driving the individual’s yearning for maintaining an adequate 
reputation. In this sense, losing face as the result of deviant behavior may serve as an avoid-
ance, as this might result in exclusion from the group (cf. Bernheim (1994)). Along these 
lines, Akerlof (1980) argues that the deviation from social standards might lead to loss of 
social reputation and consequently to ostracism. However, it is worth noting that deviant 
behavior not necessarily implies bad behavior per se, but has to be understood as a devia-
tion from the underlying social norm in either direction. Reputation can also work as a 
means to preserve a coherent self-image that allows keeping an internal consistency (cf. 
Baumeister (1998)). The concept of the self has multiple facets and impact behavior in dif-
ferent ways, as level of self-regard and self-esteem, the extent and content of self-identity 
as well as the structure of the self-concept exhibit motivational implications (cf. Wells 
                                                             
21 A point not made clear in this approach is whether such desire to conform is also dependent on the signaling value of 
one’s behavioral adaptation. The model argues that the desire to conform and reduce social distance is entirely driven by 
intrinsic concerns. However, the inability to signal conformity to one’s peers runs counter to the initial concept of 
conformism (introduced by, for example, Ash (1958) and Bernheim (1994). Thus, this concept rather resembles the ideas 
of imitation of preferences (Sliwka, 2007) or self-expansion (Aron & Aron, 1986) that will be addressed in the next sub-
chapters. 
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(1978)). By that, people try to avoid a negative update of their self-image through their ac-
tions, which otherwise would result in an internal conflict. Such a mechanism possesses the 
power to prevent individuals from engaging in delinquent behavior in the first place. This 
mechanism is more distinct when the group is salient, consequently giving rise to more ex-
tensive alignment with the group’s behavior. What is more, own actions could also be sub-
ject to social signaling, which highlights the perception of oneself by others and thus poten-
tially triggering conform behavior (cf. Grossman (2010)). It is important to clearly distinguish 
between these two motives and mechanisms when analyzing one’s individual drivers for 
conform behavior.22  
However, for image related concerns to be effective, a setting of repeated interactions has 
to be in place. In a one-shot setting, the threat of a reputation loss is negligible as the players 
won’t face each other for a second time. If recurring interaction is not taking place, any de-
viant behavior can neither be traced back to the individual nor will be colored negatively 
with regard to future collaboration. Existing research supports this perspective. For exam-
ple, there is comprehensive experimental literature pointing to the fact that contributions 
and compliance with underlying norms rise in multiple-shot interactions. In particular, this 
is true when transparency (e.g. ability to observe other participants’ contribution decisions) 
or punishment (e.g. for non-compliance with social norms) is possible (cf. Andreoni (1995), 
Fehr & Gächter (2000), Cameron et al. (2009), Chaudhuri (2011)). Consequently, in order for 
reputation to be effective (even in absence of a punishment-mechanism), a setting of re-
peated interaction has to be in place and actions have to be observable to other people.  
 
Taste for Conformity 
Research and observations of real life situations indicate that underlying social factors de-
cisively influence individual behavior. Motivation for a particular behavior is driven by the 
inherent desire to be valued and to win prestige, esteem, popularity, and acceptance 
(Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008). Arguably, both the introversive coherence and outward 
appreciation matters and can be achieved through conformity in behavior. The basic idea 
here is that any infinitesimal deviation from effective norms might be punished by the social 
                                                             
22 These aspects will be taken into consideration in the experimental design. We will return to this point later. 
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group (Bernheim (1994); see also Akerlof (1980) and Tirole (1996) for related work on the role 
of reputation in individual decision making and behavioral alignment).  
In his seminal contribution, Bernheim (1994) formalized the concept of taste conformity. He 
argues that the individual’s preference for status is in line with psychological, evolutionary, 
and behavioral considerations. In particular, natural selection favors concerns for status as 
this goes hand in hand with greater opportunities for reproduction. From a behavioral point 
of view, such concerns act as a reinforcing device to form preferences for higher esteem be-
cause esteemed individuals are more likely to receive better treatment. 
Although partly representing a departure from the traditional formulation of preferences, 
this approach does not necessarily require the abandonment of consistent, self-interested 
optimization processes. By assuming that status depends on “public perceptions about an 
individual’s preferences over actions […] esteem is determined by expectations about fu-
ture actions and that tastes and proclivities are the best predictors of future actions” 
(Bernheim, 1994, p. 843).  
Unsurprisingly, research indicates that people share similar preferences and opinions 
within the same group, which can arguably be both the antecedent and the effect of social 
interaction and norm alignment.23 Aligning with existing norms is a way to signal one’s 
(wishful) belonging to a certain social group. As argued by Hogg & Tindale (2002), enacting 
in-group-prototypical behavior is a way to validate one’s own group membership, not only 
to the social group but also to themselves. By that, aligned behavior might function as a 
signal to both the external (e.g. the peers) and the internal world (e.g. themselves) in order 
to solidify the sense of belonging. If the individual cares about status, one has to set the right 
signals to the peers in order to create esteem. This esteem will be provided in case the indi-
vidual behaves in a way that is expected from him. 
In this vein, Bernheim (1994, p. 844) derives the following proposition, highlighting the de-
cision process leading to behavioral adaptation: 
“When popularity is sufficiently important relative to intrinsic utility (defined as the 
utility derived directly from consumption), many individuals conform to a single, 
                                                             
23 Manski (1993) refers to this as the previously mentioned reflection problem, rendering it extremely difficult to study clean 
peer-effects in the field. We will return to this point shortly in the experiment’s design section of chapter 3.1.6.  
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homogeneous standard of behavior, despite heterogeneous underlying prefer-
ences. They are willing to suppress their individuality and conform to the social 
norm because they recognize that even small departures from the norm will seri-
ously impair their popularity.” 
Arguably, the extent at which people are willing to align with their peer’s behavior is driven 
by the degree of social identification to the social group. Social identity theory provides 
helpful guidance to distinguish between different magnitudes of personal identification 
with the peer’s behavior (cf. Tajfel & Turner (1979), Tajfel (1982)). According to this ap-
proach, people categorize themselves and other persons into different social groups. Mem-
bership in a group is defined as the social identity and individuals strive to enhance their 
position and self-esteem through actions. These actions encompass the alignment with ex-
isting group norms. “[…] the social identity analysis of categorization processes suggests 
that group cohesion or solidarity is not only attraction among group members, but also at-
titudinal and behavioral consensus, ethnocentrism, in-group favoritism and intergroup dif-
ferentiation, and so forth – the entire range of effects of categorization-based depersonali-
zation” (Hogg & Tindale, 2002, p. 65). A comprehensive stream of literature suggests that 
such identification is driven by in-group-out-group concerns, finding that in-group favorit-
ism is found across different contexts and social settings (cf. Tajfel (1982), Hoffman, McCabe 
& Smith (1996), Bohnet & Frey (1999), Eckel & Petrie (2011), Charness & Gneezy (2008)). From 
this one can derive the assumption that the stronger the desire to be part of the in-group, 
the stronger one’s intrinsic willingness to comply with prevalent rules and engage in con-
formity by adapting social norms. Such a desire is driven by, for example, the inherent rele-
vance of the social image component (cf. Andreoni & Bernheim (2009)). The stronger the 
social identity with a reference group, the stronger the effect of social comparison on indi-
vidual conformity. Overall, taste for conformity is a function of existing social identity and 
the extent of social comparison to one’s reference group. Deviating from the group’s behav-
ior (even in extreme cases where the group behavior is clearly wrong, cf. Asch (1958)) and 
thus being perceived as different might create discomfort in form of substantial disutility. 
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Imitation 
In this subchapter, we will discuss two streams of literature suggesting that behavioral ad-
aptation is the result of either pure behavioral imitation (e.g. due to observing behavior that 
leads to a superior outcome) or the adjustment of preferences (e.g. contingent on the be-
havior of the peers). With no claim to completeness, this chapter’s focus will lie on the se-
lected sample of contributions discussing the topics of behavioral imitation and adjustment 
of preference as a mechanism for behavioral adaptation. 
Pure Behavioral Imitation 
Imitation is a common behavioral trait of both animals and humans (Laland, 2002). While it 
is likely that imitation is driven by evolutionary and cultural facets, its pervasiveness can 
only be explained if it sufficiently often leads to a desirable outcome. Imitation has a number 
of desirable features because it allows one, among other things, to free ride on superior in-
formation (in the spirit of social learning, but see also Sinclair (1990)), to save mental re-
sources (in the spirit of bounded rationality, but see also Conlisk (1980)), or as a means to be 
regarded similar to others (in the spirit of the social esteem argument, but see also Cho & 
Kreps (1987)). 
Along these lines, Alós-Ferrer & Schlag (2009) abstract from the standard Bayesian belief-
based approach and introduce the concept of imitation as a belief-free behavioral rule. The 
authors make the case that imitation is triggered by the observation of a superior outcome. 
In face of different imitation concepts, the degree of sophistication involved in assessing the 
extent of the observed agent’s better performance clearly dominates a simple ‘follow who-
ever performs better than me’ rule. The reason behind this argumentation is that “the reluc-
tance to switch when the observed choices are only slightly better than the own might not 
be due to switching costs, but rather to the fact that the payoff-sensitivity of the imitation 
rule allows the population to learn the best option” (Alos-Ferrer & Schlag, 2009, p. 273). In 
essence, this approach highlights the idea that behavioral adaptation can be triggered by 
behavioral imitation that results from observing (sufficiently) superior outcomes.  
Adjustment of Preferences 
Another strain of literature models behavioral adaptation in a way that is hard to swallow 
by traditional economists: preferences are not stable per se but are subject to interrelations 
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with the encompassing ecological system (cf. Sliwka (2007)). In his work, Sliwka (2007) in-
troduced a third group of agents (in addition to agents of the homo oeconomicus type and 
agents with other-regarding preferences, cf. Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels 
(2000)), namely the ‘conformists’. Here, such conformists are stochastic learners and exert 
behavioral adaptation through imitation of preferences.  
Such conformists find themselves in a situation of uncertainty concerning the appropriate 
and acknowledged behavior by the social group. By such definition, a conformist will then 
be inclined to adapt his own behavior if he believes that this particular behavior is repre-
sented, meaning sufficiently supported and performed, by other agents. Observing certain 
behavior induces learning about other peoples’ preferences, which in turn potentially trig-
gers behavioral adaptation on the side of the agent.  
Arguably, a conformist of the Sliwka-type is an agent who is driven by moral convictions 
and, although being mindful of social norms, will only be guided by them if he believes that 
a sufficiently large subset of the relevant social group will behave in the same way. He will 
also suffer remorse only if such feelings of guilt are sufficiently represented within the social 
group (also see Kandel & Lazear (1992)). 
While classical economists might find the idea of contingent preferences hard to swallow, 
the recent years’ literature has steadily evolved modeling social preferences beyond what 
has typically been assumed to be the case for fully rational agents. This approach is backed 
up by a variety of findings indicating that individual taste is not invariant but merely subject 
to social influence (Salganik, et al., 2006), which is in line with existing psychological litera-
ture on the pertinence of social influence (cf. Sherif (1937), Ash (1952), and Cialdini & Gold-
stein (2004)). 
 
3.1.4.2 Concepts in (Social) Psychology 
Social Learning Theory 
Individuals constantly send signals through their behavior. These signals soak through dif-
ferent channels and as such not only reveal personal preferences but also transmit infor-
mation about the current state-of-the-world (Anderson & Holt, 1997). Observed behavior is 
constantly evaluated by the environment (i.e. the peers), triggering an action that is fre-
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quently referred to as social learning. Potentially, this allows other individuals to infer rele-
vant information with respect to accepted or correct behavior (cf. Banerjee (1992), Ellison & 
Fudenberg (1993), Bikhchandani et al. (1998), Bikchandani & Sharma (2000), Chari & Kehoe 
(2004)). Broadly speaking, this particular strain of literature suggests that behavioral adap-
tation can be subdivided into two fundamental mechanisms, one of which is social learning 
and the other, social utility (Bursztyn, et al., 2014)).  
Along these lines, Bandura’s (1986) Theory of Social Learning emphasizes that behavior is 
the result of what has been learned through the observation of others rather than through 
trial-and-error. In particular, social learning is referred to in situations where individuals in-
fer from a third party’s behavior, such as buying decision, that the product must be of high 
quality. This in turn initiates own buying decisions. With respect to financial markets, herd-
ing behavior based on social learning assumes that conscious actions, such as buying deci-
sions of an asset, transmit a positive signal about the product’s value to the observer, thus 
increasing the probability that this action will be imitated. Under social learning, individuals 
constantly engage in a form of Bayesian-updating and adjust their understanding of the 
world.24 The current trend of social trading notices this development, which utilizes the 
power of swarm intelligence to carry out investment decisions on the stock market (cf. Neu-
mann et al. (2013)). By following the crowd, these people anticipate some existing infor-
mation asymmetry and assume that the ones who act are the ones who are better-informed 
(cf. Conlisk (1980), Bernheim (1994)). 
In sum, Bandura’s approach stresses the idea that individual behavior is driven by informa-
tional motives and that we learn from direct experience, interaction, and observation. Con-
sequently, social interaction allows individuals to learn and adapt established behavior.  
 
Norms 
By nature, humans are social creatures who use norms as guidance to learn what should 
and should not be done. The social context shapes the understanding and perception of 
existing norms, which in turn substantially affect individual behavior. Along these lines, the 
                                                             
24 Conversely, social utility implies that “one’s utility from possessing an asset (or product) depends directly on the 
possession of that asset (or product) by another individual.” (Bursztyn, et al., 2014, p. 2). Although of particular relevance 
for explaining behavioral traits on, among others, financial markets, this approach will not be investigated further. 
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contributions by Cialdini et al. (1990) and Bicchieri (2006) have fueled our understanding of 
norms in general and their role in shaping social interactions.  
We start by noting that research is disunited on what exactly is meant by a social norm. In 
addition, Postlewaite (2011) argues that economists have often been reluctant to incorpo-
rate social aspects such as norms into their analysis, especially if the results lead to a devi-
ation from the standard neoclassical predictions. This, in turn, triggers even more fragmen-
tation within and among the fields of research. For our purpose, we define norms as “the 
result of shared notions of appropriate behavior and the willingness of individuals to reward 
appropriate behavior and punish inappropriate behavior. […] As long as the rewards and 
punishments are sufficiently large, norms can stabilize a vast range of different behaviors” 
(Boyd & Richerson, 2001, p. 283). Appropriate behavior is believed to be represented by a 
social norm if “the behavior differs from that of other groups in similar environments” 
(Postlewaite, 2011, p. 32). From the perspective of game theory, Binmore (1998) adds that 
social life is an infinite game with norms representing equilibria that are in line with the folk 
theorem where both types of individuals are punished, norm violators and those who fail to 
punish them.25 From this, we can conclude that social norms sustain because individuals 
have, among others, “a desire to coordinate, [a] fear of being sanctioned, [and want to] sig-
nal membership in the group, or simply follow the lead of others” (Young, 2015, p. 359). 
In their seminal work, Cialdini et al. (1990) separate two types of norms that drive individual 
behavior. On the one hand, the descriptive norms induce an understanding of what is (sup-
posedly) normal and thus mirrors the status-quo. Observing other people’s behavior trig-
gers a decisional shortcut as one relies on what seems to be sensible based on observed 
behavior. Conversely, the injunctive norm mirrors an individual’s beliefs about how some-
one (supposedly) ought to behave. This norm is socially loaded and highlights what is mor-
ally approved or disapproved. This said, “rather than simply informing one’s actions, these 
norms enjoin it through the promise of social sanctions. Because what is approved is often 
                                                             
25 Boyd & Richerson (2001) provide a theoretical model explaining the mechanism of norm adaptation under the existence 
of occasional learning and inherent conformism. For an extended evolutionary perspective see McAdams (1997), Bowles & 
Gintis (2004), and Richerson & Boyd (1998). However, the question of why individuals choose to enforce norms remains 
open. We follow Boyd & Richerson (2001, p. 283) and assume “that the problem of why people choose to enforce norms 
has somehow been resolved […] over the long history of human evolution.” 
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what is typically done, it is easy to confuse these two meanings of norms.” (Cialdini, et al., 
1990, p. 1015).  
In addition, Bicchieri (2006) introduces the notion of conditional preferences (preferences 
that are conditional on social expectations) and unconditional preferences (preferences 
that are purely inherent to the individual, like self- and other-regarding preferences). In 
terms of individual norm compliance, Bicchieri argues that expectations are the main driv-
ers. Here, the individual’s inclination to obey norms is driven by both social beliefs, which 
are represented by normative and empirical expectations, as well as by non-social beliefs, 
such as factual and personal normative beliefs. Social beliefs are represented by two sets of 
expectations. For one, normative expectations describe second order beliefs about what 
others think should be done. For another, empirical expectations represent what one ex-
pects others will do. As elaborated in Bicchieri & Xiao (2009), such expectation can be 
grounded on past observations of conformity or its consequences. Individual conformity is 
thus conditional on both belief sets. In turn, non-social beliefs are represented by factual 
beliefs (that is, beliefs about the actual consequences of behavior) and personal normative 
beliefs (that is, what one personally thinks should be done). “A social norm then is a collec-
tive practice sustained by empirical and normative expectations and by preferences condi-
tional on both these expectations” (Bicchieri, et al., 2014, p. 4).  
Norms play an important role in everyday life and are decisive in establishing and sustaining 
social interactions. They determine the way we perceive the world and make sense out of it. 
The existence of norms provides an explanation to why and when behavior is contagious 
since individuals often follow and subordinate to the prohibition, indulgence, or encourage-
ment of (un)ethical norms without much deliberation or putting it into question (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2001). In addition, Boyd & Richerson (2001) suggest that the saliency of norms 
depends on its source (e.g. on whom one interacts with), thus suggesting that norm obedi-
ence is likely to be a function of culture in general and social proximity in particular. This 
sometimes leads to the perverse outcome of antisocial punishment, in which social behav-
ior is punished because it does not correspond to the society’s norms (e.g. Herrmann, Thöni 
& Gächter (2008)).  
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Psychological Closeness and Vicarious Dishonesty 
In social psychology, there is a comprehensive stream of literature introducing concepts of 
psychological closeness and vicarious dishonesty. These concepts serve the purpose of ex-
plaining the mechanism of behavioral adaptation in various contexts. A brief discussion of 
the more prominent approaches follows. 
The self-expansion theory as proposed by Aron & Aron (1986) and extended by Aron et al. 
(1992) argues that the underlying mechanism of close relationships is defined by the inclu-
sion of others in the self. In particular, the broadening of one’s self is likely to occur if we are 
(or at least feel) close to the other person. Existing research highlights a number of factors 
that influence one’s feelings of attachment towards other persons. Among these, sharing a 
common group membership (Tajfel, 1982), a similar name (Pelham, et al., 2005), the same 
birthday (Cialdini & DeNichols, 1989), or even imagining closeness (Goldstein & Cialdini, 
2007) are found to trigger self-expansion and thus matter for conformity to selfish or un-
faithful behavior (Gino & Galinsky, 2012). Hence, individuals take the perspective of others, 
afford them “self” status, and are likely to adopt other people’s behavior when social close-
ness is imagined (Galinsky, et al., 2005). Along these lines, Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) ar-
gue that when closeness is imagined, individuals make inferences about the other person’s 
attributes based on observed behavior and reflect upon them just as if they would have en-
gaged in the very same behavior themselves.  
As psychological closeness blurs the gap between self and others, such vicarious self-per-
ception processes facilitate mimicry and render behavioral adaptation more likely the 
stronger the feelings of attachment are. In this vein, Gino and Galinsky (2012) argue and find 
experimental support that psychological closeness to an unethically acting person creates 
distance from one’s own moral compass, thus increasing the likelihood of conformity to-
wards unethical behavior.26  
 
                                                             
26 More concepts emphasizing the degree of social distance between individuals as a driving factor of behavioral 
adaptation are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.1.5. 
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3.1.5 The Role of Social Identity and Observed (Un)Ethicality in Be-
havioral Contagion 
3.1.5.1 Conceptual Introduction 
Beyond Becker’s (1968) seminal work on the rational criminal, recent work within the field 
of economics started implementing factors such as identity and culture into an individual’s 
decision framework (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). While this stream of literature does not nec-
essarily yield hypotheses contradicting those generated by the rational crime economics 
literature, the inclusion of identity, morals, and reputation allows one to draw a more com-
prehensive picture of individual decision-making (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011).   
In fact, existing research points to the relevance of social identity in determining social in-
teraction such as the degree of trust and reciprocity (Leider, et al., 2009). Psychologists have 
devoted decades of research efforts to the study of group identity, which is closely related 
to the concept of social identity. Group identity is a function of social identity and is driven 
by one’s identification with a social group. Sufficient identification triggers an in-group bias, 
indicating a preference for one’s identified in-group along different dimensions (see also 
Gino, Ayal & Ariely (2009)).27 Exemplarily, Chen & Li (2009) use painting preferences as a so-
cial identity and a matching device to study charitable giving, envy, punishment, and social 
concerns. Some research has also investigated the role of social identity for cooperation 
(Eckel & Grossman, 2005) and equilibrium selection (Chen & Chen, 2011). 
Beyond the concepts explaining general behavioral adaptation that we have already dis-
cussed in chapter 3.1.3, some theories predict that social identity affects the magnitude of 
behavioral adaptation. Exemplarily, McLeod et al. (1966) introduced the concept of the at-
traction effect, arguing that conformity is mediated by the level of social identification be-
tween two people or a group. The self-expansion theory highlights that the people’s sense of 
the self can be broadened in order to include others and even more so if we feel close to 
them. In consequence, the person’s self-bias (e.g. egoism) includes not only himself but also 
extends to others (Aron & Aron, 1986). Within the framework of the vicarious self-perception 
theory, observing the behavior of people that are closer from a social identity perspective 
                                                             
27 See Chen & Li (2009) for a comprehensive review of related literature. 
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may induce a carry-over effect of behavior (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007), whereas the perspec-
tive-taking theory assumes that the imagined social closeness is already sufficient to facili-
tate behavioral adaptation (Galinsky, et al., 2005).   
As has been discussed previously, psychological research has introduced a number of ways 
to proxy social identity in the lab. Due to methodological differences, existing economic re-
search has resorted primarily to using rough proxies to introduce social identification in one 
form or another. Exemplarily, this has been achieved by varying the wording of the experi-
mental instructions (Hoffman, et al., 1996), using face-to-face interaction (Bohnet & Frey, 
1999) or showing pictures (Eckel & Petrie, 2011), revealing names (Charness & Gneezy, 2008), 
revealing preferences such as those for paintings (Chen & Li, 2009), and recruiting friends 
and family members (Brandts & Solà, 2010). In line with most psychological research, these 
studies find that social identity triggers in-group favoritism.  
However, two natural problems arise with these approaches to introduce social identifica-
tion in the lab: firstly, the introduction of potential biases caused by face-to-face communi-
cation within the lab or letting participants interact with their kin (Roth, 1995). Exemplarily, 
it has been shown that individuals discriminate using social cues such as looks or skin color 
(Eckel & Petrie, 2011). Additional research has investigated other-regarding behavior as a 
function of social distance. Using the dictator game setting, Bohnet & Frey (1999) find that 
other-regarding behavior is more pronounced under stronger identification. They incepted 
stronger identification by the use of identification prior to the dictator game. Again, their 
approach is only a rough proxy for social proximity and does not control for potential biases 
stemming from, among others, unobserved attraction effects. Secondly, and more along the 
lines of our experiment, applying these methods to introduce social identification does not 
usually allow for a variation of social proximity beyond a simple binary outcome of no social 
identification versus some social identification. In our experiment, we propose a method 
that allows us to naturally vary the degree of social identification in the lab without having 
to deal with the issues raised above. We will return to this in our design section. 
Overall, it may be stated that different streams of existing research point at the significance 
of social identity in explaining the magnitude of behavioral adaptation thus making it worth-
while to examine this topic in more detail. 
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The ethicality of observed behavior might also be decisive to the magnitude of behavioral 
adaptation. As we will argue throughout this paper and will be explained more formally in 
this chapter, we expect that observations of unethical behavior render behavioral adapta-
tion more likely and more extensive as compared to observations of ethical behavior. Exist-
ing empirical literature on the slippery-slope effect (cf. Gino & Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. 
(2015)) as well as on the “broken windows effect” (cf. Beckenkamp et al. (2014), Lefebvre, 
Pestieau, Riedl & Villeval (2015)) support this point of view.28 Arguably, the magnitude of be-
havioral adaptation is asymmetric in one direction or another, indicating that the likeli-
hoods for adapting behavior are different when observing ethical or unethical behavior. Be-
low, we will provide some theoretical arguments for this claim before turning to a more for-
mal approach. 
Individuals engage in ethical and unethical behavior for all sorts of reasons and sometimes 
turn evil extremely quickly under particular circumstances (see the infamous Milgram ex-
periment (Milgram, 1963) and Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiment (Zimbardo, 1971)). 
Different perspectives are helpful in understanding one’s rationalization to engage in 
(un)ethical behavior, such as self-rationalization, obedience to norms, or active signaling to 
one’s peers. 
Individuals tend to rationalize their behavior with themselves while trying to avoid cognitive 
strain stemming from, among others, negative self-image updating (cf. Wells (1978), 
Baumeister (1998)). Here, individuals do not want to think of themselves as a bad person 
and thus tend to engage in self-deception and moral rationalization and create positive dis-
illusions that sustain a positive self-image (cf. Taylor (1989), Mazar, Amir & Ariely (2008)). 
“Self-deception allows one to behave self-interestedly while, at the same time, falsely be-
lieving that one’s moral principles were upheld. The end result of this internal con game is 
that the ethical aspects of the decision “fade” into the background, the moral implications 
obscured” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 223). Arguably, by avoiding thinking of immoral 
acts as such, mental processes leading to a denial of facts facilitate a person’s inclination 
towards unethical behavior.  
                                                             
28 Although not explicitly along the lines of (un)ethical behavior, a similar argument can be made based on the findings 
within the extensive literature on conditional cooperation and punishment (see Chaudhuri (2010) for a selective review). 
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From the perspective of norm theory, the exposition of unethical behavior comes with a rel-
atively higher risk of being condemned by and excluded from the social group (Bicchieri, 
2006). The degree to which one can behave unethically (if at all) among one’s social peers is 
typically grounded in uncertainty. Consequently, a person’s decision to engage in either eth-
ical or unethical behavior is not only simple cost-gain maximization under risk but also in-
volves accounting for the inherent uncertainty. The uncertainty involves, among others, the 
deviation from what is deemed appropriate within the social group, reputation loss, and the 
potential exclusion from the group. From a psychological perspective, engaging in unethical 
behavior involves higher costs, as one has to forcefully convince oneself that gaining per-
sonally at the expense of harming others is acceptable. Processes leading up to this reason-
ing involve, among others, self-deception, justification, and hypocrisy. Typically, only the 
acting individual profits from unethical behavior in (non-) monetary terms, such as stealing 
money, while another person is losing out. In turn, however, normally both individuals gain 
from ethical behavior such as donating money: the receiving individual gains in monetary 
terms and the acting individual, while losing out in monetary terms, is (over-)compensated 
from a behavioral perspective by either the positive feelings of warm glow of giving and al-
truism (Becker (1974), Andreoni (1989) & (1990)) or social pressure (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). 
Plausibly, to convince oneself to behave unethically involves more (psychological) effort 
than to behave ethically.  
From a signaling perspective, observing someone who is socially closer to oneself as com-
pared to observing a stranger sends a more salient form of social learning about appropriate 
(or at least tolerated) behavior within the social group. This assumption is also along the 
lines of Schelling’s (1968) prominently stated “the more we know, the more we care” and a 
number of experimental results in various settings (see Eckel & Grossman (1996), Bohnet & 
Frey (1999), Charness & Gneezy (2008), and Gino & Gallinsky (2012)). The resulting resolution 
of uncertainty allows the individual to overrule their own concerns about the inappropriate-
ness of unethical behavior. This stream of literature suggests that observing unethical be-
havior might trigger stronger contagion as compared to observing ethical behavior. For 
these and more reasons, we expect behavioral adaptation to be asymmetrically biased to-
wards unethical behavior. 
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3.1.5.2 Theoretical Model 
We extend the model introduced by Akerlof (1997) and expand the underlying concepts in a 
way that is conducive to understanding the role of social identity and the (un)ethicality of 
observed behavior in behavioral contagion.29 Previous work put emphasis on modeling so-
cial interactions and behavioral adaptation as a function of distance in the social space, e.g. 
resulting from distance in behavior and geographic location to one’s peers. We, however, 
shed light on the relevance of social distance and proximity resulting from overlapping and 
common interests and preferences in driving behavioral adaptation. Intuitively, one could 
reasonably assume that the behavior of one’s family and friends exhibits a more salient sig-
nal and thus is taken more strongly into consideration than observing random strangers. 
What is more, we follow the previous discussion and assume additionally an asymmetry in 
behavioral contagion depending on the ethicality of the observed behavior. This is a sub-
stantial extension to Akerlof (1997), where an asymmetric adaptation in behavior cannot be 
illustrated. 
The purpose of this section is to outline a simple reduced-form model that allows one to 
draw predictions about individual contribution decisions in the various contexts that are 
reflected by the experimental design. These predictions can then be tested empirically. The 
principal goal of this exercise is to show how behavioral contagion is mediated by social 
identity and the (un)ethicality of observed behavior and how these factors affect the adap-
tation gap, that is the difference between one’s own and observed behavior, after contagion 
has taken place. We will introduce the symmetric model first before turning to the extension. 
 
Symmetric Contagion 
Prior to introducing the formal model, we begin with the intuition of what the model should 
capture. The underlying idea is that individual behavior is a function of the peer’s actions 
                                                             
29 In particular, we focus on Akerlof’s (1997) quadratic utility version of the conformity model as this generates unique 
equilibria from which we can derive testable hypotheses for our experiment, which we also deem to be more in line with 
the general story of this paper. While Akerlof’s general model puts more emphasis on one’s own decisions, the quadratic 
utility model has an a priori assumption that puts one’s own and peer behavior on an equal footing with respect to how 
behavior affects individual utility. Assuming that individuals are on a continuum between extremely selfish and extremely 
altruistic, the quadratic utility approach is conclusive. It should be noted that this assumption is not crucial to our model’s 
predictions as we mainly focus on the relevance of two factors, i.e. social identity and the (un)ethicality of observed 
behavior, in affecting one’s own decisions. Thus, the equal-weight assumption is not decisive in predicting the direction in 
which individual behavior changes as a function of those two factors.   
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and thus encompasses more than one’s self-referentiality. In a situation of social interac-
tion, an individual is expected to face a trade-off, weighing one’s own preferences against 
the peer’s revealed preferences. To stay in Manski’s (1993) terms, social interaction and the 
understanding that one’s own actions are reflected by the peers and thus have an impact 
on other (closely related) people shapes the individual’s willingness to engage in behavioral 
adaptation. The magnitude to which one is willing to revise one’s own initial behavior and 
adapt is first and foremost a function of the social proximity to the peer. “As a consequence, 
the impact of my choices on my interactions with other members of my social network may 
be the primary determinant of my decision, with the ordinary determinants of choice the 
direct additions and subtractions from utility due to the choice) of only secondary im-
portance” (Akerlof, 1997, pp. 1006-1007). It is thus reasonable to assume that the individ-
ual’s utility is subject to a relative evaluation of one’s own behavior and the behavior of the 
peers. Similar to Akerlof (1997), the underlying characteristic of our model is the feature that 
individual utility is declining with increasing distance between one’s own behavior and the 
peer’s behavior. While the aim of this section is to outline a model that explains changes in 
general behavior, we will use the resulting predictions to generate hypotheses in the context 
of (un)ethical behavior.  
In our design, we resort to a two-stage dictator game in which each individual is paired with 
a charity of his choice. Both, the individual and the charity start with an initial endowment 
ࡵࢉ = ࡵ࢏ = ࡵ ∈ ℝା of equal size. At each stage ࢚ ∈ [1, 2], each individual ࢏ faces the choice, ݔ௧௜, 
of either (a) donate (part or all of) one’s own money to the charity, (b) retain the equal split, 
or (c) take away (part or all of) the charity’s money and add it to one’s own income. We will 
refer to (a) and (c) as ethical or unethical behavior, respectively. Naturally, the individual’s 
decision is of the form ࢚࢞࢏  ∈ [−I, +I ]. The only difference between both stages is the infor-
mation set that the individual possesses about his peer’s behavior. That is, after completion 
of stage 1, the individual observes a random individual’s behavior from stage 1. At stage 2 
(that is, after the observation), the individual is given the opportunity to revise his initial 
decision, if desired.  
Let ࢻ࢚. ∈ (0,1) depict the social proximity of an individual at time t. Importantly, let an in-
dividual’s inherent attitude towards (un)ethical behavior be described by ߠ௜. That is, ߠ௜  rep-
resents the individual ࢏’s preference to give or take a particular monetary amount within the 
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boundaries of one’s income in a given situation, thus being defined as ࣂ࢏ ∈ [−I, +I ]. What is 
more, let ߰௧௜௝  represent individual ࢏′ݏ prior (stage 1) or actual observation (stage 2) of indi-
vidual  ࢐′ݏ (un)ethical behavior.  
(1) ࣒࢚
࢏࢐ = ൝ݔଵఫ෪ ݂݅ ݐ = 1 (ݐݎݑ݊ܿܽݐ݁݀ ݊݋ݎ݈݈݉ܽݕ ݀݅ݏݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁݀ ݌ݎ݅݋ݎ)
ݔଵ
௝ ݈݁ݏ݁ (ݑ݌݀ܽݐ݁݀ ܾ݈݂݁݅݁ݏ)   
From this it follows that each player maximizes own utility at Stage 1 of the following form: 
(2) ࢓ࢇ࢞
࢚࢞
࢏
 ௧ܷ௜ = ܫ − ൫1 − ߙ௧ ൯ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ − ߠ௜൯ଶ − ߙ௧ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ − ߰௧௜௝൯ଶ 
At stage 1, individual ࢏ has no information about individual ࢐’s decision, as all participants 
carry out their decisions simultaneously. Consequently, ࢏ resorts to forming beliefs about 
the behavior of ࢐. As depicted above, individuals face a trade-off decision at stage 1, in which 
deviation from the individual inherent characteristic ߠ௜  has to be weighed against deviating 
from one’s own beliefs about the peer’s behavior ߰௧௜௝. Because no information about the 
peers was given at stage 1, the resulting decision is a simple maximization problem of the 
form: 
(3) డ௎೟
೔
డ௫೟
೔ = 2ߙ௧ ∗ ൫߰௧௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ − 2 ∗ ൫ߙ௧ − 1൯ ∗ ൫ߠ௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ .
⇔ݔ∗ = ݔ௧௜ = ߠ௜ − ߙ௧ ߠ௜ + ߙ௧ ߰௧௜௝  
yielding the comparative static: 
(4) డ௫೟
೔
డఈ೟
= ߰௧௜௝ − ߠ௜  
We can infer that a change of ࢚࢞࢏  in ࢚ depends on the social proximity (that is either a prior 
in ࢚ = ૚ or an updated belief in ࢚ = ૛) in the following way:  
(5) డ௫೟
೔
డఈ೟
=  ൞> 0 ݂݅ ߰௧௜௝ > ߠ௜ (ݔ௧௜ ݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ ݅݊ ߙ௧ )= 0 ݂݅ ߰௧௜௝ = ߠ௜      (ݔ௧௜ ݑ݂݂݊ܽ݁ܿݐ݁݀ ܾݕ ߙ௧ )< 0 ݂݅ ߰௧௜௝ < ߠ௜  (ݔ௧௜ ݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ ݅݊ ߙ௧ )  
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In order to study the adaptation gap at stage 2, that is the difference in behavior between 
individual ࢏ and ࢐ after the second stage, one has to hold ࢐’s behavior from stage 1 constant 
while giving individual ࢏ the ability to revise his initial decision.30  
Proposition: Equation (2) provides a solution to the maximization problem and reduces the 
adaptation gap to: 
(6) หݔଶ௜ −߰ଶ
௜௝ห = หߠ௜ − ߙଶ ߠ௜ + ߙଶ ߰ଶ௜ − ߰ଶ௜ ห = หߠ௜ ∗ ൫1 − ߙଶ ൯ + ߰ଶ௜ (ߙଶ − 1)ห 
Observe that unlike in Akerlof’s (1997) general conformity model, this approach generates 
a unique equilibrium prediction due to restrictions put on the social proximity parameter, 
that is 0 < ࢻ࢚. < ૚ and the linear reaction function. 
Essentially, by assuming that behavioral adaptation is symmetric in either direction this in-
dicates that the gap is driven by the social proximity to the peer that one is observing: the 
closer individual are in terms of proximity the smaller is the expected gap and the more sim-
ilar is their behavior. An alternative interpretation is that the peer effect is stronger and leads 
to a more extensive behavioral adaptation the higher their social proximity is. 
 
Asymmetric Contagion 
The main purpose of the extended model is to allow for an asymmetric adaptation to uneth-
ical and ethical behavior. It is plausible to assume that not only observing but also starting 
to act on unethical behavior requires a different mindset and triggers other cognitive pro-
cesses than it is the case for ethical behavior. Here, the ability to self-justify behavior de-
pends on the (un)ethicality of the (observed) act to the extent that it varies the boundaries 
of the moral wiggle room (Dana, et al., 2007). Empirical support is provided by the slippery-
slope effect (cf. Gino & Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. (2015)) as well as results on the “broken 
windows effect” (cf. Beckenkamp et al. (2014), Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl & Villeval (2015)), 
which suggest that unethical behavior is likely to be more contagious than unethical behav-
ior. 
We introduce ࢑, which represents a factor biasing behavioral adaptation towards the obser-
vation of unethical behavior. We assume that the degree of the adaptation bias depends on 
                                                             
30 Which is exactly what we will do in our experiment. See chapter 3.1.6. 
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the difference between one’s own and observed unethical behavior ࣂ࢏ − ࣒࢚࢏ . With ࣒࢚࢏  still 
retaining its properties from (2), the individual’s maximization is of the form: 
(7) ࢓ࢇ࢞
࢚࢞
࢏
 ௧ܷ௜ = ܫ − ൫1 − ߙ௧ ൯ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ − ߠ௜൯ଶ − ߙ௧ ∗ ݇ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ −߰௧௜൯ଶ 
with:  
(8) ݇ = max (ߠ௜ −߰௧௜ + 1, 1) 
This definition illustrates that whenever one’s own initial behavior is more ethical than what 
is being observed from the peer behavioral contagion is stronger than observing more be-
havior that is more ethical. The strength of the difference in this contagion force depends 
on the distance between own and observed behavior. This implies the following maximiza-
tion of the individual’s utility: 
(9) డ௎೟
೔
డ௫೟
೔ = 2ߙ௧ k ∗ ൫߰௧௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ − 2 ∗ ൫ߙ௧ − 1൯ ∗ ൫ߠ௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ 
.
⇔ݔ௧
௜ = ߠ௜ − ߙ௧ ߠ௜ + ߙ௧ ߰௧௜݇
ߙ௧ ݇ − ߙ௧ + 1  
with the comparative static: 
(10) డ௫೟
೔
డఈ೟
= ௞∗(ట೟೔ିఏ೔)
൫ఈ೟ ௞ିఈ೟ ାଵ൯
మ  
Under these assumptions, the resulting adaptation gap looks as follows: 
(11) หݔଶ௜ −߰ଶ௜ ห = |… | = ቤ− (ఏ೔ିటమ೔ )∗(ఈమ ିଵ)
൫ఈమ ௞ିఈమ ାଵ൯
మ ቤ 
We can easily see that the slightly differently appearing adaptation gap retains the same 
properties as in the symmetric model. In conclusion, we expect behavioral adaptation to be 
driven by social proximity with a bias towards unethical behavior. Put differently, we expect 
the spillover of unethical behavior to be more pronounced, thus leading to a stronger de-
generation of behavior relatively to the rise of good Samaritans.  
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3.1.6 The Experiment 
3.1.6.1 Experimental Design and Procedure 
In order to study behavioral contagion, we are mainly interested in answering two questions 
with our experimental design: first, whether individuals revise their initial behavior in light 
of observing peer behavior. Second, whether and how a behavioral change depends on both 
the ethicality of the observed behavior and the social identification with the observed peers. 
Our design draws on a unique approach to study behavioral contagion in the lab that allows 
us to account for potential confounds potentially inherent into peer effects studies as ar-
gued by Manski (1993) and Angrist (2014) (see Thöni & Gächter (2015) for a similar approach). 
In order to be regarded as behavioral contagion, revised behavior has to be more similar to 
observed behavior than one’s initial behavior that one has decided upon prior to learning 
peer information. That is, revision of one’s initial behavior must follow the direction of ob-
served initial peer behavior.  
Our basic design follows this straightforward procedure: action – observation of a peer – 
reaction.31  Consider a variant of a two-player dictator game in which the participant (dicta-
tor) is matched with a charity (recipient). The dictator’s action space entails taking away 
money from the charity, leaving the initial situation unchanged, or give money to a self-cho-
sen charity (the basic design follows List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)). In following Eckel & 
Grossman (1996), we use a charity to increase the saliency of the involved decisions. The 
experiment is played one-shot with a possibility to revise one’s initial behavior. Between the 
initial decision and potential revision, individuals are given the opportunity to observe the 
initial behavior of another random participant. Alongside the actual behavior, treatment 
variations include the alteration of unveiled social proximity information of the observed 
participant.32 That is, in addition to learning actual behavior and the amount that was taken 
away or given by this participant, additional information on the participant’s social proxim-
ity to oneself is varied with the random treatment assignment.  The treatment variation lies 
in the information given about the social proximity to the observed peers: no information 
on proximity (Baseline), as well as high proximity (T1) and low proximity (T2) information. 
                                                             
31 Note that in order to exclude any hedging concerns throughout the whole experiment, information about the specifics 
of the design were only provided where necessary in order to reach a deliberate decision. That is, at Stage 1 participants 
were neither aware of the possibility to observe peers later on nor to revise their initial decision, ensuring unbiased initial 
behavior. 
32 Henceforth, we will use the terms social proximity and social identity interchangeably. 
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Proximity is calculated based on overlapping answers in the list of statements used in the 
beginning of each session and then presented to the participants in the form of below- or 
above-average proximity information to the observed peer.33 We capitalize on a shortened 
25 items list of statements compiled from a major US American dating website to ensure the 
validity of the questions in successfully matching people (see Gibbs, Ellison & Heino (2006) 
and Hitsch, Hortaçsu & Ariely (2010) for a discussion).34 Since the business concept of dating 
websites is based on achieving high matching success rates, the use of such validated ques-
tions improves the success of incepting social identification between participants in the 
lab.35 
The experimental procedure is represented by a single iteration of the following three 
stages: 
First Stage - The Action: Starting with an equal distribution of money, each individual de-
cides whether to (i) donate own money to the charity’s account, (ii) not change the initial 
equal distribution, or (iii) take money from the charity and add to one’s own account.  
Second Stage – The Observation: Each active player observes one passive player of ran-
dom who has engaged in either ethical or unethical behavior. In all three treatments, the 
exact information entails the monetary amount taken away from or given to the charity. Ex-
                                                             
33 The implementation of the low- and high-proximity information followed a very straightforward calculation. For each 
participant of the active group, an individual proximity score to both participants of the passive group was calculated 
based on overlapping answers in the list of statements. From each active participant’s individual perspective, the passive 
participant with the higher (lower) score was labeled as the high (low) proximity peer. In fact, this calculation approach 
allows for the same passive person to be of high (low) proximity to one active person, while being of low (high) proximity 
to another active person, thus truly randomizing information. We abstained from providing explicit matching scores or 
percentages to retain maximum control. In addition, this allows us to alleviate the false-consensus effect, in which people 
systematically overestimate the degree of similarity to others. The provision of social cues of this kind allows the 
participants to update their beliefs reliably with respect to the actual degree of similarity. See Ellingsen & Johannesson 
(2008, p. 995) for a discussion. 
34 We should stress the fact that we report lower-bound results. We induce social proximity in a very simple way by 
providing participants with either the high- or low-proximity signal in the social identification treatments 1 and 2. Although 
this approach allows us to provide a comprehensive set of information to induce even more salient and distinct forms of 
social identity (i.e. by providing the exact matching score, the exact answers to the questions, letting participants put 
different weights on questions according to their individual importance and so on), we resort to  this easy-to-use-easy-to-
reproduce approach. See Appendix B for the exact list of questions used in our experiment. 
35 In addition, we elicit the strength of social identity to the observed peer using a variant of the self-evaluation scale of 
one’s social identity following Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) to verify the robustness of our social identity implementation 
approach. The non-parametric and regression estimations yield the same overall results both in direction and in 
magnitude.  
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cept for the baseline condition, observers received additional information related to the so-
cial identity to the observed peer, stating simply that based on the initial answers this peer 
is of higher or lower proximity as compared to the other passive peer that one cannot ob-
serve. 
Third Stage – The Reaction: After observation, the active player is given the choice to revise 
his initial decision.  
The experiment was concluded with a battery of non-incentivized questions to elicit atti-
tude towards, among others, charitable giving and risk. 
Our design accounts for the aforementioned reflection problem by randomly assigning all 
participants into two groups: active and passive. The group assignment is relevant to the 
action space available to the participants. If assigned to the active group, the participant is 
in the role of the observer and receives the opportunity to revise his initial decision. If as-
signed to the passive group, the participant is in the role of the observed person and is nei-
ther allowed to observe others nor to revise his own initial decision. In other words, in the 
active group, participants are free to request information about the behavior of one ran-
domly chosen peer following their initial decision and are then given the chance to revise. 
Whereas in the passive group, the participant’s initial behavior is held fixed and no further 
decisions are made.36  
Payoff structure: Importantly, to exclude any form of strategic interaction that might po-
tentially dilute results or affect the saliency, the participant’s decisions only affected one’s 
own and the chosen charity’s payments but not those of other participants. That is, each 
individual’s decision had no monetary impact on other individuals, therefore a change in 
behavior was due purely to behavioral contagion and not due to other-regarding concerns.37 
This becomes even more salient by randomly picking one of the individuals at the end for 
                                                             
36 The specific differences in the action space are openly communicated to everyone so that participants in the active group 
are well aware of the fact that the person they are observing can no longer readjust initial behavior. What is more, in order 
to avoid any unnecessary interferences, risk is not implemented at any point of our design. Independent of one’s behavior, 
there is no risk of facing punishment or being personally exposed. Here, peer effects are studied purely by providing 
behavioral decisions anonymously without specifically exposing any participant. We will return to a step-by-step 
breakdown of available information at any stage. Our extended design draws upon earlier studies on peer effects and 
extends them in order to avoid the aforementioned problems with circular effects, endogeneity, and potential 
experimenter demand effects.  
37 To some degree, the experimental design resembles the theoretical considerations of Alós-Ferrer & Schlag (2009). 
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which the behavioral decision was implemented, while everyone else received a flat income 
irrespective of his actual behavior. In monetary terms, each participant and the respective 
charity received the ECU equivalent of 15 Euro, thus allowing a participant to leave with a 
maximum (minimum) of 30 (0) Euro if the participant decided to take away all the money 
from (give all the money to) the charity. In order to increase the saliency of ethical behavior, 
we added a multiplier to the setting. That is, the experimenter doubled all Euro remaining 
in the charity’s account at the end of the experiment. After all decisions have taken place, 
one participant was chosen at random and the respective decision was implemented with 
respect to taking from or giving to the charity, while every other participant in the session 
received a flat income of 7.50 Euro including a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro. 
Several points are worth noting. In order to retain maximum control and reduce heteroge-
neity in observed behavior, in each session exactly two participants were chosen at random 
as passive (that is, being observed by peers), while participants randomly chosen as being 
active (that is, observing peers) always observe only one of these two passive players. What 
is more, the treatment differences are based solely on the social proximity information. Im-
portantly, the observing peers received the information that a random draw will determine 
whether they will observe a high or low proximity peer and that this person would have ei-
ther taken money away from or given money to the charity. The observer would then ran-
domly learn the behavior of exactly one passive player but was never able to infer other par-
ticipants’ behavior from this information, neither active nor passive.38 This double-random 
procedure ensured that each active player’s information set would be restricted to the 
peer’s observed behavior and focus the participant’s attention on processing this infor-
mation. In addition, to allow for perfect comparability across treatments, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three treatments within the same experimental session. In 
                                                             
38 Prior to the actual observation, we elicited incentivized beliefs about the behavior of the two passive participants. Those 
beliefs ended up being irrelevant in predicting the active participants’ behavior. We will return to this point shortly in the 
analysis section. 
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sum, this design allows us to measure clean peer effects every time a participant revises 
his/her initial decision after observing peer behavior.39 The design is illustrated below: 
 
  Figure 1: Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
3.1.6.2 Hypotheses 
In order to generate hypotheses that are sound with existing theory, we derive our theoret-
ical model as it is discussed in chapter 3.1.5 and our predictions from previous research.40 
The slippery-slope argument (cf. Gino & Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. (2015)) as well as re-
sults on the “broken windows effect” (cf. Beckenkamp et al. (2014), Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl 
& Villeval (2015)) suggest that unethical behavior is likely to be more contagious than uneth-
ical behavior. We thus derive our first hypothesis as follows: 
                                                             
39 With reference to the different concepts in economics and (social) psychology explaining behavioral contagion (as 
discussed in chapter 3.1.4) and in light of our design, some theories are better at explaining behavior in our experiment 
than others are. Contagion observed in our experiment is likely to be explained by the theories of social decisions and social 
distance (Akerlof (1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)), imitation of preferences (Sliwka, 2007), as well as by some of the 
theories in (social) psychology, such as social learning (Bandura, 1971), norms (Cialdini et al. (1990) and Bicchieri (2006)) 
and self-expansion (Aron & Aron, 1986). Other theories are not applicable due to reasons of absence of learning better 
outcomes (which is required by Alós-Ferrer & Schlag’s (2009) imitation concept), or the ability to not only observe but also 
be observed by the peers (which is required by, among others, Bernheim’s (1994) theory on taste for conformity). While it 
is questionable whether it is possible at all, we shall not attempt to disentangle clearly, which theory best explains 
behavioral contagion observed in our experiment.    
40 Our hypothesis will mainly focus on two behavioral traits that we can observe in our experiment: the first is individual ࢏’s 
revised amount after observing a peer’s initial decision: ࢞૛
࢏ . The second is the adaptation gap of individual ࢏ and ࢐ after ࢏’s 
revision decision: ห࢞૛
࢏ −࣒૛
࢏ ห. We will capitalize on these two aspects to support our hypotheses in the results section. 
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H1:  Unethical behavior is more contagious than ethical behavior.  
Previous research indicates that social identification is a decisive predictor of behavior in 
different contexts related to charitable giving, trust, punishment, and reciprocity (cf. Leider 
et al. (2009), Chen & Li (2009)). What is more, some of the existing research on neighborhood 
effects (cf. Damm & Dustmann (2014)) and our theoretical predictions from chapter 3.1.5 
support these assumptions. Consequently, we formulate our second hypothesis: 
H2: Social identification amplifies the contagion of behavior in general and un-
ethical behavior in particular.  
As previously argued, we are also concerned with understanding the main driver of behav-
ioral contagion. That is, we try to answer whether the unethicality of observed behavior or 
social identification to one’s peers is a stronger predictor of behavioral contagion. While dif-
ferent streams of research suggest the relevance of both channels, we are the first, to the 
best of our knowledge, to compare these channels in terms of their impact on behavioral 
contagion. We follow the existing research on social identity (cf. Tajfel (1982), Hoffman, 
McCabe & Smith (1996), Bohnet & Frey (1999), Eckel & Petrie (2011), Charness & Gneezy 
(2008)) and expect behavioral contagion to be more pronounced the higher the social iden-
tification with one’s peer is, independent of the (un)ethicality of the observed behavior. We 
thus derive our final hypothesis: 
H3:  Social identification is the main driver of behavioral contagion. 
 
3.1.6.3 Results and Discussion 
We conducted the experiment at the BaER-Lab at the University of Paderborn, Germany. 
Participants were recruited using ORSEE (2004). We used zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) to run 
our experiment. In sum, 227 participants throughout 9 sessions were randomly assigned to 
one of the three main treatments (no proximity, high proximity, and low proximity) as well 
as to one of the two sub-treatments (observing either ethical or unethical behavior).41 Each 
                                                             
41 Out of the 227 participants, 18 (8%) participants were randomly assigned to being observed and thus remained passive 
after their initial decision, and 24 (11%) decided to opt-out and not to observe peer behavior. The latter represents a 
significant portion of participants that refuse to learn about peer behavior and thus speak to the aforementioned problem 
of forcing participants to observe peers. See chapter 3.1.5 for discussion. In total, this leaves us with 185 observations 
entering our analysis. 
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session lasted about 45 minutes and the hourly average earnings were €10.50. What is more, 
an average of €30 was donated per session to various charities.42  
Figure 1 details our behavior data in two ways: before observation in pooled form and after 
observation by treatment. Starting with a descriptive observation, we observe some heter-
ogeneity across treatments in terms of the distribution of (un)ethical behavior. On the x-
axis, we depict the amount of money that was allocated to the charity. The point of depar-
ture is 300, which represents the equal a priory distribution of money between the partici-
pant (300) and the charity (300). Thus, any value below (above) 300 depicts the individual 
taking from (giving to) the charity’s account.  
Prior to observing peer’s behavior, decisions are mainly clustered at 300 ECU, which repre-
sents the decision to not change the initial equal distribution between oneself and the char-
ity. Across all treatments, a total of 25% of participants decided to revise his/her initial de-
cision. After the observation, however, we find a perceptible skewness towards unethical 
behavior, particularly in the high proximity condition. Although observing either ethical or 
unethical behavior is equally likely, this finding provides us with a first indication that taking 
(unethical behavior) is more contagious than giving (ethical behavior). We will return to this 
argument shortly in our hypothesis H1.  
                                                             
42 See Appendix A for more details. 
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Figure 2: Incidence of choices to not change the initial equal distribution / give money to / take money from the charity 
before and after peer observation. The horizontal axis depicts a continuum of ECU left in the respective charity’s 
cash account, with 300 representing the starting allocation. The choices were clustered in the figure for the sake 
of readability. The vertical axis depicts the fraction of participants indulging in the particular behavior. 
 
Next, we turn to testing our hypotheses.43 We are interested in whether unethical behavior 
is more contagious than ethical behavior. We will do so by illustrating the amount revised 
(%) after observation purely depending on the (un)ethicality of observed behavior.44 More 
specifically, for the amount revised (%), the results suggests that the (un)ethicality of 
observed behavior indeed affects the individual’s revision decision. When observed ethical 
(unethical) behavior, meaning that participants observed a peer who gave money to (took 
money from) the charity, participants gave on average 6.42% more (17.3% less) money to 
                                                             
43 In general, non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) specifications are used throughout this paper to test for differences 
among those who decided to revise initial behavior. Unless noted otherwise, these findings are robust to alternative non-
parametric specifications, such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and varying examinations of missing observations.  
44 For amount revised (%), a positive (negative) value implies that individual ࢏ has given more money to (has taken more 
money from) the charity as compared to his/her initial behavior prior to observing a peer’s behavior. Robustness checks 
involve the analysis of differences in the adaptation gap (%). For adaptation gap (%), a value below (above) 1 implies that 
the adaptation gap, denoted as หݔଶ௜ −߰ଶ
௜௝ห, has gotten smaller (larger) after individual ࢏ had the chance to revise his/her 
initial decision. A value of exactly 1 means that the adaptation gap remained the same after the revision stage as compared 
to the initial decision. This could be either due to individual ࢏ deciding not to revise his/her initial decision or due to a 
revision which is equidistant in monetary terms. The results support H1 and are presented in Appendix A. 
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the charity as compared to their initial behavior prior to having observed a peer’s behavior. 
The results are significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000, z = 4.365) and indicate a change in 
behavior almost three times as large when unethical behavior was observed as compared 
to ethical behavior. The results are highly suggestive of unethical behavior being more 
contagious. Thus, these results strongly support our hypothesis H1 and confirm that uneth-
ical behavior is indeed more contagious than ethical behavior independent of social identi-
fication.45 Figure 3 illustrates our findings. 
 
Figure 3: Amount Revised (%) and Observed (Un)Ethicality. The figure depicts the amount revised as percentage of one’s 
initial behavior. Any value above (below) zero indicates that more (less) ECU were given after the revision to the 
charity relative to one’s initial decision. The analysis is broken down into the (un)ethicality of observed behavior 
by the active participants. 
 
We are also interested in the type of behavioral contagion that is triggered by social identi-
fication. Following hypothesis H2, we assume that social identification amplifies the conta-
gion of unethical behavior in an over-proportional way as compared to contagion of ethical 
                                                             
45 Unless noted otherwise in the results section, we obtain similar results in terms of evidence and significance when using 
absolute ECU numbers rather than percentages. 
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behavior. We thus examine the role of social identification in affecting the magnitude and 
direction of revision choices. Both findings are illustrated below in figure 4. 
Our results robustly indicate that higher social identity indeed triggers stronger behavioral 
contagion, particularly contagion of unethical behavior. As social identity increases, the 
magnitude of revised behavior increases as well, peaking at -29.8% for the high proximity 
condition. The differences in behavior are significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000, z = 4.759) 
when comparing behavior in the unknown proximity with the high proximity condition. 
Likewise, the results are significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000, z = -3.448) when comparing 
the high proximity with the low proximity condition. Here, again, the negative numbers of 
amount revised suggest that, in terms of magnitude of revised behavior, unethical behavior 
is strongly pronounced and thus more contagious than ethical behavior. Overall, we find 
ample support for our hypothesis H2 and thus conclude that the magnitude of a revision of 
one’s initial behavior is indeed strongly correlated with social identification. 
Consistent with our theoretical model, the results also yield strong support for the idea that 
the reduction in the adaptation gap is driven by social identification. As predicted by ߙ.௜௝, 
the stronger the social identification to one’s peer is a robust predictor (all at the 1% level) 
of one’s adaptation gap to the observed peer after observation. By the numbers, we obtain 
p = 0.000 and z = 6.104 (p = 0.000 and z = -3.441) when comparing unknown proximity versus 
high proximity condition (high proximity versus low proximity condition). We find that the 
adaptation gap is inversely correlated to the social identity.  
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Figure 4: Amount revised (%) and adaptation gap (%) by social proximity.  
 
Along similar lines, behavioral contagion as a function of both social identification and the 
(un)ethicality of observed behavior is illustrated in figure 5. The behavioral space is de-
scribed by three alternatives and also speaks to the (non-)existence of observed peer ef-
fects: 
 No Contagion: after observing peer behavior, the participant either did not revise 
his/her initial behavior or revised it into the opposite direction of what he/she ob-
served the peer has done.  
 Contagion: after observing peer’s behavior, the participant did revise his/her initial 
decision. The revision was directed into the direction of the observed behavior. This 
behavior indicates the existence of behavioral contagion caused by peer effects. 
The breakdown of behavioral changes by different levels of social proximity provides addi-
tional evidence for hypothesis H2. When comparing to the condition where no social prox-
imity to one’s observed peer was induced, behavioral is more contagious for both low and 
high proximity situations in both the ethical and unethical domain. Again, since we report 
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lower-bound results, this is a strong indication that our method of inducing social identifi-
cation works and is likely to produce even stronger results when social proximity would be 
introduced in a more sophisticated way.   
 
Figure 5: Behavioral change by treatment and observed (un)ethicality. This figure illustrates the fraction of participants 
exhibiting behavioral contagion broken down into both the observed (un)ethicality of behavior and the social 
identity to one’s observed peer. Unless the active participant revises his/her behavior into the direction of ob-
served behavior the behavior is not classified as contagion. 
 
In terms of explaining the drivers of behavioral contagion, two literature streams have not 
yet been brought together in existing research: the role of social identification on behavioral 
contagion on the one hand, and the role of observed behavioral unethicality on the other. 
Our experimental design allows us to do exactly this for the first time and ascertain the main 
driver of behavioral contagion. Following our previous discussion, we assume social identi-
fication to be a stronger driver of behavioral contagion than the unethicality of observed 
behavior (H3). As a first, we investigate whether behavioral contagion is different under var-
ied levels of social proximity when directly comparing contagion in the ethical versus the 
unethical domain using non-parametric comparisons. Our results provide strong support 
that behavioral contagion is asymmetric. In particular, a variation in social identification 
yields no significant variation in behavioral changes in the ethical domain. However, the re-
sults are strongly statistically significant when looking at behavioral changes as a function 
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of social identification in the unethical domain. Here, when comparing the high proximity 
condition to the no proximity (low proximity) condition, the Mann-Whitney-U statistics yield 
results that are highly significant at the 1% level with p = 0.000 and z = 6.025 (p = 0.000 and 
z = -4.005). These results highlight the importance of our contribution in this paper: peer 
effects are not uniformly in place, but rather strongly depend on both the (un)ethicality of 
observed behavior and the degree of social identification to the observed peer. 
 
Figure 6: Amount revised (%) by social proximity and observed (un)ethicality.  
 
What is more, we ran several regressions, including OLS, Logit, and Tobit, where applicable, 
in order to assess the robustness of our results. In sum, across different specifications our 
results strongly suggest that the observation of (un)ethical behavior does not trigger any 
particular behavior, neither ethical nor unethical. Thus, the mere observation of behavior 
alone is insufficient for the existence of peer effects in the (un)ethical sphere, but is rather 
dependent on the social identification to one’s peers. These findings are in support of our 
hypothesis H3. Findings are presented in Appendix A. 
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All in all, we find convincing support for all of our three hypotheses: unethical behavior is 
indeed more contagious than ethical behavior (H1), social identification drives the magni-
tude of behavioral contagion (H2), and social identification is a more reliable predictor of 
behavioral contagion than the observed (un)ethicality of observed behavior (H3). Here, it is 
important to stress a particular point with respect to the interpretation of the results. Argu-
ably, the experiment’s framed environment created by the presence of a charity could po-
tentially carry a norm of prosocial behavior in the lab in and of itself. That is, prior to observ-
ing one’s peers, some participants at the margin of behaving unethically might carry the 
normative belief that taking from a charity represents inappropriate behavior and thus ini-
tially refrain for it. If so, it would come as no surprise to observe stronger contagion of un-
ethical as compared to ethical behavior because those who wanted to behave unethically 
in the first place but refrained from doing so might now find justification in their peer’s be-
havior. In this respect, two important remarks should be made: first, if anything, such an 
assumption would only explain level effects but not treatment differences because such be-
liefs are by experimental design uncorrelated with the treatments. Consequently, irrespec-
tive of the existence of potential norms, our design renders our main finding valid: behav-
ioral contagion is highest where social identity is strongest.46 In addition, we elicited incen-
tivized beliefs about what participants thought about his peer’s behavior prior to observing 
it. As the regressions results suggest, such beliefs yielded no explanatory power and thus 
play no role in neither explaining the magnitude nor the differences of behavioral contagion. 
From a policy perspective, our results stress that social proximity renders it difficult to 
change individual behavior, but it rather amplifies one’s initial (un)ethicality. We will return 
to this point in our policy recommendations in chapter 3.1.7. In light of the very conservative 
inception of social identification of providing very limited information on social identifica-
tion, we deem these results to represent a lower bound thus strengthening the role of social 
identification within the context of behavioral contagion. Our lower-bound approach comes 
from the fact that participants were neither told the exact matching percentage nor the ac-
tual interests and preferences they had in common. If having been randomly assigned to 
one of the social identification treatments, participants only knew whether they were ob-
serving a peer with above or below average congruence. A more sophisticated way to induce 
                                                             
46 I would like to thank Gary Bolton, René Fahr, and Elena Katok for point this out and for related discussions. 
134 
 
social identification and match participants accordingly is likely to produce results that are 
more pronounced. The well-engineered mechanisms implemented by dating websites to 
match people and achieve high success rates are a shining example for what is possible: 
excluding matching partners based on personality traits that represent a no-go (e.g. smok-
ing), putting emphasis on particular interests (e.g. sports, religion), or individual character-
istics (e.g. looks, education). We deliberatively refrained from applying sophisticated 
measures of this kind and rather resorted to an easy-to-use-easy-to-reproduce methodo-
logical approach that could be used in future experiments in which inducing salient social 
identity is key.  
Along these lines, the presence of a potential experimenter demand effects (EDE) is worth 
addressing since their presence has potentially been problematic to prior peer effect studies 
(for a discussion see Thöni & Gächter (2015)). Because we are mainly interested in treatment 
differences rather than in overall levels, the experimenter demand effect is deemed less 
problematic as long as its existence and magnitude is orthogonal to the treatment variation 
(Zizzo, 2010). Nonetheless, we considered existing experimental studies to rule out experi-
menter demand effects to the extent possible. Not exclusively to but prominently existing 
in peer effect studies, forced learning (i.e., forced observation of one’s peer’s behavior) 
might potentially induce EDE or even lead to resentment on the side of the participants. 
Forced observation might trigger thoughts related to being expected to use the information 
to reconsider and potentially revise initial behavior. In previous general and peer effect 
studies in particular, this issue has normally been overlooked, mainly to avoid self-selection 
problems. However, when the option not to learn is withheld from participants, the ob-
tained results are potentially confounded. We deem this challenging to the study of peer 
effects and should thus be discussed.  
Existing research indicates that individuals sometimes choose to deliberately remain igno-
rant about the state of nature (see Carrillo & Mariotti (2000), Dana, Weber & Kuang (2007), 
Conrads & Irlenbusch (2013), Bartling, Engl & Weber (2014), and Grossman (2014)). If pre-
sent, such strategic ignorance might be an important component of our experiment. A po-
tential reason not to acquire costless information is related to the avoidance to indulge in 
negative self-image updating or guilt aversion (cf. Wells (1978), Baumeister (1998), Charness 
& Dufwenberg (2006)). One can plausibly assume that such aversion is even stronger when 
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studying peer effects within an (un)ethical dimension. Thus, forcing participants to learn 
potentially unpleasant information might lead to biased behavior and might even increase 
EDE. In order to address this challenge, our design follows Conrads & Irlenbusch (2013) and 
Bartling, Engl & Weber (2014) and draws on a mechanism in which learning peer information 
is voluntary (see also Eckel & Petrie (2011)).47 Additionally, in order to rule out any reputa-
tional concerns, social learning, or reciprocity, the experiment includes an anonymously 
played one-shot interaction with another participant. Such an experimental design allows 
us to study behavioral contagion in the lab in an unbiased way. To our knowledge, this rep-
resents a novel design in studying peer effects in the lab in general and the behavioral con-
tagion of (un)ethical behavior in particular while controlling for potential confounds that 
peer effect studies suffer from regularly (see Manski (2000), Falk & Fischbacher (2002), An-
grist (2014)). In the light of our experimental set-up, any treatment-specific information is 
provided only after one’s deliberate decision to learn peer behavior. Thus, any still poten-
tially existing form of EDE would be fully uncorrelated with the treatments and thus exhibit 
only a general level-effect, if any. 
 
3.1.7 Lessons Learned: Policy Implications 
As argued before, understanding social interactions in general and in particular the poten-
tially resulting peer effects is fundamental from a policy perspective. It does not only help 
to understand societal and economic outcomes beyond what standard economic forces can 
explain (i.e., the massive surge in female labor participation rates in World War II (Mulligan, 
1998) or the escalation of crime rates (Levitt, 1999)). It also allows us to implement better-
targeted policy measures to tackle a battery of challenges such as reducing crime rates, im-
proving health conditions, or increasing labor market participation. “To the extent that the-
ory and measurement of social interactions enables us to understand these massive 
changes, the study of social interactions potentially has major policy relevance” (Glaeser & 
Scheinkman, 2004, p. 84). In this chapter, we will discuss some of the policy implications 
                                                             
47 However, deliberately allowing participants to remain ignorant about peer behavior bears the risk of self-selection 
effects. It is worth noting that in our experiment 10% of all the participants decided not to acquire peer information. 
Importantly, however, this choice is unconditional on the participant’s initial behavior, thus strongly suggesting the 
absence of any self-selection mechanism leading to potential biases in our analysis. 
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that one can infer from our results. We will follow the main theme of this paper and ap-
proach this topic from two sides: the ethical and unethical context (for a broader discussion 
see Irlenbusch & Villeval (2015)). 
Starting with the ethical perspective, voluntary redistribution of income e.g. in the form of 
charitable giving is an integral part of humaneness, with up to 90% of Americans donating 
to charities. Understanding the drivers of charitable giving, such as altruism and social pres-
sure, has been at the heart of last decade’s research, both in the field and in the lab (cf. Levitt 
& List (2009), DellaVigna, List & Malmendier (2012)). Still, we seem to have an imperfect un-
derstanding of what really motivates giving (Andreoni, 2006). Beyond what we have since 
learned about the existence of peer effects with respect to contribution decisions, our ex-
periment yields several new insights helpful to understanding the extent to which such be-
havior shows up, especially as compared to unethical behavior. We will return to this com-
parison shortly. 
In turn, unethical behavior in its various forms impairs the daily life. Exemplarily, yearly 
global tax evasion ranges at an abstruse $3.1 trillion or 5.1% of world GDP (The New York 
Times, 2011), over $1 trillion is estimated in bribes paid yearly around the globe (The World 
Bank, 2013), and some 210 million people use illicit drugs each year (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Here, one might credibly argue that from a purely rational self-
maximizing perspective we should observe way less illicit behavior than we actually do. 
From a game theoretic perspective, in some illicit deals that involve trust-related actions 
such as bribery do not represent a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is true for both 
one-shot and finitely repeated contexts. Thus, in many situations the occurrence of illicit 
behavior is already surprising (for a discussion, see Dimant & Schulte (forthcoming)). A so-
lution to this conflict is the recognition of, among others, peer effects. As has been thor-
oughly argued throughout the paper, the incorporation of behavioral contagion allows us 
so explain why observed behavior goes seemingly beyond clear-cut self-maximization, but 
is rather embedded in and the result of a social context. 
Consequently, both aspects raise the following question: how do these findings translate 
into a real world setting and what to do about it? While being careful at drawing concrete 
inferences from a laboratory setting and relating them directly to the outside world, our re-
sults conclusively indicate the spillover of unethical behavior to be much more likely than 
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the spillover of ethical behavior. That is, getting people to start donating solely based on 
peer effects (e.g. through observing others giving to charity) has a long way to go compared 
to having them do something unethical. What we see, however, is the individual’s respon-
siveness to social identification, in particular on the side of females. A potential solution to 
have people donate more to a good cause is to provide them information beyond simple 
statistics on what other people do, i.e. amount of money that has been collected so far (like 
Wikipedia). Instead, some research already indicates that the inception of social norms es-
pecially for settings that most closely match the individual’s immediate situational circum-
stances have the strongest effect on compliance (Goldstein, et al., 2008). Our results suggest 
to go one step further and provide information that allows us to draw inferences on the so-
cial proximity to the peers, thus increasing the saliency of social identification. Exemplarily, 
a message of the form “People in your neighborhood / with similar demographic character-
istics have donated an average of $...” would lead to pick-up rates of this behavior that are 
higher than when resorting to a simple statistic.  
In all likelihood, a similar approach could be applied to make people refrain from behaving 
unethically. Research on slippery slope indicates that once behavior is spoiled, even honest 
people converge quickly to a steady state with a plethora of unethical behaviors (cf. Gino & 
Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. (2015)). Even more worrisome, recidivism rates for convicts 
are normally very high, leading to what is called a recidivism nightmare. In the US recidivism 
rates are up to 80% of re-arrests within the first 3 to 5 years after their release from prison 
(National Institute of Justice, 2014). This is particularly detrimental from a welfare perspec-
tive, as the US spends approximately $75 billion on incarceration and $260 billion on pre-
vention, detection, and prosecution of crime on a yearly basis (Khadjavi, 2015). In terms of 
effective countermeasures to unethical behavior, our experimental results indicate that ex-
posing individuals to unfaithful of socially close people is likely to trigger repulsion and less 
unethical behavior, thus contributing to a positive transformation.48 
 
                                                             
48 For an approach along similar lines, see Pennsylvania State University's Justice Center for Research on desistance from 
crime (Pennsylvania State University's Justice Center for Research, 2014).  
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3.1.8 Conclusion and Outlook 
Deviant behavior that benefits oneself at the expense of others is socially harmful and brings 
about second-best solutions that are distortive from a welfare perspective. Conversely, the 
voluntary redistribution of money to those who have the least, e.g. in the form of donations, 
is socially desired. It is worthwhile to understand the underlying mechanism that drives 
(un)ethical behavior in order to implement effective policy measures that mitigate or facili-
tate either behavior. Beyond pure self-maximizing considerations, behavior is also be the 
result of social interactions in which the conformity to particular behavior is affected by 
one’s peers (Akerlof (1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)). One particular mechanism 
through which social interactions occur are peer effects, which play a decisive role in ex-
plaining societal and economic outcomes. A battery of behavioral traits affects the shape 
and magnitude in which social interactions occur. An extensive stream of literature suggests 
that individuals are social animals and care for esteem, respect, reputation, among other 
things (cf. Rabin (1993), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Akerlof & Kranton (2000), Bolton & Ockenfels 
(2000), Charness & Rabin (2002),  Bénabou & Tirole (2011)). As such, individuals steadily act 
and react in social environments that define their role and standing within the social group.  
Although peer effects have been extensively studied in different contexts both in the field 
and in the lab, research is still at the outset of understanding the role of peer effects in 
(un)ethical settings. It is this paper’s goal to improve our understanding of whether, to 
which extent, and through which channels individuals are influenced by their peers to en-
gage in (un)ethical behavior, in which they most likely would have not engaged otherwise.  
This paper is in line with and an extension of the seminal Moving-to-Opportunity field re-
search that has allowed us to understand the positive societal spillovers of having the 
chance to move to a better neighborhood (cf. Case & Katz (1991), Katz, Kling & Liebman 
(2001), Kling, Ludwig & Katz (2005), Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007), and Chetty, Hendren & 
Katz (2015)).  In going beyond, we try to understand the spillovers of both unethical and 
ethical behavior and the role of social identity to one’s peers by employing a controlled lab 
experiment. Understanding behavioral contagion is important from a policy perspective in 
order to set the right incentives and effective measures to improve pro-sociality and miti-
gate unethical behavior. 
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By extending existing research from both the methodological and the content perspective, 
our work contributes to a better understanding of the nature of peer effects and behavioral 
spillovers, and answers the following two questions in particular: for one, to what extent 
does the (un)ethicality of a peer’s observed behavior influence one’s own behavior? For an-
other, what is the role of social identity to one’s peers in affecting behavioral contagion? For 
our purposes, we extend a variant of the give-or-take dictator game as introduced by List 
(2007) and used by Bardsley (2008) by the use of an ethical setting. To provide clean evi-
dence on peer effects, we capitalize on a one-shot dictator game in which participants are 
given the opportunity to give to or take money away from the charity before and after learn-
ing the (un)ethical magnitude of peer behavior. Treatment variations include different levels 
of social identity to the observed peers, which we incept by the novel use of a matching al-
gorithm based on a series of dating website questions. We deliberatively refrained from ap-
plying sophisticated measures of this kind and rather resorted to an easy-to-use-easy-to-
reproduce methodological approach that could be used in future experiments in which in-
ducing salient social identity is key. 
Our results suggest that a) unethical behavior is more contagious, and b) social identifica-
tion with one’s peers and not the (un)ethicality of observed behavior is the main driver of 
behavioral contagion. Our results conclusively yield that the mere observation of behavior 
alone is insufficient for the existence of peer effects in the (un)ethical sphere, but is rather 
dependent on the social identification to one’s peers. 
Beyond these first results, much more scientific research has to be done in order to gener-
ate reliable measures to achieve both, more ethical and less unethical behavior. Exempla-
rily, recent MTO-research points at gender differences in behavioral assimilation (cf. 
Chetty, Hendren & Katz (2015)). It is important to understand to which extent these differ-
ences are driven by the two factors studied in this paper: the (un)ethicality of peer behav-
ior one is exposed to and the magnitude of social identity to one’s peers. Our research is 
hopefully one of many more contributions to come.  
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3.1.9 Appendix 
 
A: Data Overview, Robustness Checks, and Additional Results 
 
 
 Treatments   Total 
 
Baseline  
(no Proximity) 
Treatment 1  
(High Proximity) 
Treatment 2 
(Low Proximity) 
 
Observed Ethical Behavior 44 27 34 105 
Observed Unethical Behavior 39 42 41 122 
Total 83 69 75 227 
 
A1: Summary table of the observations by treatment variation and observed unethicality 
 
Our theoretical foundation assumes behavioral adaptation to be asymmetrically biased towards un-
ethical behavior, holding social identification constant. Thus, for adaptation gap (%), the results sug-
gest that the observation of ethical (unethical) behavior leads to a less (more) pronounced closing 
of the adaptation gap. More precisely, the results indicate that observing unethical behavior leads 
to a revision behavior that reduces the gap between own initial and observed peer’s behavior more 
strongly (from 100% down to 69.4%) as compared to observing ethical behavior (from 100% down 
to 78.5%). The differences are marginally significant at the 10% level (p < 0.074, z = 1.787). This im-
plies that, if anything, individuals who observe unethical behavior go a long way and close the ob-
served gap by some 66% through revising their initial decision, while individuals who observe ethical 
behavior reduce the gap only slightly by 14%. This result is not only in line with the theoretical pre-
dictions of our asymmetric model, but also suggests that one’s inherent conquest to do good is less 
pronounced than to do bad, which yields additional support not only for hypothesis H1 but also for 
our asymmetric model specification. 
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A2: Adaptation gap (%) by observed (un)ethicality. The gap is calculated as the difference between the individual’s revised 
decision and the behavior observed from the peer relative to the difference between one’s initial behavior and the 
behavior observed from the peer. That is, the adaptation gap indicates how different the behavior between two par-
ticipants are after the active participant was given the chance to revise his/her initial behavior. In this sense, the nar-
rower the gap, the more similar the active and the respective passive participants are in terms of (un)ethical behavior. 
Participants who did not revise their initial behavior are treated as adaptation gap = 100%. The analysis is broken down 
into the (un)ethicality of observed behavior by the active participants 
 
Overall, the results relating to hypothesis H1 (see Figure 3 and A2) indicate that not only is the con-
tagion of ethical behavior only half as likely as contagion of unethical behavior but it is also less 
pronounced. Following our results, ethical behavior is imitated only to a limited extent as compared 
to the imitation of unethical behavior. 
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We ran several OLS specifications to control for treatment effects, initial behavioral heterogeneity, 
observed behavior, and gender (including several interaction effects). Although not explicitly shown 
in the regression table, adding controls for, among others, risk, self-control, and greed show up as 
insignificant and did not alter the robustness of the results presented here. Overall, the presented 
results are robust to the inclusion of controls and across different specifications and estimation 
methods. Estimations are available upon request. In addition, we ran robustness checks using Tobit 
estimations in order to account for potentially censored behavior caused by ceiling effects in revi-
sion behavior.  
The estimations yield a number of interesting results. For example, the high proximity condition, in 
which social identity was highest, shows up significantly negative across different specifications. The 
negative coefficient suggests that comparing to a situation in which social proximity remained un-
known to the observer (Baseline), being exposed to a high proximity signal induced a downward 
revision of one’s initial behavior. More precisely, participants took away 29%-36% more money from 
the charity in the high social identification condition independent of the (un)ethicality of the ob-
served behavior. This effect is not statistically significantly pronounced for the low proximity condi-
tion. These numbers are in line with the findings presented previously, indicating that peer effects 
are particularly present in a high social identification environment, which over-proportionally 
crowds-out ethical behavior and leads to more unethical behavior. The adaptation gap observed by 
the individual, which is the difference between one’s own and the peer’s initial behavior in monetary 
terms, leads to a similar reasoning: individuals over-proportionally react to a larger gap by nega-
tively revising one’s initial amount, indicating that an increase in observed adaptation gap leads to 
more unethical behavior overall. 
In addition, our results also suggest that one’s initial behavior strongly predicts the direction of be-
havioral contagion. This speaks to the idea that the individual’s predisposition to behave (un)ethi-
cally is essential for the direction of behavioral spillovers caused by peer effects. More precisely, be-
having (un)ethically when peer effects are absent renders it likely to behave even more (un)ethically 
when being exposed to peer effects. Compared to the base level of no change in the initially fair 50:50 
split between oneself and the charity, the revision of one’s initial (un)ethical behavior is similar in 
either direction in terms of magnitude. Relative to one’s initial behavior, the numbers indicate that 
an individual is likely to donate (take) between 9%-19% (19-23%) more money when his/her initial 
decision was to donate (take) money after observing peer’s behavior, thus again supporting the 
asymmetry of behavioral contagion. Consequently, beyond social identification one’s initial behav-
ior is highly predictive of how an individual reacts to peer effects. The results also suggest that initial 
behavior represents a trait that is consistent and robust to the exposure to peer effects: those who 
143 
 
decided to behave (un)ethically in the first place are likely to remain (un)ethical, only to a more pro-
nounced extent. We do not observe behavioral heterogeneity across gender. The table A3 below il-
lustrates our results. In addition to analyzing the magnitude of behavioral change, we find the 
same robust results when looking at the drivers of behavioral contagion in general. Results 
using logit estimations are reported in Appendix A4. What is more, we find similarly robust 
results when further subdividing No Contagion into those who were invariant to the ob-
served behavior and thus did not react at all and those who reacted but changed their be-
havior into the opposite direction of what they have observed (anti-contagion). We apply a 
multinomial logit regression and report results in Appendix A5. 
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A3: Amount Revised (%) as a function of social identification and observed unethicality. Model 1 and 5 (Model 2 and 6) tests for the effect of the treatments (of observed unethicality) while 
controlling for initial behavior and the observed adaptation gap. Model 3 (Model 7) tests for both treatment effects and observed unethicality simultaneously.  Model 4 (Model 8) adds controls 
for gender and some interaction terms as well as the number of interest. In order to rule out any endogenous concerns and stress the effectiveness of exogenous variation of social proximity 
we also add dummies for the dating website questions. None of the dummies turn out significant in neither model specification, thus emphasizing the robustness of our results.
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A4: Examination of the adaptation gap (%) using Logit estimations. Participants who did not revise their initial decision 
are treated as adaptation gap = 100%.  
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A5: Examination of the drivers of behavioral contagion using a multinomial logistic regression. Behavior of participants 
who revised their initial decision but into the opposite direction of what they have observed from their peer is treated 
as anti-contagion (repulsion). 
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Following the regression results, our results also speak to the idea that behavioral contagion seems 
to facilitate the magnitude of (un)ethical behavior rather than changing individual behavior to the 
better or worse, respectively. That is, those who behaved (un)ethically in the first place become even 
more (un)ethical after being exposed to their peers. This is true for both revision of one’s initial 
amount and the reduction of the adaptation gap to one’s peer. In more detail and in line with our 
previous results, this relation is more pronounced the more salient social identity to one’s peers is 
and in particular in the unethical domain. This is additional support for our hypothesis H1 that un-
ethical behavior is more contagious than ethical behavior. We find similar results for those who de-
cided to keep the fair equal split in the beginning, while the behavioral change of those who donated 
initially seem not to be susceptible to changes in social identity. The figure below illustrates results. 
 
A6: The upper (lower) graph depicts the amount revised (%) (adaptation gap (%)) conditional on initial behavior broken 
down by social proximity. This figure depicts the percentage of initial behavior revised as a function of the participant’s 
initial behavior and broken down into different social identity categories. Essentially, the figure illustrates the magni-
tude and direction of behavioral contagion after observing the passive peer conditional on one’s initial decision prior 
to having observed a peer.  
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B:  Social Identity Statements  
1. I am a reliable person. 
2. I am interested in politics and/or economics. 
3. Money is important to me. 
4. I am an honest and sincere person. 
5. I am a cinephile. 
6. I am interested in sports. 
7. I am a religious person and faith is important to me. 
8. I am fond of animals. 
9. I am interested in art and/or cultures. 
10. I am an active and adventurous person. 
11. I am interested in cars and/or technology. 
12. I am fond of children and family-oriented. 
13. I am interested in foreign languages and/or countries. 
14. I am a warmhearted and helpful person. 
15. I am a tolerant person. 
16. I like to gossip. 
17. I am a faithful person. 
18. I play an instrument. 
19. I like to go out and dance. 
20. I am a goal-oriented person. 
21. I spend a lot of time in front of the TV. 
22. I am a sociable person and like to be among people.  
23. I like to play videogames. 
24. I am a humorous and entertaining person. 
25. I am a strong-willed person. 
 
Average amount of chosen statements (across all treatments): 15.8 (63%) 
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C:  Experimental Instructions 
 
General Information on the Experiment 
 First of all, we would like to thank you very much for participating in this experiment. 
Please read the instructions carefully. The experiment will last for about 45-60 
minutes.  
 
 During the entire experiment, no communication is allowed. If there is something you 
do not understand or if you have any questions, now or at some point during the ex-
periment, please raise your hand and remain seated. One of our colleagues will come 
to you and answer your question. 
 
 During the experiment, you have the possibility to earn money. The amount you will 
receive at the end of the session depends on how many “Taler” you earn during the 
experiment.  
 
 At the end of the experiment, the amount of “Taler“ that you have earned will be con-
verted into real money at an exchange rate of 20 Taler = 1 Euro.  
 
 All decisions you make during this experiment will remain anonymous. None of the 
participants gets to know the identity of other participants in the experiment and de-
cisions cannot be linked to a specific participant.  Moreover, you will be paid anony-
mously at the end of the experiment. 
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Order of Events: 
 The experiment consists of a list of statements that you will receive at the beginning 
and further decisions. Explanations and information related to these decisions will be 
given as the experiment progresses. You will make these decisions once.  
 
 Both you as well as a charitable organization of your choice (i.e. an officially regis-
tered charity organization) will be provisionally assigned a monetary amount of 300 
Taler each.  
 
 During the experiment you will have to decided on whether you want to…  
 … take a part or all of the money from the charitable organization. 
 … leave the division of the sum of money as it is. 
 … give a part or all of your money to the charitable organization.  
 
 In case you decide to take money from the charitable organization, the respective 
amount of money will be transferred to your individual cash account and exactly the 
same amount will be deducted from the cash account of the charitable organization.   
 
 Should you decide to give money to the charitable organization of your choice, the 
respective amount of money will be deducted from your individual cash account and 
given to the charity. The experimenter will double all ECUs remaining in the charity’s 
account at the end of the experiment. 
 
 Your decision remains anonymous and neither the other participants of the experi-
ment nor the experimenters have the possibility to assign your choices to your iden-
tity.  
 
 At the end of the experiment, one participant will be chosen at random and his or her 
choice will be implemented and count towards the charity (i.e. that choice will be rel-
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evant for the payment). In particular, we will double the respective amount and do-
nate it to the charity after the experiment ends. The receipt of this donation will be 
published on the homepage of the BaER-Lab (www.baer-lab.org) in a timely manner. 
All other participants will receive 150 Taler (including the show-up fee) at the end of 
the experiment.   
 
 The total payoff of the participants:  
 In case you are the randomly chosen participant 
300 Taler +/- the amount of money that has been given to/taken from the cash 
account of the charitable organization 
 In case you are not the randomly chosen participant 
150 Taler 
 
 The total payoff of the charitable organization:  
 (Amount of money in the cash account of the charitable organization of the ran-
domly chosen participant) × 2 
 
 At the end of the experiment, the relevant information on the payment will be made 
visible to each participant on his or her screen.  
 
 After the actual experiment concludes, we will ask you to fill out a questionnaire. 
Please fill out the questionnaire carefully and truthfully. 
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D:  Screenshots of Decision Screens 
 
1. List of statements: generates the proximity measure in all treatments 
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2. First decision: behaving (un)ethically 
 
 
 
 
(Exemplarily for the taking away decision) 
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3. Observation of one’s peer and potential revision of one’s initial decision 
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Important: treatments vary by the information on the social proximity measure (first box): unknown similarity (Baseline), more similar (Treatment 
1), less similar (Treatment 2). 
 
 
 
(Exemplarily for revision of one’s initial decision)
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ABSTRACT: 
This paper experimentally investigates indirect tax evasion that requires the cooperation of 
an intermediary.  We explore the eﬀectiveness of the introduction of a principal witness reg-
ulation as a means to facilitate tax compliance. Reactions show a significant drop in tax 
compliance that, surprisingly, is vastly diﬀerent across gender with the eﬀect being mainly 
driven by women. As a result, women decrease their tax compliance significantly reaching 
an even lower level than men who in turn do not react to the institutional change. 
 
KEYWORDS: Tax Evasion, Gender Differences, Principal Witness Regulation 
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* University of Trento. 
** University of Cologne. 
*** University of Pennsylvania. Corresponding author. 
157 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Illicit behavior, such as tax evasion, induces negative externalities on both the economic 
and societal level. Understanding its drivers and implementing suitable institutional 
measures to curb its severity has been at the center of past decade’s theoretical, empirical 
and experimental research. Beyond theoretical exercises such as the seminal work of Alling-
ham and Sandmo (1972), research that analyzes tax evasion experimentally has been grow-
ing, although with a particular focus on income tax evasion only (for a recent discussion see 
Alm (2012)). Other forms of tax evasion, like indirect tax evasion or the evasion of taxes that 
are in some way collected through the direct intermediation of a tax oﬃcer, e.g. some kind 
of custom duties, have almost completely been neglected by the experimental literature. In 
many countries, the introduction of the principal witness regulation (PWR) represents an 
integral institutional feature aiming at suppressing criminal behavior. In this paper, we are 
interested in examining the role of PWR in tax evasion behavior. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first experiment studying the influence of an insti-
tutional change in the form of a PWR on tax compliance when taxes are indirect. Tax com-
pliance, although almost exclusively referring to direct taxes, has been studied extensively 
in the literature, however, indirect tax evasion has been almost completely neglected. We 
contribute to this literature by shedding light on how indirect tax evasion is aﬀected by the 
specifics of the strategic interaction, a dimension not present in a setting with direct taxes. 
We use a controlled laboratory experiment modeling a tax reporting scenario with indirect 
taxes that require the interaction between two parties, the tax payer (TP) and the tax oﬃcer 
(TO). First, TPs repeatedly report taxes over the course of 10 rounds after which we intro-
duce the principal witness regulation (PWR). The experiment then continues for another 10 
rounds under this modified regime. 
The goal of this study is twofold: First, we seek to analyze tax compliance behavior when 
taxes are indirect. Second, we investigate the eﬀects of an institutional change via the intro-
duction of a PWR on tax compliance and collusive behavior. We find that the introduction of 
a PWR induces an initial drop in tax compliance coupled with a reversal in trends before and 
after the institutional change occurs. While compliance is at a decline in the absence of a 
PWR we see a steady increase of tax declarations in the periods following the institutional 
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change. Surprisingly the drop on the aggregate level is mainly driven by female participants. 
In fact, males’ tax evasion propensity is not aﬀected by the new regime, while females’ tax 
compliance significantly decreases, to a level even below that of males. 
We find a significant decrease of compliance as a reaction to the introduction of a PWR, 
hence providing evidence that the institutional frame aﬀects tax compliance. Gender diﬀer-
ences have been repeatedly demonstrated in various domains such as risk preferences, so-
cial preferences, lying behavior (Childs, 2012), and honesty (Muehlheusser, et al., 2015). For 
example, Hasseldine and Hite (2003) study framing eﬀects in tax compliance and find a sig-
nificant frame by gender interaction indicating a stronger reaction to changes in framing for 
women. We surprisingly observe that woman strongly react to the institutional change while 
men’s behavior seems mostly unaﬀected indicating vastly diﬀerent behavior across gender. 
Our results add to the growing body of evidence on gender diﬀerences within the frame of 
choice under risk and strategic uncertainty, and provide further evidence to the idea that 
women are generally more sensitive to the contextual frame. An idea put forward in Croson 
and Gneezy (2009) where it is argued that gender diﬀerences can often be explained by a 
higher sensitivity of women to the contextual frame. 
 
3.2.2 Experimental Design 
We use a simple tax reporting game with indirect taxes collected through an intermediary, 
the tax oﬃcer (TO), and hence tax payers (TP) require the cooperation of a third party to 
evade taxes. The experiment consists of a total of 20 rounds. In each of the rounds 1 to 10 
subjects play the tax reporting game, we henceforth refer to this first phase as “Ph1”. After 
10 rounds subjects are informed through a detailed description on the screen about the in-
troduction of a PWR. That is, we use a within variation of an institutional setting to study the 
eﬀect of a PWR on tax compliance. Rounds 11 to 20 were played in this modified environ-
ment, i.e. in each of the rounds 11 to 20 subjects played the tax reporting game with PWR, 
we henceforth refer to this second phase as “Ph2”. Subjects were informed in the instruc-
tions that the existing institution may be subject to change but no information regarding the 
nature of the change was provided. Subjects were randomly assigned either the role of a TP 
or that of a TO. Each TO was randomly assigned 3 TPs and that assignment remained fixed 
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throughout the experiment. For Ph1, the course of events is as follows: TPs receive an in-
come of 80 ECU that has to be declared to the tax authorities represented by the (assigned) 
TO. Declared income is subject to a tax rate of 50%. An incorrect declaration of less than the 
full income requires the cooperation of the TO and can be accompanied by a bribe between 
1 and 30 ECU that is oﬀered to the TO. The TO receives the tax declarations together with 
potential bribes of the three TPs assigned to her. She then decides to individually accept or 
reject each of the incorrect reports together with potential bribes. The rejection of a bribe 
implies the rejection of the untruthful tax report, forcing the TP to truthfully declare taxes. 
Correct declarations are automatically accepted. With an exogenous probability of 20%, a 
TP’s declaration is audited and incorrect reports are detected resulting in a fine for the TP 
that equals 125% of the evaded tax amount (maximal 50 ECU). See Figure 1 for a detailed 
game tree. 
For Ph2, the course corresponds to that of Ph1, with the exception of the existence of a PWR 
option. We model the PWR by adding an additional stage following detection of an incorrect 
tax report through an audit. The PWR oﬀers the TP the opportunity to denounce his TO and 
correct the report, i.e. to truthfully declare taxes, without incurring an additional monetary 
punishment. A denounced TO on the other hand incurs a fine that equals the bribe received 
from the respective TP plus an additional 10 ECU. The TOs income per round consists of 
three components: a fixed wage of 50 ECU, a commission of 15 % of the taxes collected from 
the three TPs assigned to her, and the bribes she accepted. In Ph2, a TO might also incur a 
fine that is deducted from her income in that particular round. 
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Figure 1: Game tree depicting interaction between TO and single TP within a single round. Blue stage is only available in 
PWR. D denotes taxes declared, b bribes oﬀered, p the probability of an audit, t the tax rate. For the sake of a 
simpler exposition the PO’s fixed wage of 50 is not depicted. 
 
In order to make tax evasion more salient in the laboratory setting, we introduce a third 
party that incurs a monetary damage as a result of tax evasion. That is, tax evasion in the 
experiment translates into an actual social welfare loss outside the lab (see Eckel and Gross-
man (1996); Lambsdorﬀ and Frank (2010)). The final payoﬀ of each subject was determined 
as the sum of all earnings over the 20 rounds converted to Euro at a rate of 100 ECU = €0.7. 
All participants were paid their final payoﬀ plus an additional show-up fee of €3 in cash at 
the end of the experiment. The experiment was conducted with a total of 128 undergraduate 
students at the Computable and Experimental Laboratory at the University of Trento. Ses-
sions averaged 60 minutes and consisted 20 rounds followed by an incentivized risk-elicita-
tion task (Holt & Laury, 2002) and a questionnaire. Average earning was €12. 
 
3.2.3 Predictions and Hypothesis 
Consider the interactions within a single round between a single TP and a TO, both assumed 
to be risk-neutral expected payoﬀ-maximizers. In this one- shot scenario a TP optimally de-
clares zero taxes independently of the presence of a PWR. In contrast, experimental evi-
dence suggests that in one-shot scenarios subjects tax compliance is well above zero, but 
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oftentimes declines over time when decisions are made repeatedly, thus approaching the 
one-shot equilibrium prediction. Further, in order to forgo punishment, a TP should always 
denounce the TO in Ph2. The TO, anticipating this behavior, optimally raises her acceptance 
threshold for bribes from 6 ECU in Ph1 to 10 ECU in Ph2. Intuitively, the introduction of a 
PWR oﬀers the TP a “safe way out” eﬀectively reducing the risk faced when evading taxes, 
while on the other hand exposing the TO to a risk of being denounced and fined.  Due to risk-
aversion we thus expect tax compliance to be lower when PWR is implemented. 
The literature suggests that there is ample gender heterogeneity with respect to both risk 
taking in general and particularly engaging in risky unethical behavior within contexts of or 
similar to tax evasion. Existing research indicates that males have a tendency to be less risk-
averse and engage in illicit behavior more often than women (cf. Croson and Gneezy (2009); 
Torgler and Valev (2010); Banuri and Eckel (2012)). We thus expect male participants to 
evade more taxes, than their female counterparts do. 
 
3.2.4 Results and Discussion 
We first compare tax compliance behavior before and after the introduction of a PWR. Fig 2 
shows a significant decrease of mean tax declarations as a reaction to the institutional 
change from 20.18 ECU in Ph1 to 14.89 ECU in Ph2 coupled with a reversal in trends.1 On 
average, tax compliance was 5.3 ECU lower in Ph1 as compared to Ph2 (p < 0.001).2 The in-
troduction of a PWR oﬀers the TP a safe way out eﬀectively reducing the risk when evading 
taxes, and furthermore shifts responsibility to the TO potentially also reducing the TP’s psy-
chological costs of evading taxes, which then results in lower compliance in Ph2. We now 
analyze the evolution of tax compliance behavior over time. In Ph1, prior to the institutional 
change, the slope shown in Fig. 2 is negative, thus indicating an acceleration of tax evasion 
over time. However, after the PWR has been introduced in Ph2, we observe that now the 
slope is positive, with the reversal in slopes being highly significant (p = 0.0021).3 Our results 
                                                             
1 It is worth noting that simply looking at average behavior disguises the participant’s actual behavior in the experiment. 
Analyzing the development of behavior across rounds yields that behavior is not stationary but rather approaches a 
steady-state over time. We thus report both, averages and trends in order to strengthen the robustness of our results. 
2 Unless noted otherwise, we use Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for all mean comparisons within subject using individual 
averages for Ph1 and Ph2. 
3 We examine differences in trend using OLS estimations with a standard error correction that accounts for repeated game 
effects. Indicated p-values are obtained using post-hoc estimation tests. 
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suggest that the eﬀect of the institutional change is twofold: First, we observe a negative 
short term eﬀect resulting from a drop in mean compliance directly after the PWR is intro-
duced. Second, the decline in compliance over time observed in Ph1 is halted, and even re-
versed, in the periods following the institutional change (see Fig. 2). We interpret the rever-
sal in trends for compliance as an indicator for a potential positive long-term eﬀect from 
introducing a PWR.4 
 
Figure 2: The top figure displays the average tax declared in Ph1 and Ph2 pooled on the individual level. The bottom figure 
shows the evolution of tax declarations over time. 
 
Let us now consider the amount of bribes paid.  As expected we observe a behavioral break 
following the introduction of the PWR resulting in an upwards shift of bribes paid in Ph2. The 
average amount of bribes paid before and after introducing a PWR were 12.98 ECU and 14.63 
                                                             
4 In a control treatment, an additional 36 subjects have played Ph1 for 20 consecutive rounds without introducing a PWR. 
The findings suggest a gradual decline in tax compliance behavior, thus strengthening our findings related to the impact 
of a PWR on tax compliance. Results are made available in the Appendix A1. 
163 
 
ECU (p = 0.0283), respectively. Evidently, taxpayers acknowledge the higher risk that public 
oﬃcials have to bear after the introduction of the PWR and, at least partially, compensate 
them with higher bribes. As argued in Section 3.2.3, a rational TO optimally rejects all bribes 
below 6 ECU in Ph1, and respectively below 10 ECU in Ph1. We use the minimal bribe ac-
cepted per round by a TO as an indicator for this acceptance threshold. As expected, we find 
that the threshold for acceptance increases from 14.53 in Ph1 to 16.27 in Ph2, although not 
significant (p = 0.164).5 Again there is evidence of a dynamic diﬀerence, in Ph1 the threshold 
stays constant (with an insignificant downward trend), whereas it increases significantly in 
Ph2 (p = 0.027). Again, we observe that behavior is not stationary across periods but dynam-
ically converges to a lower (higher) level in Ph1 (Ph2), suggesting that convergence takes 
place. 
It is not among the specific aims of this paper to investigate the frequency of TOs denounc-
ing corrupted POs, nevertheless it may be interesting to report that on average TOs de-
nounced in 28.62 % of the possible cases. There were no diﬀerences between gender. 
Notably, our experiment yields surprising results with respect to how differently male and 
female participants respond to the introduction of a PWR. The main results on gender diﬀer-
ences are summarized in Figure 3 illustrating the mean declared taxes in Ph1 and Ph2 bro-
ken down by gender, and the development of mean declared taxes by gender over rounds. 
Previous studies (see e.g., Kastlunger et al. (2010); Torgler and Valev (2010)) found women 
to be less inclined to be corrupt or evade taxes. For Ph1 (Ph2), our results indicate an aver-
age tax compliance of 21.2 ECU and 19.2 ECU (13.1 ECU and 16.5 ECU), for females and males 
respectively. Pooled over 20 rounds, we observe a mean tax compliance of 17.2 ECU (17.9 
ECU) for females (males). In accordance with the literature in Ph1 women are slightly more 
compliant than men, but become slightly less compliant compared to their male counter-
parts when a PWR is introduced. Across gender, diﬀerences in general tax compliance are 
not significant, thus indicating that tendencies towards tax evasion are the same for females 
and males. Most surprisingly, however, we find a strong heterogeneity in reactions to the 
                                                             
5 In fact, when accounting for learning in behavior and thus only looking at the last 5 rounds of both Ph1 and Ph2, we see 
a weakly significant increase in averages in the threshold of accepted bribes from 13.3 ECU to 16.9 ECU (p = 0.063). 
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introduction of a PWR across gender. There is a highly significant drop in average tax com-
pliance for females by 8 ECU on average (p < 0.01), whereas changes in average behavior for 
males are small (2.7 ECU) and insignificant (p = 0.34). In addition, we observe a highly signif-
icant change in slopes for women (p < 0.01) and men (p < 0.01) respectively. Here, the change 
in slopes suggests that females and males react diﬀerently to the introduction of a PWR: 
females resort to a stationary high tax evasion behavior, while males gradually converge 
towards higher tax compliance. In sum, our findings suggest that women show a greater 
sensitivity in their reactions following the introduction of a PWR, which is both surprising 
and not completely in line with the existing economic literature. 
 
Figure 3: Average Tax Declared by Gender and Shock pooled on the individual level over rounds, and Evolution of Tax 
Declarations over rounds by gender. 
 
In what follows, we should discuss factors that could drive our surprising results. The exper-
imental design adopted in our study included two main factors that potentially play a role 
in explaining female participants’ reactions to the implemented institutional change. The 
first ingredient is risk (to be fined) and the second one is the institutional setting adopted to 
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mimic the decisional frame. For one, a general diﬀerence in risk attitudes across gender 
could potentially explain the significant drop in female tax compliance after the introduc-
tion of a PWR, since by the design the PWR sharply reduces the risk of deviant behavior. 
However, our results survive and remain highly significant when controlling for individual 
risk aversion attitudes. For another, Lighthall et al. (2009) study how stress aﬀects decision 
making under risk and find that overall men take more risk than females, but interestingly 
stress increases risk-taking for men, whereas women become more risk-averse. In Preston 
et al. (2007), using a diﬀerent stress manipulation, it is shown that stress induces male par-
ticipants to perform worse, while female participants perform better under stress in the 
Iowa Gambling Task, a task shown to measure eﬃciency in decision making under uncer-
tainty. Assuming that stress aﬀects females and males diﬀerently, we can interpret our re-
sults as an “inverted stress eﬀect”. In Ph1 TOs were aware that the decision to evade exposes 
them to the risk of being punished, a burden they had to bear alone. In Ph2, the PWR pro-
vides a possibility to avoid a severe sentence after tax evasion is detected, thus providing a 
“save way out” that potentially creates an environment that is perceived as less stressful. 
One would therefore expect women to engage in higher risk-taking in the less stressful en-
vironment after the introduction of a PWR, whereas risk-taking of men would be expected 
to decrease. The exposure to risk is generally higher in Ph1 than in Ph2, and hence risk-aver-
sion would lead to a decrease in compliance from Ph1 to Ph2. As a consequence, a reduction 
in stress would amplify this tendency for women, while it might counteract a potential eﬀect 
of stress for men. This might explain we do not observe an increase in compliance for males. 
However, our reasoning remains speculative as there is, to the best of our knowledge, no 
existing research on the interrelations between stress, risk aversion, and gender diﬀerences. 
This offers a potential venue for future research. 
A second reason could be that the sudden institutional change aﬀects women more strongly 
than men, which is in line with (Croson & Gneezy, 2009) who argued that females are more 
sensitive to the contextual frame. The introduction of a PWR renders the TO formally re-
sponsible, hence creating a situation where the responsibility (and risk) is shared among TP 
and TO. This new distribution of responsibility might enhance the wiggle-room for misbe-
havior on the side of the females. This second interpretation can be considered as further 
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evidence that gender eﬀects might oftentimes stem from a higher sensitivity of women to 
the institutional environment. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
Our examination represents the first attempt to shed light on the eﬀective- ness of the prin-
cipal witness regulation utilizing a controlled laboratory setting. We extend the general tax 
evasion framework by adding a dimension of strategic interaction that allows us to capture 
a broader spectrum of tax evasion contexts. Our findings suggest that the introduction of 
such a policy measure has a negative short-term eﬀect of decreased compliance, but at the 
same time induces a reversal in the dynamic adjustment over time that hints upon a poten-
tial positive long-term eﬀect of a principal witness regulation on tax compliance. In contrast 
to the literature, we do not find women to be generally more compliant than men, however, 
there is considerable gender heterogeneity in terms of responsiveness to the introduced in-
stitutional change: women over-proportionally react to the introduction of a PWR by reduc-
ing tax compliance, while the results suggest that men react with a gradual increase of tax 
compliance. Our results yield important policy implications. While the introduction of a 
principal witness regulation not only yields limited eﬀectiveness in mitigating tax evasion, 
its eﬀectiveness is also highly gender specific and should thus be regarded in policy deci-
sion-making. 
 
167 
 
3.2.6 Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Average tax compliance in an additional control treatment (N=36).  
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